Türkiye faces a remarkable set of geopolitical challenges and opportunities at present which have the potential to give big wins but also present new headaches for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He seems to be good at playing multidimensional geopolitics so let’s see how he manages through all these.

First, and a positive, Donald Trump seems to have genuine respect for Erdogan, appreciating a strong, male leader, who also excels in a world of transactional power plays. Trump sees Erdogan as someone with whom he can do business and who can potentially give him solutions in Syria, with Russia-Ukraine, and as also a useful player on Iran, while also potentially being a large market for US weapons. Erdogan appreciates the fact that Trump has not lectured him on recent domestic poltical events, which has left the Turkish opposition somewhat exposed in the context of the on-going cases against the CHP, [Istanbul mayor and chief political rival to Erdogan, Ekrem] Imamoglu et al. The appointment of Tom Barrack as US ambassador to Türkiye is appreciated in Ankara. His roots in the region means he understands the sensibilities, and those Turks I spoke to who had met Barrack were hugely impressed with his knowledge of the key issues facing the region. For Türkiye, it’s useful that Barrack has a bigger remit than just Türkiye but also as the US point person for Armenia-Azerbaijan, Syria and Lebanon, and Barrack has a strong line direct into Trump. Barrack is seen as a deal maker, with whom Erdogan can do business.

Importantly for Trump, Türkiye is offering solutions in Syria, and a backstop for key US interests, such as countering ISIS, which could allow the withdrawal of US troops. Solutions are also being sought on the illusive S400 [Russian missile defence system] issue which could bring Türkiye back into the F-35 [fighter jet] programme, and if CAATSA [Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act] sanctions are lifted see Türkiye benefit from much sought after defence technology sales.

Syria is though complicated, and Turkiye’s efforts to stabilise the country by supporting a unitary solution backing the al-Sharaa government are being undermined by Israeli military action. Israel seems to have diametrically oppposite interests to Türkiye, wanting a Federal solution which keeps the country weak, and unstable. Such a strategy also pushes back on any thoughts of Türkiye having a sphere of influence in Syria and towards Israel’s borders.

Recent Israeli military strikes against Syrian military infrastructure and in support of Druze groups can be seen in this context. Israel also appears to be supporting Kurdish groups in Syria, again as a foil to Turkiye’s interests, but which potentially complicate Türkiye’s efforts to secure peace at home and an accord with Kurdish groups – and the potential therein for a huge peace dividend.

All the above complicates issues for the Trump administration as the risk here is that competing Turkish and Israeli interests in Syria comes to some kind of direct conflict. Türkiye for one would be loathed– to get into a direct military fight with Israel, given its own lack of advanced air defence systems, or fifth generation fighter jets to match Israel [which boasts F-35s].

A problem for both Türkiye and the US at present though is the overconfidence of Israel after a series of military wins in Lebanon, Iran et al. Can the US hold Israel back from using its military might while it has the opportunity to shape the region in its interests? But in keeping its neighbours weak and divided Israel risks sustaining security threats for other powers in the region such as Türkiye and even Europe (instability in the region creates yet more risk of migrant flows).

Second, and at home, the Erdogan administration is keen to reinvigorate the Kurdish peace process. The conversion of Erdogan’s nationalist ally, the MHP, to supporting a Kurdish peace is quite extraordinary but I think also reflects an understanding that given challenging regional geopolitics – particularly the rising, now almost dominant regional power of Israel – that if Türkiye does not offer concessions to Kurds at home, Israel might exploit the opportunity to promote the creation of a Greater Kurdish state from land in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Türkiye.

Negotiations by the Erdogan administration with Kurdish groups at home have already yielded results, including the [Abdullah] Ocalan statement on giving up the armed struggle, and the ceremonial burning of weapons by the PKK in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq. A lasting peace deal seems possible – the leadership on both the Turkish and Kurdish sides seems to want it, the asks are not enormous and the prior biggest impediment – Turkish public opinion – also now seems to be moving in favour.

For Erdogan a Kurdish peace brings three big positives: a) The prospect of Kurdish Democratic Party MPs backing to change in the constitution to allow Erdogan to run for another term in office — overcoming the current two term limit. b) Prospect of an improvement in relations with neighbours in Iraq and Syria, as Kurdish tensions ease, but also with Europe as the Kurdish diaspora would be less vocal in campaigning against Turkish interests. c) Potentially a huge economic peace dividend, helped by point a) just given but also by the prospect of new investment and reconstruction spend into Turkiye’s southeast. Finance Minister Mehmet Simsek has estimated that the cost of the 40-odd year Kurdish conflict has been $1.8 trillion, or $40-50bn a year which merely no longer being a drag would be a boon to the Turkish economy. Then think of the reconstruction spend.

Optimism is building of a Kurdish peace – and I think it happens.

