The new Syrian authorities has gone a long way towards gaining full recognition by the international community and as these relations get better those with Russia are getting worse. The new president, Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa, is slowly squeezing Russia out. If forced to choose between the West and Russia, Damascus is increasingly choosing the West.

“Al-Sharaa has shown himself to be a pragmatic leader, so there is no reason to expect Damascus to exhibit excessive haste in ending its cooperation with Russia. But it will be increasingly difficult for Moscow to maintain its presence in Syria,” said Nikita Smagin, a political analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a note.

Although Moscow was among the first to establish contact with the new Syrian authorities following the collapse of the Assad regime, the Kremlin’s leverage has steadily diminished. Russia had relied on a partnership that included key military assets – most notably the Khmeimim air base and the naval hub in Tartus – which play a critical role in Russia’s regional logistics across the Middle East and Africa.

At the outset, Damascus gave security assurances for those facilities, and al-Sharaa himself publicly acknowledged the value of continued cooperation. However, the geopolitical calculus has shifted rapidly. “The normalisation of relations with the West could cancel out the remaining arguments in favour of cooperation with Moscow for new Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa and his entourage,” Smagin said.

Turkey and the Gulf monarchies – particularly Riyadh and Doha – played a decisive role in supporting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamist faction that now forms the backbone of Syria’s post-Assad government. The new leadership has rapidly diversified its international partnerships, ranging from Middle Eastern capitals to Brussels and Washington. Most recently al-Sharaa has backed Israel in its conflict with Iran by giving the Israeli air force permission to use Syrian airspace to refuel its fighter jets. Smagin noted that “Riyadh and Doha have already paid off Damascus’s $15mn debt to the World Bank, and offered to pay government salaries.”

By spring 2025, the European Union suspended some its sanctions on the country, and US President Donald Trump met al-Sharaa during a Middle East tour – symbolic milestones in Syria’s re-entry into the Western political fold.

Despite Moscow’s early diplomatic outreach, residual animosities persist. “The Syrian authorities made it clear that they still had grievances against Moscow, which bombed the members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham themselves, who form the backbone of the new government,” Smagin observed. He added that “in 2015 it was Russia’s intervention that extended al-Assad’s rule for another decade” and won no favours from the members of the new government.

Since Assad’s fall, Russia has halted food deliveries and begun to lose key economic contracts. In early 2025, Damascus cancelled a Russian management contract for the port of Tartus – signed in 2019 – and replaced it with an $800mn investment agreement with Dubai Ports World. The port has been a cornerstone in Russia’s strategy of returning its naval power to the Mediterranean, after being bottled up in the Black Sea for most of the Cold War. The printing of Syria’s currency, long outsourced to Russia, has also been shifted to Germany and the UAE.

Meanwhile, trade ties are beginning to fray. Although Russia resumed deliveries of oil and grain in March and April respectively, Smagin noted that these are likely to be short-lived. “Syria is due to be imminently reconnected to the SWIFT international payment system, to which Russia does not have access,” he said. “It’s unlikely that Damascus will deem that grey schemes to import Russian goods are worth risking Syria’s reintegration into the global financial system.”

The fate of Russia’s military presence in Syria remains the most contentious issue. Reports have emerged that Syrian authorities are increasing security checks on Russian personnel at Khmeimim and Tartus, amid growing pressure from Western allies to close the facilities.