Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), junior ally Nationalist Movement Party (AKP) and the pro-Kurdish DEM Party will from now on “walk together”, the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said on July 12.

Erdogan, who also serves as the head of the AKP, announced the AKP-MHP-DEM coalition at a gathering of his party’s officials.

Those who follow Turkey closely know full well that DEM is essentially a unit of the militant-political Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Ocalan through more than four decades of asymmetric warfare with Ankara. So, you can also read the new combination as the AKP-MHP-PKK coalition.

Since the supporters of the parties concerned feel dizzy and uncertain from the quickfire manoeuvres that took them to this point, all sides put a blur on Erdogan’s coalition announcement.

But avoid falling for mealy-mouthed public relations “speak”.

After the bosses rule, the servants, even including those with the title of party chair, have no say. But bne IntelliNews has been parroting since last October that what we have here is a coalition.

Makes no sense?

If a coalition between a Turkish nationalist party and a Kurdish socialist party makes absolutely no sense to you, please take into account that the MHP serves as the political party of Operation Gladio in Turkey, while the PKK has founded a state-like enterprise in northern Syria under US patronage.

When big boss Erdogan and Washington’s involvement are added to the equation, the problem is solved.

“The US government has stated that it will review all their [the PKK commanders’] issues and do its best to ensure a fair and accurate decision. If they want to come to America and live with us, they can do so,” Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Ankara and Donald Trump’s special envoy for Syria, told Turkey’s government-run news service Anadolu Agency on July 12.

If British-American historian Bernard Lewis was still alive, a consequence of relaying this easy solution to the equation would be Lewis calling you a Middle Eastern primate who thinks in conspiracy theories.

Perhaps, all of this coalition-building has come about from deep social, ethnic, political and gender dynamics (avoid the “economic” here so as not to be labelled Marxist). Sure. A survey would also help to explain why Trump bombed Iran last month.

Cheap bunk and bosh

The latest spectacle put on for the media circus began on July 11 with a hyped-up showpiece staged by 20-30 PKK militants in front of a cave in northern Iraq.

Hacks were transported from Turkey. Before their eyes and cameras, militants tossed their Kalashnikovs into a cauldron. A perfect attraction to mesmerise the media pack. “Historical” headlines. “Sexy” story photos and videos.

Kalashnikov rifles are in fact a PKK trademark weapon. Kurds call them Kalash.

The bunk and bosh cauldron event over, the media monkeys were primed for some more “historical” stuff, to be uttered by Erdogan at an AKP gathering the next day. This turned out to be the announcement of the AKP-MHP-PKK coalition.

Erdogan’s wife, Turkey’s First Lady Emine Erdogan, cried before the cameras following her husband’s speech. “Historical”. Emotional. Big developments are clearly under way. If only mere mortals could explain what they see.

What’s going on?

In May 2024, following the local elections held two months earlier, bne IntelliNews reported on how Erdogan was considering his options for getting rid of junior coalition ally MHP, particularly with regard to its leader Devlet Bahceli.

Erdogan had not found what he was looking for in dealings with the main opposition Republican People’s Party’s (CHP’s) new leader Ozgur Ozel and as we reported in July 2024, he was therefore steering clear of collapsing his coalition with the MHP.

After Erdogan turned to the Kurds following dialogue with Ozel, murmurs entered into circulation in the media, along the lines of: “Erdogan wants to normalise with the Kurds as well, just as he did with Ozel… But what will he do with [nationalist] Bahceli?... Hmm…”

At this point, Bahceli pulled off a sharp professional political manoeuvre. He took matters into his own hands, avoiding an Erdogan-instigated exclusion. It was last October that Bahceli shocked onlookers by holding out an invitation to the PKK’s Ocalan to address DEM’s parliamentary group in the legislature. 

bne IntelliNews noted: “Concerns over the reaction of the nationalist Bahceli had apparently become unnecessary since he had already okayed a coalition with the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan prior to the rerun local election in Istanbul in 2019.”

November brings Trump

Trump won his return to the White House a month later. Syria’s Assad regime fell a month after that. Given that Hamas had launched its “kamikaze” cross-border strike from Gaza against Israel on October 7, 2023, Iran suddenly found itself in the position in which it had lost its influence across the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Syria.

