As tensions between Iran and Israel threaten to escalate into a broader regional conflict, the global power with the most at stake, China, occupies a uniquely complex position – one that straddles historical loyalties, economic necessity and strategic calculation.
Beijing has long pursued a foreign policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of others, and multipolar diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East. But the deepening crisis between Iran and Israel has tested these principles. With major energy and infrastructure ties to Tehran, and simultaneously a growing technology and investment relationship with Israel, China finds itself in a precarious diplomatic position.
Beijing is quite literally caught between two partners now locked in open hostility.
However, recent developments suggest that Beijing may be manoeuvring quietly behind the scenes. In particular, the appearance of two flights reportedly operating between China and the eastern end of the Middle East in recent days – flagged by military tracking accounts online – has raised fresh questions about whether China is simply observing events or playing a more active role in shaping them.
China’s ties to Iran
China and Iran have steadily expanded economic cooperation over the past two decades, with energy at the heart of the relationship. Beijing is the largest and only significant buyer of Iranian oil, often circumventing international sanctions by conducting transactions through intermediaries or ship-to-ship transfers on the open seas. Since the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and Washington’s imposition of maximum pressure sanctions, Chinese imports of Iranian crude have remained a lifeline for Tehran’s economy. In turn this has reinforced Iran’s role as a Chinese proxy of sorts in the region.
In 2021, China and Iran signed a sweeping 25-year cooperation agreement, pledging $400bn in investment across oil, gas, infrastructure and even the banking sectors. At the time this was hailed by Iranian leaders as evidence of the Islamic Republic’s ability to withstand Western isolation. Beijing painted it differently – as part of its wider Belt and Road ambitions.
As such, the current war between Israel and Iran threatens to disrupt these arrangements. Should the conflict damage Iran’s export capabilities either through sanctions, cyberattacks or physical strikes on its energy infrastructure, as is appearing more and more likely, China’s access to cheap oil may be jeopardised. Moreover, if Iran is pushed further into international isolation, China may find its long-term projects in the country, including railway and port developments, put at risk.
The possibility too of regime change would cause some consternation in Beijing. In dealing with a government willing to ignore Chinese aggression against its own Muslim minority in East Turkestan / Xinjiang, Beijing knows that Tehran has long-since accepted its role as subservient to China as both a financial and influential lifeline to the non-sanctioned world. Nonetheless, Beijing has so far avoided taking sides in the war.
Official statements from the Chinese Foreign Ministry have called for “calm and restraint” on all sides, and for respect for international law. At the same time, China has expressed strong support for the Palestinian cause; an irony not lost on the Uyghurs, Tibetans and other minorities routinely prevented from their own claims to a historical homeland.
China and Israel: a quiet but crucial partnership
Less visible, but no less significant, is the relationship between China and Israel. Over the past decade, the two countries have deepened cooperation in high-tech sectors, including artificial intelligence, water technology and agriculture. Chinese firms have invested in a number of Israeli start-ups and infrastructure projects, including the management of Haifa Port, an important shipping hub.
This burgeoning economic partnership has not gone unnoticed in Washington, where US officials have raised concerns about technology transfers to China and national security. In response to American pressure, Israel has recently become more cautious about Chinese investment in sensitive industries, but the two countries remain commercially entwined.
China’s balancing act is itself made more difficult by Israel’s historically close alignment to the US, Beijing’s primary geopolitical rival at a time tariffs remain a thorny issue and the question of Chinese claims over Taiwan in the Western Pacific remain unresolved.
At a time when Washington is reinforcing its own support for Israel, China’s refusal to criticise Tehran more harshly could be perceived as tacit endorsement of Iran’s position by a White House keen to play up any supposed faux-pas on the part of its economic and geopolitical rivals. This, in turn, risks fraying ties with Tel Aviv with Israel now walking a tightrope of sorts between Washington and Beijing.
Unusual flight patterns
Added to this, in recent days, online aircraft tracking communities have identified two unusual flights reportedly linking China and Iran – or at least Turkmenistan – with speculation swirling about their nature and purpose. While there has been no official confirmation of their contents or authorisation, some analysts have suggested they could be military-related, or involve technology transfers relevant to the conflict. Other sources have claimed the flights in question landed short of the Iranian border in Ashgabat – Turkmenistan.
The flights are particularly intriguing given the triangulated alliance that appears to be developing between Russia, Iran and China. All three share adversarial relations with the West, and each has a vested interest in undermining US influence across various theatres – from Ukraine to the South China Sea.
While the flights do not in themselves prove Chinese involvement in the Iran-Israel conflict, they may indicate logistical support or intelligence-sharing taking place between Beijing and Moscow, with potential ramifications for Tehran. That at least one of the flights supposedly involved a Luxembourg registered cargo aircraft and not a Chinese plane adds to the mystery.
It is worth noting too that during the recent Syrian civil war, similar unmarked flights often preceded shifts in battlefield dynamics or weapons transfers.
To this end, should it subsequently emerge that China is indeed providing indirect support to Iran via Russia’s ally Turkmenistan or Russia itself – or in some way facilitating Iranian logistics – it would mark a significant shift from Beijing’s traditionally cautious approach to Middle East conflicts. Any future claims by Beijing that it prefers to stay out of the domestic affairs of others would also be left in tatters.
More importantly, such a move would also risk drawing China into a wider geopolitical confrontation with the United States and its allies.
Implications for China
As we stand, less than a week after the first attack was launched, the Iran-Israel war presents China with both a challenge and an opportunity. On one hand, it risks undermining China’s relationships with both sides of the conflict. On the other, it allows Beijing to continue presenting itself as a stable, non-interventionist power in contrast to the perceived heavy-handedness of the West – but only if it remains at a distance. A start would be clarifying the real purpose and intent behind the recent mystery flights towards Turkmenistan and possibly on into Iran.
If the war intensifies, however, China may find its strategy of quiet engagement and economic statecraft increasingly difficult to maintain. A drawn-out conflict could force Beijing to clarify its position one way or the other, especially if oil supplies are threatened or if US allies in the Indo-Pacific begin pressing for a coordinated diplomatic response.
Ultimately, however, while Beijing may not be fuelling the conflict directly, it is certainly shaping the geopolitical context in which it unfolds. Whether through trade, energy, or deliberate but subtle strategic alignments, China remains a quiet but critical actor in a war whose consequences extend far beyond the borders of the Middle East.