Nearly a year has passed since former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reportedly fled to India amidst widespread unrest and political pressure at home. Her sudden departure sent shockwaves through Dhaka’s political class and left the nation in a state of uncertainty. Today, Bangladesh finds itself at a crossroads - torn between competing regional influences and facing an uncertain political future.

What began as protests over alleged electoral manipulation and economic hardship quickly spiralled into a nationwide movement that paralysed key cities and shook the Awami League’s grip on power. The government’s response, marked by mass arrests, internet blackouts, and heavy-handed policing, only added fuel to the fire. Then, in early August 2024, after days of speculation, reports confirmed that Sheikh Hasina had left the country and was in India, under what sources at the time described as “informal diplomatic protection.”

Since then, the political vacuum has yet to be conclusively filled. The caretaker administration, backed by the military and nominally neutral, has struggled to maintain legitimacy, while the opposition - long suppressed - is fractured and lacks a unifying figure. Against this backdrop, the question looms: is Bangladesh charting its own course, or is it now being pulled in the geopolitical tug-of-war between India and China?

India’s quiet influence

India’s historical role in Bangladesh’s internal affairs is no secret. From supporting the country’s 1971 liberation war to backing successive governments, New Delhi has always had skin in the game. Sheikh Hasina, in particular, has long been viewed as a friendly ally of India—credited with improving cross-border cooperation on terrorism, trade, and water sharing.

As such, her arrival in India last year, reportedly under unofficial protection, has only reinforced suspicions of Indian involvement in Bangladeshi politics. Though the Indian government has maintained a policy of non-interference in public, its close coordination with Bangladesh’s security and diplomatic apparatus is evident and continues behind the scenes.

Indian analysts argue that a stable, secular, and India-friendly government in Dhaka is in New Delhi’s strategic interest, especially as tensions with China remain high across the region. Bangladesh’s geographic proximity to India’s sensitive northeastern states makes it a vital buffer. Moreover, India remains concerned about rising Islamist rhetoric among certain opposition factions in Bangladesh, some of whom are seen as having links to groups India, and Western powers deem extremist.

Yet, for many in Bangladesh, India’s influence, while often discreet, is deeply resented. Perceived Indian backing of the Awami League during past elections, its control over key water resources such as the Teesta River which enters Bangladesh in the Rangpur region, as well as trade imbalances have all fed public scepticism.

Bickering in recent months over power supplies through western Bangladesh and payment of bills has not helped.

Hasina’s flight to India has therefore stoked nationalist sentiment, with some accusing India of shielding an unpopular leader and meddling in Bangladesh’s sovereign affairs.

China’s expanding role

While India may hold historical and cultural sway, China’s presence in Bangladesh is growing in ways that are far more visible. Beijing has poured billions into infrastructure, energy, and digital connectivity projects under its contentious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Padma Bridge, telecommunications partnerships, and deepening defence cooperation are only the tip of the iceberg.

Following Hasina’s exit, China was quick to re-establish contact with the interim administration led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a 2006 Nobel Peace Prize recipient. In doing so, Beijing was offering economic support and public expressions of “non-interference.” Yet, few believe Beijing is truly disinterested.

As with all countries linked to its BRI, China views Bangladesh as a strategic node in the Indian Ocean, crucial for its regional logistics and counterbalancing India’s influence in South Asia. That Bangladesh has direct access to the bay of Bengal is of great interest to China.

Some reports even suggest that Chinese officials have been actively lobbying Dhaka’s power brokers to keep Bangladesh within its economic orbit, particularly through debt diplomacy and strategic investments in ports and power stations. For the military-led caretaker government of Yunus, Chinese funding and diplomatic cover offer a tempting lifeline as it navigates international pressure and economic instability.

However, such dependence comes at a price.

Critics warn that Bangladesh risks becoming over-leveraged, both financially and diplomatically. The example of Sri Lanka to the Southwest, plunged into its own debt crisis partly on the back of Chinese loans serves as a cautionary tale.

A country caught in the middle

For ordinary Bangladeshis, the geopolitical calculations of New Delhi and Beijing offer little comfort amid rising inflation, declining foreign reserves, and political repression. Power supply too is a worrying issue although Dhaka has in recent months paid off a substantial portion of its outstanding fuel debts.

Trust in democratic institutions in the country remains fragile and for good reason.

Bangladesh is a nation in need of a credible, transparent political process that restores faith in governance. The interim government’s promise of new elections has yet to materialise meaningfully, and both India and China must be cautious not to be seen as kingmakers.

The world is watching. But for Bangladeshis, the real question is no longer just about Hasina’s exit - but about who truly governs their future.