As tensions look like they are coming off the boil between China and the United States, an increasingly important theatre for global influence is emerging: Southeast Asia. From infrastructure and investment to trade and technology, the region’s nations are being quietly drawn into Beijing’s orbit — and in the event of a full-blown regional split triggered by tariffs or trade decoupling, several of them appear more likely to lean toward China than Washington.

Though the US retains considerable soft power and security clout in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing’s approach — driven by pragmatism, deep-pocketed diplomacy, and cultural affinity — is beginning to pay dividends. In some parts of Southeast Asia, the shift is more than subtle. It is structural. This is particularly noticeable in countries including Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia.

A region in the middle

Comprising 11 countries with a combined population of nearly 700mn, Southeast Asia is not a monolith. Yet as a bloc, the region has one clear priority: growth. Most of its economies are still developing, and for these nations, infrastructure, trade facilitation, and capital inflows matter far more than ideological alignment. That is the space in which China has stepped in with purpose.

Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), often caricatured as a debt trap diplomacy vehicle in Western commentary, has nonetheless resonated with several ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members. Roads, ports, railways and power plants have materialised where other donors hesitated or hedged.

In Laos, for instance, the tiny landlocked country now has a high-speed railway connecting it to China’s southern Yunnan province — a testament to Beijing’s infrastructure prowess. Built at a cost of around $6bn (roughly half of Laos’ GDP), the railway has faced questions about long-term debt sustainability. But for Laotians, it offers a tangible escape from geographical isolation. China, not the US, made it happen.

Tariffs and trade realignments

The US-China trade war, far from resolving itself under the Biden administration, has only morphed under Trump into a deeper technological and strategic decoupling although there are now signs that tariffs on Chinese goods will be substantially reduced. Semiconductor restrictions and export controls have tightened. Meanwhile, Washington has ramped up rhetoric around “friendshoring” and “de-risking,” signalling a desire to move manufacturing out of China and into so-called more “trusted” partners.

For Southeast Asia, this shift offers short-term opportunity but long-term tension. Vietnam, for example, has become a favoured alternative for global supply chains seeking to reduce exposure to China. Its electronics exports have surged. Apple now assembles AirPods and iPads there. Yet paradoxically, Vietnam’s trade with China has also ballooned. Much of its input material still flows through Chinese supply chains.

It is a dynamic repeated across the region.

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are all benefiting from the partial relocation of factories. Yet they remain deeply interwoven with the Chinese economy — not just as suppliers or markets, but increasingly as partners in industrial policy and digital infrastructure.

A growing digital influence

China’s digital footprint in Southeast Asia is also growing rapidly. Huawei, despite being blacklisted by several Western nations, continues to provide backbone infrastructure for 5G networks in Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia. Chinese apps dominate mobile phones across the region, from e-commerce platform Lazada (owned by Alibaba) to video-sharing app TikTok (owned by Beijing-headquartered ByteDance).

Fintech features too. Ant Group and Tencent have partnered with local firms to offer mobile payments and digital wallets — filling a void in financial inclusion. For many young Southeast Asians, the tech products they use every day are more likely to be Chinese than American.

As such, with millions of younger residents around Southeast Asia, this digital influence may prove more enduring than physical infrastructure. It shapes not only consumption patterns but also norms around data governance, surveillance, and online discourse — areas where China offers a starkly different model from the liberal West.

Who will follow Beijing?

If the global trading order continues to fragment and regional blocs harden around China and the US, the big question is: which countries in Southeast Asia would side with Beijing?

The most obvious candidate is Cambodia. Prime Minister Hun Manet, like his father Hun Sen, has embraced Chinese investment with open arms. Chinese companies dominate the country’s garment sector and construction industry. In return, Beijing has received geopolitical loyalty, including Cambodian support on contentious issues like the South China Sea.

Laos is another firm Beijing ally, albeit one more reliant than enthusiastic. Its economic dependency leaves little room for geopolitical manoeuvre.

Myanmar, engulfed in civil conflict following the 2021 military coup, has found itself increasingly isolated by the West. China, with its long-standing ties to the military and border-based influence, remains a critical partner — though one whose embrace is cautious and transactional.

Elsewhere, the picture is more nuanced. Thailand, long an American ally, has steadily deepened economic and defence ties with China. While Bangkok continues to hedge, its political elite is notably receptive to Beijing’s overtures — particularly in infrastructure and energy.

Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, sits more squarely on the fence. Former President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) courted investment from both superpowers — Chinese capital for nickel refining and railways; American backing for clean energy and digital startups. But his successor Prabowo Subianto may face pressure to pick a side, especially if tariffs or sanctions escalate.

Malaysia and the Philippines are more firmly in the balancing camp — publicly aligned with the US on maritime issues while reaping the benefits of Chinese trade and investment. Manila’s recent naval skirmishes with China in the South China Sea, however, suggest that the Philippines may tilt further toward Washington if tensions persist.

Vietnam remains the region’s paradox: an ideological communist state wary of Chinese hegemony, yet deeply tied to China’s economy. Its growing defence cooperation with the US — including arms talks — signals strategic concern. But barring outright conflict, Hanoi is unlikely to sever economic links with its northern neighbour.

The US response: late but typically loud

Washington though is not sitting idly by. Through its Indo-Pacific Strategy, it has pledged to counterbalance Chinese influence via investment partnerships, diplomatic re-engagement, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Defence ties have also deepened: rotational troop deployments in the Philippines, joint exercises with Vietnam, and security dialogues with Indonesia and Singapore have all been revitalised.

But America’s offer to the region often lacks one thing China provides in abundance: immediacy. Chinese roads, factories, and fibre-optic cables come with fewer conditions. American aid and projects are often tied to governance benchmarks, environmental safeguards, or lengthy legislative approvals. In this regard – links to the US are seen as idealistic by many; links to China as realistic.

Moreover, the US lacks a cohesive trade policy in Asia. Having withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, Washington has been reluctant to rejoin large multilateral trade agreements — a reluctance that undermines its economic relevance in the region.

A shifting centre of gravity

Because of this, the story of Southeast Asia’s future may well be the story of how China reshapes the regional order, not through confrontation, but through co-option. This is influence by design, not decree.

Chinese power is not without limits, however. Resentment over land grabs, environmental degradation, and labour practices has sparked protests against some BRI projects. Geopolitical overreach — especially in the South China Sea — risks galvanising resistance. But as a long game, China’s economic statecraft appears to be working and while the countries of Southeast Asia will act in their own interests, those interests increasingly run parallel to Beijing’s.