The upcoming BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, set to take place between July 6-7, will be a key milestone for the group’s evolving role on the global stage. Under the motto “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance,” Brazil’s pro tempore presidency seeks to address internal divisions, forge new institutional paths, and deepen cooperation across several critical domains. Yet the journey towards becoming the world’s most relevant grouping, with a Global South perspective, is anything but straightforward.

The complex dynamics of expansion and unity

Since its inception in 2009, BRICS has evolved from a loose coalition of emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—into a significantly larger and more complex organisation comprising 35% of the world’s GDP measured at purchasing power parity. After the latest expansion round, the bloc now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia. During the 2024 summit in Kazan, it has also created a “Partner Country” category, which now includes Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

This layered structure is a sign of growing interest in BRICS, but also introduces strategic, political, and economic complexities that challenge consensus-building, as shown by the recent failure to produce a joint declaration at the Rio Foreign Ministers Meeting.

According to my sources at Itamaraty, Brazil’s foreign ministry, no new full members will be added at the upcoming summit, with the focus instead on consolidating the previous expansion. This measured approach highlights a central dilemma: while broader inclusion enhances BRICS’ global legitimacy, it also makes internal coherence more difficult, as demonstrated by Egypt and Ethiopia’s resistance to language around UN reform.

Lula’s BRICS diplomacy: between idealism and realpolitik

President Lula da Silva has positioned Brazil as a diplomatic leader within BRICS, championing autonomy from the traditional US-led order. His recent visits to Russia and China demonstrate a calculated attempt to pivot Brazil towards a more assertive Global South alignment. In China, Lula celebrated over $5bn in bilateral agreements, including AI in agriculture, debt bonds in native currencies, and major infrastructure investments. Most notably, he took the occasion to advocate for an increase of trade in local currencies—a significant step towards de-dollarisation.

But Lula’s position contrasts with a significant conservative faction within Itamaraty that sees Brazil as integral part of the Western bloc, while his foreign policy is increasingly shaped by his international adviser Celso Amorim, a clear signal of simmering internal tensions. His visit to Russia, despite international criticism, further reaffirmed his commitment to an independent role in global diplomacy, attested by his attending Victory Day celebrations and engaging with President Vladimir Putin directly, even as Ukraine recalled its ambassador in protest.

The financial architecture challenge

Yet one of the biggest challenges for BRICS is turning its tough talk against the dominance of the US dollar into real, working alternatives. Plans for a BRICS cross-border payment system are still unfinished. While trading in local currencies has made progress—especially between China and Saudi Arabia or India and Russia—some members like India and the UAE remain hesitant. They worry that fully backing an alternative system would be seen as openly defying the Western financial order, which they are not ready to break away from entirely.

The 2023 Johannesburg Summit saw Lula advocate for a common BRICS currency, but technical, political, and institutional barriers persist. The Brazilian presidency now wisely focuses on practical initiatives such as task forces on currency use and trade facilitation, avoiding over-politicised messaging that could irk Washington and prompt more punitive tariffs.

The upcoming summit’s agenda on trade and finance, laid out in the Brazilian Concept Note, includes reforming the IMF and World Bank governance, expanding the use of the New Development Bank (NDB), and updating the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2030. Notably, the NDB, the de-facto BRICS Bank, continues to attract new members, such as Colombia, a candidate for BRICS membership, and Uzbekistan, further anchoring the burgeoning bloc in the Global South's development strategies.

Agenda of the 2025 Rio Summit

The 2025 summit’s agenda spans six thematic pillars: global health cooperation, trade and finance, climate change, AI governance, reform of peace and security structures, and BRICS institutional development. These are ambitious and deeply interconnected themes. For instance, climate change and financial reform converge in discussions on climate finance and the reform of multilateral development banks.

The AI governance pillar is particularly forward-looking. Brazil’s chairship calls for non-discriminatory access, ethical standards, and digital sovereignty—issues of particular concern to emerging economies. Similarly, the climate leadership agenda seeks to outline BRICS-wide principles for carbon accounting and climate technology cooperation, challenging areas where North-South disparities have long prevailed, just as Brazil readies to host the COP30 global climate change conference in November.

The emphasis on institutional development betrays the recognition that the current format—originally tailored for five members—struggles to accommodate 11 full members and 10 partners. Brazil proposes a task force to revise the BRICS Terms of Reference, a move that could help streamline operations and clarify the role of partner countries like Vietnam.

Vietnam’s entry and the rise of “Integration of Integrations”

Vietnam’s recent accession as a partner country signals the strategic depth BRICS aims to achieve through the "integration of integrations" approach. As an ASEAN member, Vietnam strengthens BRICS’ connections with Southeast Asia, aligning with previous partner entries from Thailand and Malaysia. This trend reflects a new geopolitical strategy: positioning BRICS as a hub for inter-regional cooperation, potentially mirroring a Global South version of the G20.

This move has major implications for future expansion. While Brazil resists new full members for now, analysts argue that Venezuela—holding the world’s largest oil reserves—should be considered, despite Brazil’s opposition. Bringing Venezuela into BRICS could concentrate 70% of global oil reserves within the bloc, but at the cost of increased US antagonism and internal friction.

China-CELAC engagement: parallel alliances and the regional rebalance

The recent CELAC-China Forum in Beijing underscored BRICS' larger ecosystem. With $9.2bn in new credit and growing investments, China – BRICS’ most powerful economy and leading force – is clearly building a trade corridor across Latin America. Colombia’s formal entry into the Belt and Road Initiative exemplifies this shift.

This expansion contrasts sharply with the Trump administration’s approach rooted in the Monroe Doctrine paradigm—hegemonic, transactional, and a shortage of investments. China provides infrastructure, trade, and even AI partnerships, while the US offers conditionality and geopolitical pressure. Lula’s statement during his Beijing visit—“China brings development; the US brings ideology”— best captures the prevailing sentiment in much of the Global South.

Internal contradictions and the road ahead

Still, despite its lofty ambitions, BRICS remains a motley crew of emerging markets with diverging national interests. India’s cautious stance on de-dollarisation, Egypt and Ethiopia’s resistance to UN reforms, and varying regional affiliations and animosities all hinder strategic alignment. The planned absence of key leaders—Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian—at the upcoming Rio Summit further weakens the group’s optics at a critical time.

Nevertheless, the commitment to advance flexible diplomatic language, create technical pathways for cooperation, and foster institutional consolidation are pragmatic steps in the right direction. The 2025 summit will be a continued test of BRICS’s ability to function as a cohesive entity despite its diversity.

Most likely, the Rio summit will not mark the culmination of a smooth path to global leadership, but rather another waypoint in a long, contested journey. BRICS aspires to be more than a geopolitical counterweight to the G7; it seeks to redefine the norms of multilateralism itself. But achieving relevance in a fragmented, multipolar world requires more than shared discontent with the current order. It demands vision, discipline, and institutional maturity.

As President Lula accurately put it, “BRICS is our possibility to change history a little.” That possibility remains alive—but not fully guaranteed.”