In a move that signals a deeper geopolitical realignment in the Global South, China hosted the Fourth China-CELAC Ministerial Forum in Beijing last week, bringing together top Latin American leaders and setting the stage for an ambitious overhaul of regional cooperation. Among the attendees were Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Gustavo Petro of Colombia, and Gabriel Boric of Chile – figures who are increasingly steering their countries towards strategic engagement with Beijing.

The forum, held on May 13, came at a moment of growing US-China tensions, an unravelling global trade architecture, and a wider recalibration of international alliances. For Beijing, the event was more than just diplomatic pageantry; it marked the 10th anniversary of the China-CELAC Forum and a robust reaffirmation of its “Shared Future” policy, aimed at placing China and Latin America on a new footing of economic, technological, and geopolitical interdependence.

CELAC and China: a growing alliance

CELAC, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, is an intergovernmental platform comprising all 33 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. Since its founding in 2010, CELAC has worked to reduce dependence on US-centric institutions and foster intra-regional cooperation. Its partnership with the Asian superpower, formalised in 2014 through the China-CELAC Forum, now represents a cornerstone of Beijing’s strategy to deepen ties in the Western Hemisphere, a region historically under US influence.

The 2025 forum emphasised multipolarity, South-South cooperation, and sustainable development. President Xi Jinping, in his opening remarks, hailed the China-CELAC platform as "a towering tree grown from a decade-old sapling." He pledged a new CNY66bn ($9.2bn) yuan-denominated credit line for Latin American infrastructure and development projects, reinforcing China’s positioning as a development partner rather than a hegemon.

Brazil’s President Lula, a central figure at the forum, echoed this sentiment, highlighting the need for “a new international order where the Global South shapes its own path.”

The shadow of the Monroe Doctrine

This regional courtship with China has not gone unnoticed in Washington. Analysts warn that the United States is increasingly reverting to a Monroe Doctrine mindset, attempting to deter Chinese influence across Latin America through a mix of diplomatic pressure, trade leverage, and military cooperation.

In recent years, several Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries have experienced pressure from the United States – "the heavy hand of Uncle Sam" – to distance themselves from China, often at the cost of strategic partnerships.

Panama, after switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2017, signed multiple infrastructure deals, including a Chinese-managed port project, which was later blocked under US pressure amid national security concerns. It also bowed to Washington’s wishes by announcing plans to exit Beijing’s trademark Belt and Road initiative (BRI) earlier this year.

El Salvador faced intense lobbying and aid threats from Washington after establishing ties with Beijing in 2018 and receiving pledges for Chinese-funded stadiums and ports.

In Honduras, diplomatic normalisation with China in 2023 at the expense of Taiwan sparked backlash from the US, which warned of "strategic consequences" and delayed aid disbursements.

Ecuador, heavily indebted to China, faced pressure from the US to renegotiate its loan terms and avoid further BRI alignment, especially in its vital oil and mining sectors.

In Guyana, a planned Huawei 5G mobile network project was scrapped in 2021 after US officials intervened.

These examples reflect a pattern: Washington’s geopolitical playbook increasingly relies on coercive diplomacy to counter China’s growing economic footprint in its former sphere of influence.

However, these efforts have largely failed to produce substantive alternatives. Critics such as the Panamanian Alonso Illueca from the China-Global South Project argue that the US continues to offer “sticks without carrots” –threats of sanctions and exclusion from trade deals, but little regarding infrastructure, technology, or financial assistance. Meanwhile, China has filled the void, offering investment-backed diplomacy across sectors like transportation, digital infrastructure, agriculture, and green energy.

For Latin American leaders navigating economic challenges and climate risks, the Chinese offer is highly attractive: capital without conditions, and partnerships framed around mutual benefit rather than political alignment. That said, it is worth keeping in mind that China’s engagement is strategic, not charitable.

Belt and Road: Latin America's infrastructure lifeline?

One of the forum’s most tangible outcomes was the announcement that Colombia would officially join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), becoming the 23rd CELAC country to do so. China’s BRI presence in the region already includes large-scale projects such as ports in Peru, hydropower plants in Argentina, energy grids and electric vehicle plants in Brazil, and telecommunications infrastructure across the Caribbean.

China is also plowing through with renewable energy investments. In Brazil, Chinese-backed firms have invested in biofuels, solar farms, and SAF (sustainable aviation fuel) production, marking a shift from raw material extraction to value-added partnerships. President Lula’s visit alone resulted in $5bn in commercial agreements, from AI-driven agribusiness to shipbuilding and aerospace collaboration.

