Southeast Asia stands at the crossroads of a great power competition, with the interests of global actors like the United States and Russia intersecting with the priorities of dynamic regional players.

Although both nations have engaged with the region historically and continue to do so in the present day, their roles, influence, and staying power differ markedly.

Of the two, Russia appears to be the actor on the wane, while the United States, though not without its own challenges, retains a broader, deeper, and more sustainable foothold in Southeast Asia.

The United States: strategic pillar, longstanding partner

The United States has maintained a robust presence in Southeast Asia since the aftermath of World War II, with its involvement in the region spanning military, economic, and diplomatic spheres. While its Cold War policies were dominated by attempts to stem the spread of communism - most notably in Vietnam - the post-Cold War era saw Washington shift its emphasis toward promoting free markets, democratic governance, and regional security partnerships.

As a result, today, Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy relies on Southeast Asia as a focal point in its rivalry with China. Key alliances and partnerships, particularly with the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, support American objectives of preserving freedom of navigation, countering terrorism, and promoting economic development.

In the main, US engagement in the region manifests through:

1. Military cooperation: The United States maintains a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the Philippines and conducts regular joint exercises like “Balikatan.” It also has access arrangements with Singapore and engages in security dialogues with several ASEAN nations. These activities reassure regional allies, project power, and provide a counterbalance to Chinese maritime assertiveness in the region.

2. Economic engagement: Though Washington withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it has since advanced alternative frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). In this regard, American corporations are now active investors in ASEAN economies, particularly in high-tech sectors, services, and manufacturing.

3. Soft power and diplomacy: The United States invests heavily in education, cultural exchange, and civil society initiatives. English-language education, Fulbright scholarships, and initiatives such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI) all contribute to America’s favourable image among Southeast Asia’s youth.

Despite growing regional concerns about its political volatility and occasional signs of strategic incoherence - especially with the re-election of the Trump administration - the United States remains a formidable player due to the depth and breadth of its engagement.

Russia’s role: tactical opportunism with limitations

Russia’s presence in Southeast Asia meanwhile is much more restrained, episodic, and largely reactive.

While it seeks to play the role of a resurgent great power on the world stage, Moscow’s influence in Southeast Asia is fundamentally constrained by geography, limited economic ties, and a lack of consistent soft power.

Historically, the Soviet Union had stronger ties with Vietnam and Laos during the Cold War, supporting them both militarily and ideologically. However, post-Soviet Russia retrenched from the region throughout the 1990s. Vladimir Putin’s leadership has, at times, seen a renewed push into Southeast Asia, driven by arms sales, energy diplomacy, and political alignment with authoritarian regimes – but it is not consistent.

Russia’s influence in the region is largely characterised by:

1. Defence and arms exports: Russia remains a major arms supplier to Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia and Myanmar. Its military-industrial complex continues to provide hardware such as fighter jets, submarines, and anti-aircraft systems. However, Western sanctions, technological limitations, and the emergence of alternative suppliers (notably the US, China, and South Korea) have chipped away at its competitive edge.

2. Energy diplomacy: Russian energy firms such as Gazprom and Rosneft maintain stakes in offshore oil and gas projects, particularly in Vietnam. These partnerships serve Moscow’s broader strategy of projecting itself as an energy superpower. Yet, concerns over geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) and the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine have cast a shadow over future prospects. This will only worsen should China overstep the mark with fellow SCS neighbours.

3. Political engagement: Russia promotes a multipolar world order and non-interference in domestic affairs, themes that resonate with certain ASEAN states wary of Western criticism. As such, Moscow has signed various strategic partnerships and cooperation agreements with ASEAN and individual countries. Nevertheless, these remain largely declarative, with limited implementation and effectiveness.

4. Soft power deficit: Unlike the United States or even China, Russia lacks substantial cultural, educational, or linguistic outreach in the region. Russian media outlets such as RT and Sputnik have negligible reach in Southeast Asia, and there is no strong presence of Russian academic, technological, or philanthropic institutions even if the region has been flooded by young Russian men fleeing conscription and forced service on the front in Ukraine in recent years.

Moscow or Washington on the wane?

While both Russia and the United States face challenges in Southeast Asia, Russia is clearly the actor in relative decline.

Much of this claim can be based on economic weight – or lack thereof. Southeast Asia is an economically vibrant region that prizes trade, investment, and technology transfer. The US remains a major source of foreign direct investment and a top trading partner. Russia, by contrast, is marginal in economic terms, offering little beyond arms and hydrocarbons.

In geostrategic reach too Moscow fails. American naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific, coupled with forward-deployed forces and strong alliances, provides Washington with the ability to shape regional security dynamics. Russia, however, lacks the military infrastructure or logistical capacity to exert sustained influence across the maritime domain of Southeast Asia.

Institutional depth too is another area in which the Russian state lags behind the US as the US engages ASEAN through multiple multilateral platforms, including the East Asia Summit, APEC, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. While Russia participates in some of these forums, its contributions are limited and rarely agenda-setting.

And then of course there is thee elephant in every room when discussion Russian relations around the world – the impact of the Ukraine War.

This has further isolated Russia diplomatically and economically. Southeast Asian nations have generally responded with caution or neutrality, but the long-term effect is a deepening of Russia’s pariah status in Western-aligned systems, including finance, technology, and defence cooperation.

Meanwhile, as both the US and Russia engage with Southeast Asia in part to hedge against China, only the US is capable of presenting a credible balancing option. Russia’s growing dependence on Beijing, particularly post-2022, undermines its own appeal as an independent actor. In contrast, many ASEAN countries see the US as a necessary counterweight to Chinese assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea – another strike against Russia.

One winner – and it is not Russia

Given all of the above, and in the strategic calculus of what makes up Southeast Asia in mid-2025, the United States remains a powerful and multidimensional actor, albeit one that must continuously navigate internal political shifts and external regional sensitivities.

Russia, on the other hand, is constrained by its economic limitations, lack of regional integration, and over-reliance on transactional diplomacy. While Moscow can still play a tactical role in some areas like arms sales or diplomatic theatre, it is unlikely to become a dominant or even decisive actor in Southeast Asia’s future. Its influence is waning not only in relative comparison to the US but also in the face of more regionally embedded powers like China, Japan, and India.

Russia missed the boat to Asia long ago. The US came into port to stay – and Southeast Asia’s geopolitical theatre continues to be shaped by the enduring presence of the United States. That will not change any time soon.