As the BRICS grouping continues its evolution from a loose economic alliance into a potentially transformative geopolitical force, attention is turning to its future in Asia.
With founding members China and India playing pivotal roles, and with recent expansions welcoming countries such as Iran and the United Arab Emirates, speculation abounds as to which Asian nations might be next to join—and what that could mean for the region’s balance of power.
For Asian countries outside the current BRICS framework, the stakes are high. Membership could mean enhanced access to financial resources, a larger voice in global institutions, and strengthened ties with emerging powers. But aligning with BRICS also comes with its complexities, especially amid the group’s increasingly assertive stance against Western-dominated global governance.
Current setup and BRICS expansion
BRICS, initially comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, was formed as an informal bloc of emerging economies. In recent years, however, it has taken steps towards institutionalisation. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), proposals for alternative financial systems, and a growing list of summits and declarations suggest a group aiming to challenge the status quo and US dollar-led dominance of global financial institutions.
In 2024, BRICS expanded to include a number of new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE. Saudi Arabia, while once expected to join at the start of 2024 has delayed its final decision to join although it is expected to join at some point in the near future.
Then, in late October 2024, 13 more countries predominantly from Southeast Asia, Africa and South America were invited to take part in a "partner country" role.[
This expansion reflects a new ambition—to offer an alternative to Western-led institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, and to amplify the voice of the Global South.
For many South and Southeast Asian countries watching from the sidelines in particular, BRICS now appears more than a club of emerging economies—it is a geopolitical project with clout.
Asian nations watch closely
Asia is home to several fast-growing economies, many of which feel underrepresented in global decision-making bodies. These include Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia.
The idea of a multipolar world, long championed by BRICS members like Russia and China, to this end, resonates across the region.
Moreover, initiatives like the NDB, and discussions about a BRICS digital currency or alternative payment systems, could offer practical benefits. For countries wary of dollar dependency or Western sanctions, BRICS presents an opportunity for strategic diversification, particularly with President Trump’s recent talk of tariffs that has been taken as an affront to established trading practices by much of Asia.
Yet, joining BRICS also means navigating complex diplomatic waters. The presence of both India and China—two Asian giants with an often tense relationship—adds a layer of geopolitical sensitivity to any potential accession. That the US is also watching closely adds a further element of tension to any decision to align more closely with BRICS at any level.
Next in line
While BRICS has not formally announced a timeline or criteria for future enlargement, several Asian countries have expressed interest or are seen as strong candidates.
1. Malaysia
Malaysia has not made public overtures towards BRICS, but analysts point to its foreign policy independence and its active role in the Muslim world as factors that could favour future alignment. With growing trade ties to China and India, as well as an economy integrated into global supply chains, Kuala Lumpur could be tempted by the economic and strategic benefits of BRICS.
However, internal political stability over gas production and exports of late as well as regional leadership aspirations within ASEAN might influence the timing and terms of any such move.
2. Bangladesh
Bangladesh formally expressed interest in joining BRICS and has applied to become a member. The country has enjoyed strong economic growth over the past decade despite a long-time president fleeing to India in mid-2024, and issues in paying fuel bills that are only now being paid off. As such, Dhaka sees BRICS as a potential platform to enhance trade, infrastructure finance, and geopolitical relevance, and given close ties to both Russia and China and cultural ties to neighbouring India could and should be welcomed with open arms by existing BRICS members.
Dhaka is particularly interested in the development opportunities linked to the NDB and its potential to finance large-scale infrastructure without the political conditionalities often associated with Western lenders.
However, some observers caution that aligning too closely with BRICS could risk alienating key Western donors, on whom Bangladesh still relies for some aid and trade access in certain sectors.
3. Pakistan
Pakistan has long voiced support for multipolarism and has strong bilateral ties with China, a key BRICS member. However, its fraught relationship with India complicates any immediate pathway to membership and this has only been compounded by the recent outbreak of hostilities between New Delhi and Islamabad. The consensus-based nature of BRICS decision-making implies that India could block Pakistan’s entry, and New Delhi is unlikely to welcome Islamabad into a bloc where strategic coordination is paramount.
Nonetheless, Pakistan continues to participate in BRICS-affiliated forums and maintains close relations with Russia and China which helps keep the door open for future cooperation, even if full membership remains elusive.
4. Thailand
Thailand is another candidate with growing economic ties to China and a tradition of diplomatic flexibility. As one of the strongest economies in the Southeast Asia region it has been targeted by the US for participation in the Alaska LNG project, with Bangkok recently hinting that it could be in the market for up to 5mn tonnes per year of LNG from the US once the project is up and running. Though it has not publicly applied for BRICS membership, Thai officials have acknowledged monitoring the bloc’s development. The country’s participation in China-led initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative may also act as a stepping stone.
Bangkok’s alignment with the West, particularly through security ties with the United States, could pose obstacles. Nevertheless, Thailand’s leadership in ASEAN and its strategic geographic position make it a country to watch in BRICS-related discussions.
Challenges to Asian expansion
While BRICS expansion in Asia seems likely, it is not without challenges. Chief among them is the geopolitical tension between founding members India and China.
Their competition for regional influence may complicate consensus on new members, particularly from South Asia or Southeast Asia, where both powers have vested interests.
Additionally, many Asian countries maintain strong defence and economic ties with the United States and its allies. Joining BRICS may be seen as antagonistic, potentially drawing retaliation or reduced cooperation from Western partners.
There are also questions about the cohesion of BRICS itself. While the group champions multipolarity, its members often diverge on key international issues. New entrants will need to weigh whether BRICS membership offers tangible benefits or merely symbolic alignment.
Risks for Asia
To this end, as of mid-2025, for Asia, BRICS represents both an opportunity and a dilemma.
The opportunity lies in reshaping the global order in favour of regional emerging economies and reducing reliance on Western-dominated institutions. The dilemma is balancing these aspirations with existing partnerships and internal dynamics.
For countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, joining BRICS could open doors to alternative finance, expanded trade networks, and enhanced global visibility. For others, such as Thailand and Malaysia, the calculus may be more cautious—concerned about being seen as shifting sides in an increasingly polarised world.
Moreover, BRICS expansion could reshape Asia’s multilateral architecture. If more ASEAN countries join, it could challenge ASEAN’s consensus-driven model.
If South Asian countries align more closely with BRICS, the subcontinent could witness further divergence in geopolitical orientation.
As BRICS morphs into a broader platform for the Global South, Asia’s engagement will be critical to its legitimacy and influence. Whether through full membership or strategic partnerships, more Asian countries are likely to join the BRICS conversation in the coming years.
But the path will be very complex. Every potential member will need to balance economic incentives with diplomatic consequences, and weigh the promise of a multipolar future against the reality of current alliances.
For now, BRICS is expanding. But how it navigates Asia’s diverse political landscape will determine whether it becomes a truly global alternative, or just another, albeit international, geopolitical club with lofty ambitions.