This reflects a maturing relationship. As Lula said in Beijing, “We want more than to export soybeans and iron ore. We want to build railways, subways, and factories. We want China to share its technological expertise with us.”

The Beijing Declaration: a quiet rebuke to the US?

The joint Beijing Declaration, issued at the end of the China-CELAC forum, is a comprehensive and coordinated message of strategic autonomy. In 28 points, the statement affirms:

• A commitment to multilateralism and the UN Charter,

• Rejection of unilateral sanctions and coercive measures,

• Support for reforming global governance, including the UN Security Council,

• Endorsement of de-dollarisation, via mechanisms like yuan-based trade and currency swap agreements.

Notably, the declaration called for a Latin American Secretary-General at the UN, and greater inclusion of developing countries in global decision-making: a direct challenge to US dominance in international institutions.

From a US perspective, these moves threaten its traditional sphere of influence. For China, the forum advances its effort to bypass Western-centric systems and cultivate new alliances in its long game of global repositioning.

Lula’s state visit: Brazil as a diplomatic bridge

Lula’s state trip to China – his fourth as president – ahead of the summit was not merely ceremonial. The visit marked the first since the elevation of Brazil-China relations to a “Community of Shared Future for a Fairer World” in 2024, and delivered a series of high-impact agreements.

Among the 20 signed deals were a joint AI and agriculture initiative, a satellite data-sharing partnership, investments in Brazil’s ports and shipbuilding industry, and a currency swap deal worth $27bn, which reduces dependence on the US dollar.

Significantly, China also committed to buying Brazilian debt bonds, boosting confidence in Brazil’s fiscal management and deepening its financial sovereignty.

But Lula’s diplomacy is not without controversy. His personal involvement in foreign policy has sidestepped Brazil’s US-aligned diplomatic corps, which gained force since the ousting of Dilma Rousseff’s leftist government in 2014 and the subsequent right-wing governments, such as Bolsonaro’s, drawing criticism for marginalising Itamaraty in favour of direct presidential and ministerial channels.

In the same way, Lula’s controversial attendance at Vladimir Putin’s Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 has also faced discontentment from part of Brazil’s domestic diplomatic corps and corporate media, though Lula sees the move as a way to reinforce BRICS solidarity and the broader Global South agenda as Brazil readies to host the bloc’s summit in July.

Still, Lula remains optimistic. “China is the technological and economic engine of the 21st century,” he said. “We must approach it with affection and without prejudice.”

His state visit also reaffirmed Brazil’s commitment to BRICS, where China has a leading role. For Lula, BRICS is “the platform to rewrite history and include the excluded.”

Is Latin America picking sides?

Despite appearances, most Latin American countries are not abandoning the US just yet; they are hedging their bets. The continent is embracing “multi-alignment”, seeking to secure development financing from China while maintaining its long-standing trade and diplomatic relations with the US and Europe. Although shunned by the collective West, Latin Americans and Caribbeans tend to think they are inherently part of the West.

The risks of this pivot are clear: over-dependence on China, project delays, possible “debt traps”, lack of transparency, and potential retaliation from Washington. But the short-term rewards – financial autonomy, upgraded infrastructure, and diversified global ties – are proving hard to resist.

As Rebecca Ray, a senior researcher at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, put it: “Latin America is making a pragmatic choice, not an ideological one.”

What’s next?

The tightening relationship between Latin America and China is not just a regional development – it is a reflection of a broader global realignment. With the US increasingly focused on its own domestic and strategic rivalries, China is gleefully stepping into the vacuum, not as a new hegemon, but as an alternative source for building infrastructure, growth, and partnership.

Brazil, under Lula, appears poised to spearhead this transition, crafting a vision of developmental sovereignty that resonates across the region.

What remains to be seen is how the US will further respond. Will it continue to invoke the rhetoric of hemispheric dominance by threatening punitive tariffs and sanctions, or recalibrate its approach to offer genuine partnership? The latter option seems unlikely, especially under the Trump administration. Now more than ever, Washington continues to rely on hard power.

Panama, for example, has recently felt the full wrath of Uncle Sam’s hand; it was pressured to withdraw from the Belt and Road Initiative and to cancel two port administration contracts with a Hong Kong-based company, to prevent a possible military takeover of the Panama Canal by the US – an option floated by President Donald Trump himself.

For now, Latin America is sending a clear message: it wants more than just ideology. It wants railways, satellites, vaccines, and digital bridges to the future. And it is finding them in Beijing, not in Washington or Brussels.