The war is not an obstacle to Ukraine's membership of the EU, and most of the EU members states have indicated their support for getting Ukraine into the club as fast as possible.

This week European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos said that Ukraine has real prospects for progress in joining the EU, even if the war drags on for years.

The first step of the screening of Ukrainian legislation is already well advanced and several of the negotiation clusters have already been opened. According to Kos, the EC is preparing to open all negotiation clusters by the end of 2025.

Brussels says it is making every effort to hasten the negotiation process, as Ukraine has fulfilled many of the necessary conditions already, although no one is expecting the accession process to be finished for years; Kos says she is confident that Ukraine will become an EU member by 2030, but others have said it will take a decade to complete the application.

 

Good start on nuts and bolts issues

Ukraine has made significant progress in preparing for formal European Union accession talks with the "Internal Market" cluster – one of the most technically demanding areas of the negotiation process. However, despite the completion of screening procedures and positive evaluations in some of the chapters, a lot of work remains to be done.

The war has also slowed the process, but the war is a problem not an excuse for making change says Brussels. The EC has made clear that martial law cannot be used as a blanket justification for introducing delays, exemptions or transitional periods. The Commission expects Ukraine to meet all membership obligations upon accession without exception.

Still, the EC negotiators have been showing some flexibility in the face of the crashing demographics changes and infrastructure being destroyed by Russia on a daily basis. Still, the underlying principle remains: deviations from EU norms must be minimal and justified, Europravda reports.

Talks on the Internal Market cluster will be the first to see formal negotiations start and is likely to set the tone for the broader accession effort. This is the nuts and bolts cluster that enshrines the basic single market principles of the freedom of goods, capital and labour within the EU.

Ukraine has completed the initial screening procedure for this cluster – a comprehensive technical assessment comparing Ukrainian legislation with EU law (acquis communautaire).

The cluster is designed to unify the rules with the rest of Europe including, the removal of trade barriers, product safety and standards alignment. Workers are given the right to move and live where they like. Capital too can flow without restriction into banks that are covered by shared set of rules. Copyrights, patents and trademarks are protected and intellectual property rights are enforced. In short, Ukraine has to bring its everyday rules for life into line with those of the rest of the EU.

According to the draft European Commission screening report, three chapters – Company Law (Chapter 6), Intellectual Property (Chapter 7) and Competition Policy (Chapter 8) – received "positive" evaluations. These chapters were deemed to be largely in alignment with EU norms, although additional harmonisation and institutional strengthening are required.

However, progress is uneven. Chapter 1, Free Movement of Goods, which had previously received the highest score in this cluster in an earlier EU progress report, was downgraded in the screening. The Commission spotted "significant gaps in coherence," particularly in market surveillance. Despite achievements in areas such as standardisation, Ukraine’s approach was found to “lack systemic application across the full scope of the chapter.”

 

Judiciary and anti-corruption cluster

While a lot of progress has already been made in the Internal Market cluster, challenges are emerging in the trickier political and legal aspects of the Fundamentals cluster – widely seen as decisive for Ukraine’s membership prospects – the section that covers things like commitment to an impartial judiciary, property rights and anti-corruption measures.

Ukraine has long been branded as one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. As bne IntelliNews reported, pre-war corruption was not the problem, corruption was the system. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy campaigned on an anti-corruption platform to win election in 2019 and, among other things, launched an attempt to break the oligarchs’ grip on power with his oligarch speech in March 2021 followed up by his oligarch law in September the same year. He even arrested oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, his mentor, business partner and one of the most powerful oligarchs in the country into jail. However, these efforts have been sidetracked by the war following Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Nevertheless, corruption and weak property rights remain the bane of the economy.

There are going to be serious challenges in getting some of the laws through the Rada as some of the laws cover emotive topics like land and other are just obstruse. Trust between parliamentarians, the executive branch, and civil society has emerged as a growing stumbling bloc, Europravda reports. The Fundamental cluster includes complex areas where EU law is often principle-based, requiring interpretative and context-specific implementation rather than a simple transposition. The once-automatic support for EU-designated draft laws is beginning to erode as law makers ask: “Why do we need these laws if they don’t fix anything,” Ukrainska Pravda reports.

While the government has targeted completion of all reforms under this cluster by 2028, experts involved in the discussions have called this timeline “very ambitious.”

Ukraine has already lost up to €2bn in European Union financial support after missing four EU chapter reform targets required under the Ukraine Facility programme in the first quarter of the year.

Changing the land rules is going to be particularly tough. As bne IntelliNews reported there was an attempt to liberalise land ownership that raised expectations restrictions on agricultural land would be removed in 2020 that would have brought in billions in investment, but the government fluffed the deregulation and put the whole question off to be addressed by a referendum at a later date.