Third, we are closer to a long term Armenia – Azerbaijan peace deal than at any time for the past 30-odd years also. For Türkiye this would open up its border with Armenia and also boost trade routes and flows to Central Asia and China. Turkish military support (drones) to Azerbaijan was instrumental in Baku’s recent victorys in wars over Nagorno-Karabakh. De facto Azerbaijan won the wars, and the fine detail is now left for final negotiation and agreement on the peace deal. The Pashinyan administration in Yerevan seems understanding and willing to deal/compromise, seeing the bigger win now also of a huge peace dividend. It is also grappling with the challenge of trying to reset its relations with Moscow – recognition that the Russian security backstop failed in the recent wars with Azerbaijan, and understanding that Türkiye now perhaps provides a more logical strategic and economic partner.

Azerbaijan, and perhaps Israel are now complicating factors, as still is Russia. Azerbaijan appears super, perhaps over, confident after its recent military victories over Armenia and perhaps sees the chance for further gains over Armenia – control over the Zangezur corridor to Nakhchivan [the Azerbaijani exclave bordering Turkey]. It is hence playing hardball with the Pashinyan administration, demanding changes to its constitution to affirm Azeri gains. These are difficult for Pashinyan to deliver given he faces elections next year and is badly trailing in the polls.

Russia’s hand is also likely a force meddling in Armenian domestic politics supporting its old allies in the nationalist opposition. Pashinyan is seeking allies in Türkiye and Europe. Indeed, Pashinyan has made various recent trips to meet President Erdogan in Türkiye and they seem to have a genuinely warm personal relationship. Azerbaijan though seems to be playing a game to undermine Pashinyan in the hope that a nationalist opposition return to power in elections in Armenia next year will then create a pretext for another military campaign to capture the Zangezur corridor by force. Israel appears to be egging Azerbaijan on – and has been supplying arms to Baku. Likely Israel thinks any peace in Armenia–Azerbaijan would be a win for Türkiye – it is – and hence seems to be trying to complicate things. Türkiye does supply military kit to Baku but it’s leverage is limited by the fact that Azerbaijan is a source of energy, financing and investment into Türkiye, hence it does not want to play hardball to force Baku to compromise.

Then into all this comes the US, and Russia.

The US, like Türkiye sees scope for a peace deal – Nobel peace prize for Trump? Therein Barrack came up with the innovative solution (actually the Europeans suggested this first) of the US administering the Zangezur corridor through a 100-year lease. That would keep the peace and facilitate trade. I think both Armenia and Azerbaijan would accept that, albeit it’s complicated constitutionally for Pashinyan and his weak domestic political position means he cannot really force through that solution. Indeed, even having the issue raised has been a gift to the opposition.

Russia also seems less than enthused by the prospect of US troops on the ground in the South Caucasus. Likely recent actions against Azeri citizens in Russia was meant to send a warning shot to Baku not to accept the U.S. plan. They perhaps did not plan for the incensed Azeri reaction – closing Russia’s Sputnik [news agency] operation in Baku and arresting Russian citizens. The latter might also reflect overconfidence by Azerbaijan, perhaps they are eager to demonstrate it no longer needs to be pushed around by Russia and is now moving in a much more independent orbit. Relations are at a low point between Azerbaijan and Russia, and Baku is perhaps hoping that Moscow has its hands full in Ukraine and will not risk a military option – it might lose given the now potent capabilities of the Azeri military and given the Turkish and Israeli military tech support.

Net-net, an Armenian–Azerbaijan peace is close, is possible, but could still all unravel into further conflict if not carefully managed. It is good though that Tom Barrack is engaged on the issue, and Trump cares.

Fourth, the Russia-Ukraine war and Türkiye would potentially be a huge beneficiary from a peace given it is well regarded by Ukraine and could benefit from big reconstruction and defence contracts. But, don’t hold your breath, as Trump has so mismanaged the process that we are further off from peace than we were before he took office. The war goes on in my view, which in itself creates risks still for Türkiye –  could Ukraine lose, which would see a disastrous Russian return to dominate the Black Sea? Türkiye is though still benefitting from the kudos of being trusted by both Russia (somewhat) and Ukraine and hence is a useful conduit and location for peace talks. This also gives Erdogan brownie points with Trump.

Fifth, and connected to four above, assuming the Russia threat to Europe remains, Türkiye looks set to be a big winner from European insecurity and the weakening of the US military backstop to Europe. Europe needs to spend, spend, spend on defence, and Türkiye has a large military industrial complex which can fill gaps left in Europe. It also has leading technology in drones.

Europe should bring Türkiye in from the cold, and boost military and defence cooperation and production, but also a deepening of trade and economic ties - Customs Union plus plus. Post Munich Security Confernce 25 it’s all about defence autonomy and Türkiye wants military technology exchange, it has bargaining power and we saw that over the past year with the Leonardo-Baykar deal. Italy stole a March there on its European and British peers who were literally asleep at the wheel – or computer screen of the drone. But the European security challenge is a huge opportunity for Türkiye to help Europe counter the threat from Russia and fill the vacuum left by US disengagement.

This commentary was first published by author and veteran Turkey analyst Timothy Ash on his Substack platform, @tashcon blog here.