Israel's latest bombing campaign of central locations in Damascus, Daraa and other locations following days of clashes between the Druze religious minority and the Turkish-backed government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa has worsened the situation in the country.

The Arab Druze, roughly 3% of Syria's population, have historically balanced loyalty to local powers with a commitment to self-preservation. The fall of Assad's regime in December 2024 created both opportunity and uncertainty, particularly for those in southern Syria. Now, with Israel vowing to "protect" them and reports of Druze militias clashing with Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces, a new political entity could emerge under Israel's influence.

Netanyahu's strikes on Damascus appear to serve broader strategic objectives beyond immediate protection of Druze civilians. When the Israeli air force targeted the General Staff building and areas near the presidential palace, the operation seemed designed to demonstrate Israel's capacity to act decisively against Syria's new government whilst ostensibly defending minority rights.

The strategic context is significant. Syria's new authorities are struggling to consolidate control after decades of war, creating opportunities for external intervention. As Russian analyst Elena Suponina observed, this intervention appears to serve dual purposes: demonstrating that Israel will act when it perceives Syria cannot maintain order, and potentially creating leverage for future negotiations over the Golan Heights.

However, there appears to be a deeper strategic calculus at work. Middle East expert Kirill Semenov's analysis suggests Israel's preference for maintaining "controlled chaotic entities" rather than stable states on its borders. The Druze situation provides justification for what increasingly resembles efforts to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria.

Historical precedent suggests caution. Israel's previous attempt to establish a Christian Maronite client state in southern Lebanon lasted until 2000, ultimately proving unsuccessful for all parties involved. The pattern of identifying minority groups, claiming protective responsibilities, and using this as justification for intervention has proven problematic in practice.

The Druze community's response reflects their historical pragmatism. Having survived centuries of regional upheaval through careful political navigation, many Druze leaders understand that external protection can become dependency. The community faces the challenge of balancing immediate security concerns with long-term integration into Syria's evolving political structure. Israel has already cautioned Druze not to cross the border into Syria to assist their ethnic kin, despite some breaking through the fence in the Golan.

The domestic Israeli context adds another dimension to these developments. Netanyahu's corruption trial has been suspended due to the current escalation, raising questions about the relationship between external military action and internal political pressures. With Israeli regional dominance now more pronounced following Iran's reduced influence and Assad's removal, the strategic environment has shifted significantly.

The Syrian authorities managed to broker a ceasefire with the Druze in Suwayda through Sheikh Yusuf Jarboa. That's how these things should be resolved - through dialogue, not airstrikes. But Israel's intervention has complicated those negotiations and sent a signal to other minority groups that they can challenge Damascus with impunity.

Syria's Druze don't need Israel's protection – they need space to work out their differences with Damascus without foreign interference. Israel's bombs aren't helping them; they're making everything worse.

Public opinion remains divided. Some observers praise the move as a pragmatic bulwark against radical Islamism, suggesting an autonomous Druze region could stabilise the area. Others warn of potential consequences, arguing that further fragmenting Syria could embolden other minorities and deepen regional instability. As one social media post noted, the Druze themselves face internal divisions: whilst some in Hader have expressed pro-Israel leanings, others in Suwayda reject foreign involvement entirely.

Damascus is paranoid that the Syrian Druze could splinter off, with Israeli flags flying above Suwayda already and troops moving in on the ground, according to some social media accounts. The situation remains entirely fluid currently and somewhat unexpected. What happens now is entirely up to the different factions now in control of the majority of Syria. The sooner the international community recognises this, the better chance there is of preventing another Lebanon-style disaster.