Now land reform will have to be addressed against as part of the EU process, but government officials believe sufficient support can be assembled, despite expected opposition from factions linked to former speaker Dmytro Razumkov and long-time opponent Orange Revolution firebrand, Yulia Tymoshenko. “Of course, Yulia Volodymyrivna will be against again,” one lawmaker told Ukrainska Pravda. “But with reasonable safeguards, we believe 226 votes are achievable.”

 

External problems

The largest external problem is Hungary’s continued veto over decisions related to Ukraine’s accession remains the principal obstacle. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s position has evolved into a matter of political identity, according to EuroPravda. He is demonising Ukrainian’s EU in part bid to portray himself as a strongman and to distract from his own poor showing at the polls.

EU foreign policy chief and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas is amongst Ukraine’s chief cheerleaders in Brussels and says she has a Plan B to deal with Hungary. It includes starting the negotiations now, but putting off the vote on closing the chapter talks, which needs all 27 members to sign off, until either Hungary is stripped of its voting rights, or Orban is voted out of office. Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Minister of Justice, Olha Stefanishyna, said this month that 26 votes will be enough for now.

Despite Orban’s resistance, Ukrainian officials are publicly downplaying the Hungarian veto. “I hope that all 26 EU members will be able to convince the one that remains,” said Stefanishyna during a closed-door discussion. However, concerns remain that other member states could follow Hungary’s lead as while it is the most vocal, several other EU members quietly harbour reservations as well.

Another major barrier Ukraine will have to clear is that Ukraine cannot join the EU unless Common Agricultural Policy is reformed. Currently a third of the EU’s budget goes on agricultural subsidies, but if Ukraine joins under the current rules it would be entitled to a massive €186bn of subsidies. The EU budget structure would have to radically reformed and countries like Hungary and Poland, current net beneficiaries of the subsidies, would turn into net contributors. Poland, an ardent Ukraine supporter in its military struggle against Russia, is less enthusiastic when it comes to agriculture. Warsaw has already unilaterally, and illegally, ban the import or transit of Ukrainian agricultural products over its territory after cheap Ukrainian grain wrecked its domestic grain market in 2023. Thanks to Polish resistance a waiver on all import duties Kyiv has enjoyed since the start of the war expired on June 5 that will cost business millions in lost revenue this year.

Likewise, there have been boarder blockades between Poland and Ukraine by Polish truckers, complaining that cheap Ukrainian operators have wrecked their livelihoods.

 

Screening for other clusters underway

So far, most of the attention has focused on the Fundamentals and Internal Market clusters, but the Rada deputies have also advanced on the remaining clusters: External Relations, Green Agenda & Sustainable Connectivity, Resources, Agriculture & Cohesion, Competitiveness & Inclusive Growth, and the cluster broadly termed Other Chapters. The pace of progress has been mixed, but overall remains broadly aligned with expectations for a candidate country negotiating under wartime conditions, Ukrainska Pravda reports.

In the External Relations cluster, which includes Chapter 30 (External Relations) and Chapter 31 (Foreign, Security and Defence Policy), Ukraine completed the screening process in the first quarter of 2025. Chapter 30 was screened by January, while Chapter 31 was finalised by March. These screenings concluded that Ukraine has largely aligned its foreign policy with the EU, particularly in its stance on sanctions and strategic cooperation. While formal negotiations have not yet begun, they are expected to start in late 2025, assuming continued progress and consensus among EU member states.

The Other Chapters cluster includes several important but technical areas such as Chapter 28 (Consumer and Health Protection), Chapter 29 (Customs Union), Chapter 34 (Institutions) and Chapter 35 (Other Issues). Chapters 28 and 29 have already completed screening – February and April 2025 respectively. Ukraine is now working on the detailed technical adjustments required before negotiations can open. In contrast, screening for Chapters 34 and 35 has not yet started and is expected to take place later in the process, probably in 2026, as they usually contain closing benchmarks and country-specific transitional provisions.

In the Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity cluster, Ukraine has completed screening for all four chapters: Chapter 14 (Transport Policy), Chapter 15 (Energy), Chapter 21 (Trans-European Networks) and Chapter 27 (Environment and Climate Change). These were finalised between mid-June and early July 2025. This rapid progression reflects Ukraine’s early efforts to harmonise its energy and environmental laws with EU norms, especially as part of its wartime green recovery strategy. Negotiations for these chapters are expected to open before the end of the year.

The Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion cluster remains the least advanced, partly because it is connected to the thorny topic of land. Screening for Chapter 11 (Agriculture and Rural Development), Chapter 12 (Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy) and Chapter 13 (Fisheries) is scheduled for September 2025. Chapter 22 (Regional Policy) is expected to follow in October, while Chapter 33 (Financial and Budgetary Provisions) does not yet have a screening date.

These chapters are among the most complex to align due to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), structural fund regulations, and fiscal convergence requirements. The EU already acknowledges that the CAP needs an overhaul, but it has its own headaches as agriculture is also wrapped up with the EU’s own Green Deal and following the publication of the report from former Italian Prime Minister and ex-European Central Bank boss Mario Draghi, the whole relationship between green goals and agricultural policy is also under review in Brussels.