In December 2024, bne IntelliNews noted: “The next stop for Israel, prior to Tehran, looks like Iran’s proxies in Iraq.” That proved not to be the case. Israel instead directly bombed Iran in June.

Since January, this publication has been repeating: “Do not let press reports fool you. All of the US proxies, including Turkey, are on the same path.”

In January, bne IntelliNews noted: “After Trump takes office on January 20, Erdogan may find himself in a position that makes it necessary to recognise the de facto Kurdish regional government in northern Syria just as he recognised the Kurdish regional government (KRG) in Iraq.”

“Erdogan officials have, meanwhile, been holding talks with… Ocalan… It is not clear whether some serious matters are under discussion or whether some meaningful results can be achieved. The discussions are definitely related to the developments in Syria,” this publication added.

Since February, this media outlet has also advised more than once: “It would be no surprise if Israel ‘solves’ its last problem [namely Iran] during the second Trump term of office.”

The problem remains unsolved. A ground offensive may be necessary in the coming period.

Disarmament saga

In January, Human Rights Watch (HRW) wrote in the Turkey section of its World Report 2025 that Turkey’s negotiating process with Ocalan had not addressed the rights deficit in Turkey endured by the Kurds. This remains a fact as of July.

In February, after Ocalan called on the PKK to lay down arms, bne IntelliNews noted: It is “not the first [call] of its kind. Nor is it serious”.

The laying down of arms is a story told to the crowds. No arms beyond a handful will be laid down. The weapons are needed for the state-like enterprise in northern Syria and for a possible ground offensive in Iran.

PKK is headquartered in its Qandil base in northern Iraq, not far from the border with Iran. In May, we noted: "Following World War I, the Kurds were divided among four states. Two parts have so far been ‘liberated’. The next part will be Kurdistan province in Iran."

Coalition against Imamoglu

In March, Turkey’s government jailed Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, Erdogan’s chief political rival. Since then, the number of jailed CHP mayors has reached 16.

In May, after the PKK announced once again that it would lay down arms, this publication pointed to the “Coalition against Imamoglu”.

“The latest announcement by the PKK allows the regime to argue at home that it won a victory against the PKK and that it is time to legitimise the Kurds. Meanwhile, it can champion its peace efforts whenever a foreign partner attempts to talk about Imamoglu,” we added.

In the past two months, this publication has stated and restated that the PKK was “aligning with Turkey's ruling coalition”.

And on July 8, we noted: “The upcoming ‘weapon surrendering’ videos are another step in the ongoing public relations campaign.”

What now?

Turkey’s new coalition plans to change the country’s constitutional law to legalise Erdogan’s unending rule. If it can attract 20-30 more MPs from the CHP, which is possible with ex-party chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu currently dividing the party, the coalition will not need to hold a referendum to do so.

A total of 360 seats in parliament is required to spark a referendum on a constitutional amendment, while 400 are needed to change the constitution without running a referendum.

The AKP has 272 seats. Add the MHP’s 47 and Dem’s 56 and the number rises to 375. The regime can also count on some seats held by smaller allies. However, it still falls short of 400. Some 20-30 more seats will be required.

Erdogan leads, laws follow

Don’t neglect to note that Erdogan does not need a constitutional amendment to remain in power. Erdogan remains in power and the lawmakers change the laws to legalise his rule.

While calling for a previous constitutional amendment, executed with a referendum in 2018, Bahceli made a telling remark in 2016: “A legal solution should be sought for the de facto situation.”

Based on the then constitution, the president was supposed to be bipartisan, yet Erdogan was not complying with the stipulation. If in the new amendment it is written that Erdogan will not need to win an election to remain in his post, another de facto situation will be legalised. 

Let’s look at another de facto truth. Since 2014, Erdogan has not won an election. After each poll, he announces that he has attracted 52% of the vote, and the feckless CHP then confirms that it is indeed the case.

Imamoglu, jailed since March, was supposed to be the long-awaited politician who would step forward to challenge the next “52%” proclamation of an Erdogan victory.