Comments from Russian officials in recent days indicate that Moscow its turning its attention to Moldova ahead of the autumn general election. The critical vote in September will determine whether President Maia Sandu’s pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) will remain in power – and thus whether it will continue reforms aimed at bringing Moldova closer to EU membership. 

Since Sandu and her PAS came to office, in 2020 and 2021 respectively, Moldova, long torn between the Russian and Western spheres of influence, has made decisive moves towards European integration.

As the EU rethought its enlargement policy after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moldova, along with Ukraine, was given candidate status in June the same year. This was followed by the opening of accession negotiations in June 2024 – a step some Western Balkan candidates had taken many years to achieve. 

Moldova also signed a security and defence partnership with the EU in 2024, while officials have also deepened Moldova’s partnership with Nato.

But while EU leaders sought to strengthen ties with countries in the bloc’s eastern neighbourhood, especially those vulnerable to interference from Russia, the Kremlin has continued to wield its considerable influence in attempts to stymie Westward movement by its former satellites such as Moldova. 

In the Russia-backed anti-government protests of 2023, pro-Russian forces linked to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor sought to exploit the misery caused by high energy prices and one of Europe’s highest inflation rates to destabilise the PAS government. 

Officials in Chisinau again accused Russia of interference around the presidential election of October 2024, which pitted Sandu against former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoianoglo, and was held at the same time as a referendum on adding the goal of EU membership to Moldova’s constitution. 

In October 2024, Moldovan authorities said they had uncovered a scheme allegedly orchestrated by Shor involving $15mn in Russian funds distributed to approximately 130,000 individuals. The goal was reportedly to sway voters toward anti-Western choices and spread EU disinformation via social media. 

"Russia is using a range of hybrid tactics to derail Moldova’s EU accession and influence the outcomes of both the referendum and the presidential election," said Sandu’s foreign policy adviser Olga Rosca at a briefing with bne IntelliNews in Chisinau in October 2024. She said officials believe the $15mn was “a monthly sum, and estimates suggest Russia could spend up to $100mn to sway these elections”.

It was later reported that $24mn was transferred from Russia to Moldova via the Promsvyazbank (PSB) app in October alone, following the $15mn sent in September, as announced by Moldova's chief of police, Viorel Cernautanu, after the first round of the presidential elections. Raids at 26 sites also prompted increased security at Chișinău International Airport after passengers arriving from Russia were found with large sums of cash. 

Despite these efforts, the outcome of the votes were a second round victory for Sandu and a narrower-than-expected ‘yes’ vote in the referendum that sets EU accession as a goal for Moldova. However, the election of a new government unfriendly to that goal could still stall reforms and at least temporarily derail efforts to pursue entry to the bloc. 

After the elections, the next crisis came just a few months later with the cutting off of Russian gas supplies to Moldova (already directed entirely to the separatist Transnistria region) via Ukraine. While Moldova has successfully reoriented its gas and electricity supply map to receive power from other sources, Transnistria remained dependent on Russian gas, used both to supply its industries and to generate electricity to sell to Moldova proper. 

The cutting off of Russian gas thus caused an economic and humanitarian crisis in the Russia-backed separatist republic that occurred during the coldest time of the year. This created fertile grounds for Russian politicians to blame the pro-EU politicians in Chisinau for the problem – even though Tiraspol rather grudgingly accepted help from both Chisinau and the EU. 

As the September general election approaches, there are fears Russia will use its levers of influence within Moldova, which has a substantial Russian minority as well as the Moscow-backed separatist regime in Transnistria and pro-Russian leadership in the semi-autonomous Gagauzia region. Officials from Gagauzia, including the region’s president, Eugenia Gutul, were detained this spring in a case concerning illegal party financing. 

Prime Minister Dorin Recean told The Financial Times on June 4 that Russia is seeking to deploy up to 10,000 troops in Transnistria should the pro-EU authorities lose the parliamentary election. 

Recean said Moscow is intensifying efforts to interfere in Moldova's domestic politics to secure a more Kremlin-aligned government in Chișinău, which could facilitate an expanded Russian military presence on the Ukrainian border. "This is a huge effort to undermine Moldovan democracy. They want to consolidate their military presence in Transnistria," Recean said.

According to the Moldovan prime minister, Russia is engaging in hybrid warfare tactics including online propaganda and illegal financial transfers aimed at influencing political parties and voters. 

Meanwhile, Russia’s ambassador to Chisinau, Oleg Ozerov, has hinted that a new energy crisis in Transnistria, similar to the one in January this year, is most likely envisaged by Russia as a scenario to be used if the PAS remains in office after the September election. 

"So far, the solutions that have been found are working. By winter [ie after the election], the situation may worsen again … And, of course, this will require an increase in gas supplies," Ozerov warned. He also accused the government in Chisinau of hindering “a long-term solution”. 

Currently, Russia offers Transnistria just enough financial backing for it to buy small volumes of natural gas from European suppliers. This is sufficient to meet residential needs and generate electricity for households, but not enough to power the region’s heavy industries, many of which have shut down or scaled back. As a result, Transnistria’s de facto authorities are under growing fiscal pressure, struggling to meet basic obligations such as wage and pension payments.

Ozerov has been pushing other buttons in Moldova too. A few days before his interview with RIA Novosti, he called for the Russian language to be granted legal status once again as the language of interethnic communication in Moldova, Deschide.md reported on June 6. The appeal was made amid longstanding political tensions over language policy in Moldova. 

Recent polls show that the PAS is likely to be first placed in the upcoming general election but not secure an outright majority like it did in 2021. 

For example a poll conducted by iData and published by Newsmaker.md at the end of May puts the PAS on 27.5%, with the Socialist Party (PSRM) and the Shor-backed Victory (Pobeda) political bloc on 11.6% and 11.2% respectively. That would give the PAS 46 out of the 101 seats in Moldova’s parliament, forcing it to scramble to find allies among the smaller parties. 

With a large number of undecided voters, the race is very much still open, meaning both the PAS and its Russia-backed rivals have everything to fight for.