In the complex landscape of Southeast Asia, Thailand has long held a position of strategic importance. Blessed with a rich cultural heritage, a sizeable economy, and a central geographic location, the country is often seen as a natural leader within the region. Yet in recent years, there has been growing concern that Thailand is not pulling its weight, diplomatically, economically, or strategically in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the wider regional framework.

While countries like Indonesia and Vietnam stride forward, Thailand seems to be treading water, encumbered by internal strife, inconsistent foreign policy, and economic inertia.

Political paralysis and democratic instability

One of the most significant factors hampering Thailand’s regional influence is its internal political volatility. Since the military coup of 2014, the country has oscillated between quasi-democratic governance and authoritarian control. Though elections were held in 2019 and again in 2023, the military continues to exert disproportionate influence behind the scenes.

The result is a fragile political environment where long-term strategic planning is often sacrificed for short-term political survival by leading voices at any particular point in time.

This instability has diminished Thailand’s moral and diplomatic authority within ASEAN. In a region grappling with issues of democratic backsliding — from Myanmar’s military regime launching air raids against its own population, to Cambodia’s one-party state, Thailand is no longer seen as a credible advocate for democratic norms.

Its voice on matters such as the ongoing Rohingya crisis, human rights abuses in neighbouring Myanmar, or the South China Sea dispute is either absent or muted.

Instead of leading, Thailand has opted for studied neutrality or silence, thereby ceding ground to more assertive actors.

Economic drift

Economically, Thailand remains one of Southeast Asia’s largest economies — but its momentum has stalled. The country has struggled to maintain its competitive edge as regional peers aggressively court investment and develop infrastructure. Vietnam, in particular, has emerged as the new darling of global manufacturing, bolstered by political stability, market reforms, and a clear vision for digital transformation. That it has all this based on a solid energy policy only helps leave Thailand in the dust.

Bangkok’s “Thailand 4.0” initiative - a policy designed to transition the country from an industrial to an innovation-driven economy - has failed to gain meaningful traction. Implementation has been sluggish, and investment in education and research remains insufficient.

To this end, the kingdom’s heavy dependence on tourism, which accounts for around 20% of GDP, was brutally exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Recovery since the end of the pandemic has been slow, and the lack of diversification leaves the economy vulnerable to external shocks.

In regional trade diplomacy, too, Thailand has largely failed to distinguish itself. While it is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), it has played a secondary role in its formation and evolution. Other member nations in the region have played a far more prominent role.

Other opportunities to take leadership in ASEAN economic integration especially through cross-border digital trade with Malaysia to the south and both Vietnam and Cambodia to the east by way of infrastructure development and green technology have been largely missed.

A foreign policy of hesitation

Thailand’s foreign policy in the last decade has been characterised by hedging and ambiguity. It attempts to balance its long-standing alliance with the United States against the economic pull of China to the north. But rather than navigating this duality with finesse, Thai diplomacy often appears reactive, and excessively risk-averse.

China has become Thailand’s largest trading partner and a significant investor, particularly in infrastructure. Yet Bangkok has failed to use this relationship to leverage more strategic outcomes within the ASEAN-China framework.

Simultaneously, its engagement with the US has cooled due to Washington’s discomfort with Thailand’s democratic backsliding. This may change should Thailand agree to purchase up to 5mn tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) each year from the Alaska LNG project as has been hinted at recently, but for now, the result is that Thailand finds itself increasingly sidelined in major regional conversations, neither fully aligned with Beijing nor trusted in Washington.

Contrast this with Vietnam or Indonesia, both of which have managed to enhance their international profiles and exert influence despite complex domestic challenges.

Thailand’s relative passivity in ASEAN summits, limited leadership in multilateral initiatives, and inconsistent stance on regional security issues underscore its declining diplomatic ambition.

ASEAN: A platform ignored by Bangkok

Within ASEAN meanwhile, Thailand’s performance is similarly underwhelming.

Although it has hosted summits and held the rotating chairmanship (most recently in 2019), its capacity to shape the agenda has been limited. Unlike Indonesia, which routinely takes the initiative in peacekeeping, conflict mediation, and economic integration, Thailand rarely takes bold stances.

Most notably, Bangkok has remained largely silent on Myanmar’s post-coup civil war, despite sharing a long border with the country and housing tens of thousands of refugees. Its reluctance to criticise Naypyidaw’s junta — arguably due to its own military-led government reflects a broader unwillingness to confront difficult regional issues. This abdication of responsibility undermines ASEAN’s credibility, and reinforces the perception that Thailand is more interested in maintaining the status-quo than leading positive change.

In infrastructure connectivity projects, such as the ASEAN Highway Network or cross-border energy grids, Thailand is often a participant but rarely the driver.

The Mekong region, where Thailand has significant economic and security interests, is increasingly shaped by China rather than initiatives led from Bangkok, and the country’s hesitance to challenge China’s environmental impact on the Mekong River reflects its political timidity.

Soft power potential too is an area ignored by Thailand for the most part.

The nation possesses immense soft power potential. Its cuisine, tourism, media, and cultural exports enjoy global popularity. Yet this influence is rarely channelled into regional leadership. Unlike South Korea or Japan, which have systematically built cultural diplomacy into their foreign policy strategies, Thailand treats its soft power as a passive asset rather than an active tool.

Regional power in retreat

Despite the ‘lack of effort’ by Bangkok all round, however, Thailand is not a failed state, nor is it entirely absent from the ASEAN stage.

However, its failure to punch at its weight class despite its economic scale and geographic centrality is undeniable. What is missing is not capacity, but clarity of purpose and political will.

To reassert itself, Thailand must first address its internal political contradictions and invest in long-term institutional reform. It needs a coherent foreign policy that balances relations with major powers while taking principled stances on regional issues.

Economically, it must break its dependence on tourism and reboot its innovation agenda. Most importantly, Thailand must reclaim its voice in ASEAN, not as a cautious bystander, but as a committed leader.

Until then, it will remain a sleeping tiger; potentially formidable, but in practice, disengaged and not fully awake.