Azerbaijan's foreign ministry has launched a full-spectrum charm offensive, declaring itself the emerging "bridge" between the Global South and the West. 

In practice, however, the self-congratulatory tone masks a shallow diplomatic agenda that is more performative than strategic.

At a parliamentary committee meeting in May titled "The Rise of the Global South and the West: Azerbaijan's Role, Cooperation, and New Opportunities for Development”, Deputy Foreign Minister Yalchin Rafiyev showcased a laundry list of summits, leadership roles and rhetorical alignments designed to portray Baku as a hub of global multilateralism.

Next year, Azerbaijan will host both the Islamic Cooperation Organisation (OIC) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summits. It is also chairing the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) summit and claims to champion UN Security Council reform in favour of the Global South. Yet, beyond hosting rotating events and issuing statements of solidarity, Azerbaijan has shown little institutional depth or policy consistency in translating such platforms into durable leadership.

Rafiyev praised Azerbaijan’s role in supporting countries of the Global South and emphasised Baku’s commitment to multilateralism, including its chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement. The country has indeed organised high-profile forums, and made headlines during its COP29 climate summit chairmanship by claiming to have secured a commitment for $300bn in climate finance for developing countries. But the verifiability and long-term implementation of such pledges remain unclear, especially in the absence of any enforcement or follow-up mechanism.

The foreign ministry’s narrative presents Azerbaijan as a neutral actor rooted in international law. Rafiyev cited Baku's 'balanced' stance on India-Pakistan relations and expectations that third parties, including India, avoid undermining the fragile normalisation with Armenia. However, the notion of Azerbaijan as a legalist, impartial actor sits uneasily with its own record of coercive diplomacy, grey-zone influence operations and growing authoritarianism at home.

Rafiyev and other speakers repeatedly framed Azerbaijan as a geopolitical "bridge" between West and East, North and South. This trope conveniently allows Baku to claim strategic centrality while avoiding hard alignment or accountability. Meanwhile, Baku has prioritised symbolic diplomacy over substantive reform: its proposed changes to the UN Security Council (UNSC) champion a rotating seat for the OIC and NAM but exclude specifics on accountability, veto reform or enforcement powers.

Baku’s Global South outreach has focused heavily on African states, citing political consultations with Ethiopia, Guinea and Somalia, and upcoming plans with Congo and Zimbabwe. But these ties remain mostly ceremonial. The foreign ministry's triumphalist tone obscures the limited bilateral trade, development cooperation or institutional capacity underpinning these engagements.

Azerbaijan’s frequent invocation of the Global South’s economic rise, citing BRICS expansion and the Global South’s rising share of the world’s GDP, feels more like rhetorical opportunism than principled solidarity. Its foreign trade remains heavily dependent on Europe and Russia, and its most ambitious connectivity initiatives (like the Middle Corridor) are funded by external actors such as China or the EU.

The Azerbaijani government portrays its regional and global activism as part of President Ilham Aliyev's leadership in a new world order. Yet this framing repackages authoritarian consolidation and transactional diplomacy as visionary foreign policy. Azerbaijan’s parliament, filled with ruling party loyalists, echoed this narrative with claims about parliamentary diplomacy, geopolitical balance, and universal principles, despite the country's declining democratic indicators and growing press restrictions.

European actors appear increasingly susceptible to Baku's multilateral theatre. In their eagerness to present Azerbaijan as a reliable energy alternative to Russia, EU institutions and member states risk enabling the Aliyev regime's domestic repression. The absence of meaningful repercussions for the arrest of journalists, activists and opposition voices only emboldens Baku further. Since November 2023, more than 20 journalists have been arrested in groups in Azerbaijan on smuggling and other charges. According to reports prepared by local human rights organisations, there are currently at least 350 political prisoners in Azerbaijan. The energy partnership narrative provides convenient cover for a government that continues to consolidate authoritarian control while projecting itself as a responsible regional stakeholder.

In sum, Azerbaijan’s Global South rhetoric serves more to bolster its international image than to deliver meaningful geopolitical or development outcomes. Unless matched by transparent governance, diversified diplomacy, and policy coherence, Baku’s multilateral posture will remain what it currently is: a performance staged for international audiences and regional powerbrokers.