However, Ukraine has already entered into bilateral talks with the EU over agricultural trade quotas – these began in early June 2025 and are expected to result in a deal by the end of summer. This may facilitate faster progress once formal chapter negotiations commence, Ukrainska Pravda reports.

The Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth cluster has seen perhaps the most consistent forward movement after the Fundamentals cluster. Ukraine completed screening for all six chapters between March and June 2025. These include Chapter 16 (Taxation), Chapter 17 (Economic and Monetary Policy), Chapter 19 (Social Policy and Employment), Chapter 20 (Enterprise and Industrial Policy), Chapter 25 (Science and Research) and Chapter 26 (Education and Culture).

With technical screening out of the way, Ukraine is now focusing on implementing the recommendations provided by the EC. Formal negotiations for these chapters are anticipated to open later in 2025.

In terms of performance, the Ukrainian government has delivered effectively across most technical areas. It has completed screenings for over 20 chapters within a single year. Progress in competitiveness, green policy and external relations has been particularly solid. However, agriculture and regional policy are going more slowly. Nonetheless, Ukraine's proactive engagement – particularly in areas like trade, energy and digital infrastructure – has kept momentum steady, diplomats in Brussels say. With screenings nearly complete for most clusters and negotiation rounds expected to begin for many chapters before the end of 2025, the coming year will be decisive in determining the feasibility of a mid-decade opening of substantive negotiations and, ultimately, the country’s path to EU membership.

Ukrainian manufacturers consider their market already open and are primarily focused on ensuring reciprocal access to the EU market.

“Without the European Union, the Ukrainian economy will not survive,” a representative of a business association said during the Eurohub meeting. “The only opportunity to increase our competitiveness is through the European Union.”

EU Accession Chapters Grouped by Cluster
Fundamentals Cluster
23. Judiciary and Fundamental Rights	Judicial reform, anti-corruption, human rights and civil liberties.
24. Justice, Freedom and Security	Border control, asylum, migration, law enforcement, police cooperation.
5. Public Procurement	Transparent and competitive rules for public tenders and contracts.
18. Statistics	Harmonised collection and quality of official statistics.
32. Financial Control	Internal audits, anti-fraud systems and protection of EU funds.
Internal Market Cluster
1. Free Movement of Goods	Removal of trade barriers, product safety and standards alignment.
2. Freedom of Movement for Workers	Workers’ rights to move, reside and work across the EU.
3. Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services	Cross-border service provision and business access.
4. Free Movement of Capital	Liberalisation of capital flows and financial operations.
6. Company Law	Company formation, mergers, corporate governance, and auditing.
7. Intellectual Property Law	Protection and enforcement of copyrights, patents and trademarks.
8. Competition Policy	Antitrust enforcement and control of state aid.
9. Financial Services	Regulation of banking, insurance and financial markets.
10. Information Society and Media	Telecoms, digital services, data protection and media pluralism.
Competitiveness & Inclusive Growth Cluster
16. Taxation	VAT, excise duties, corporate tax rules and cooperation mechanisms.
17. Economic and Monetary Policy	Economic governance, coordination and fiscal responsibility.
19. Social Policy and Employment	Labour law, social inclusion, equal opportunities and health at work.
20. Enterprise and Industrial Policy	Industrial competitiveness, SME development, innovation support.
25. Science and Research	Participation in EU research programmes and innovation systems.
26. Education and Culture	Cooperation on education policy, youth mobility (Erasmus+) and cultural heritage.
Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity Cluster
14. Transport Policy	Road, rail, air, and maritime transport standards and infrastructure.
15. Energy	Energy markets, renewables, energy efficiency and security of supply.
21. Trans-European Networks	Integration into EU transport, energy and digital infrastructure.
27. Environment and Climate Change	Environmental protection, waste, water, air and climate policies.
Resources, Agriculture & Cohesion Cluster
11. Agriculture and Rural Development	CAP alignment, farm subsidies, rural policy reform.
12. Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy	Food hygiene, animal health, and plant protection standards.
13. Fisheries	Sustainable fishing practices and marine resource management.
22. Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments	EU cohesion funds, regional development and programme implementation.
33. Financial and Budgetary Provisions	Contributions to and benefits from the EU budget.
External Relations Cluster
30. External Relations	Common trade policy and relations with non-EU countries.
31. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy	Alignment with EU foreign policy, CFSP and CSDP.
Other Chapters
28. Consumer and Health Protection	Consumer rights, product safety and public health policies.
29. Customs Union	Harmonisation of customs rules and tariffs.
34. Institutions	Technical adjustments regarding representation in EU institutions.
35. Other Issues	Country-specific closing benchmarks and transitional arrangements.
Source: bne IntelliNews