The rise of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K, or ISKP) militant and terrorist group in Afghanistan and the growing security threats posed to Central Asia pushed Moscow toward a pragmatic re-engagement with the Taliban.
That’s a key conclusion of an analysis released ahead of Russia’s big July 4 announcement that it had become the first country to recognise the administration of the fundamentalists, set up after they returned to power in August 21 following the Afghanistan exit of the US and its allies.
ISIS-K is a common enemy of the Taliban, Russia and the states of Central Asia, as noted by the assessment, penned by analysts Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi and published on the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute’s Substack.
It sprang to major international prominence when it claimed responsibility for the March 2024 terrorist assault on Crocus City Hall in outer Moscow, a brutal episode that left more than 140 people who were in the concert hall dead.
“Russia’s concerns over ISIS-K have grown significantly since 2014, especially in light of the group's ability to operate in northern Afghanistan, close to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These concerns have helped shift Russia’s strategic calculus,” write Turgunbaeva, a journalist and researcher focusing on the former Soviet space of Central Asia, and Ghiasi, a Rumsfeld fellow and senior researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan Studies.
They add: “Uzbekistan’s involvement in the peace process with the Taliban—including its invitation to a high-level Taliban delegation to visit Tashkent—prompted Russia to deepen its own engagement. Moscow responded by inviting the Taliban for separate discussions, as well as joint talks alongside the Afghan government delegation, to address the peace process and the post-withdrawal landscape following the exit of U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan.
“Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai played an instrumental role in reshaping Moscow's perception of the Taliban. Karzai has argued that ISIS-K has no Afghan roots, and its fighters were introduced from abroad to destabilize the region. According to Karzai, only the Taliban are capable of effectively fighting ISIS-K. This narrative found a receptive audience in Moscow, which has long feared the potential spillover of instability into the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.”
Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, bne IntelliNews warned that jihadists from Syria and other locations would flood into the country.
Russian officials have argued that normalising relations with the Taliban – a process given a big lift in April when the Russian Supreme Court removed the Taliban from Moscow’s list of terrorist organisations – is a step firstly aimed at fostering dialogue and enhancing regional security cooperation.
“While some critics in Russia have questioned the wisdom of legitimizing a group with a violent past, proponents argue that engagement with the de facto authorities in Kabul is a geopolitical necessity,” observe Turgunbaeva and Ghiasi. “Moreover, economic considerations have also played a role. Since 2022, Afghanistan has expressed interest in purchasing Russian oil and wheat. The Taliban have also invited Russian companies to invest in mining, infrastructure, and energy projects. Removing the terrorist designation facilitates such cooperation, especially given Western sanctions that have pushed Moscow to diversify its foreign partnerships.”
The authors of the analysis also suggest that Russia’s policy shift on the Taliban is likely to have a ripple effect across Central Asia and beyond.
“For Central Asian countries,” they say, “Russia’s policy shift may serve as a green light to expand their own engagement with the Taliban. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which share borders with Afghanistan, have already established pragmatic relations with the Taliban, primarily driven by security and economic interests.
“Uzbekistan’s active involvement with the Taliban on trade and transit connectivity to South Asia has influenced Russian policymakers to adjust their strategy in favor of smoother economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban.”
Russia has shown signs that it views Uzbekistan as a regional competitor and the recent Termez Dialogue, hosted by Uzbekistan with the participation of Central Asian countries and the Taliban, “heightened Moscow’s concerns over Uzbekistan’s growing role as a regional player and the potential challenge it poses to Russia’s influence in Central Asia”, according to the analysts.
In their conclusions, they also point out how Tajikistan has also begun expanding trade and transit relations with Kabul. That has included opening joint border markets in the Badakhshan provinces of both countries and bringing Sher Khan land port in Afghanistan’s northern Kunduz province into use.