Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban are facing a challenge from at least four different armed groups in the country’s northeastern Badakhshan Province. Two have attacked Taliban positions in the province since mid-July.
The Taliban claim at least one of the groups is supported by Pakistan, but the conflict area is also close to Tajikistan’s border and Tajikistan has a long history of supporting anti-Taliban groups.
Violence has been slowly increasing in Badakhshan due mainly to opium poppy-cultivation and gold-mining in the province. The introduction of armed resistance fighters could spark widespread violence in an area wedged between Tajikistan and Pakistan, with a short eastern border with China.
Resistance renewed
In a surprising development, on July 17, a group calling itself Sepahiyan-e Mihan (Soldiers of the Homeland) seized control of administrative buildings in Badakhshan’s Yaftali-Sufla (also known as Yaftali Payin) district. The 20-25 Sepahiyan-e Mihan fighters reportedly disarmed the Taliban fighters in the area and took weapons and equipment from the police and military stations before driving away in government vehicles. The group also briefly raised their flag at the district compound.

Fighters who eized control of key buildings in Yaftali-Sufla raised their flag at the district compound (Credit: Social media).
Local Taliban officials later released a statement saying “irresponsible and malicious armed individuals” had attacked Yaftali-Sufla while the district’s leaders were away.
The Taliban claimed reinforcements sent to the area drove the intruders out, with several captured.
Locals acknowledged that after the Sepahiyan-e Mihan fighters left, Taliban helicopters appeared searching for the group.
A more serious incident happened in the Topkhana area of Badakhshan’s Zebak district on July 23 when armed fighters from a group called the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) attacked several Taliban positions.

The AFF is said to be led by Afghan National Army Chief of Staff General Yasin Zia, seen here in 2020 greeting commandos of the then Afghan National Army (Credit: US Army Spc. Jeffery J. Harris, public domain).
Reports said the AFF is led by former Afghan National Army Chief of Staff General Yasin Zia, and that his fighters are former military and security personnel. Zia said his forces captured three Taliban bases.
Despite the Taliban rushing reinforcements to the scene, fighting was still reported on July 24 with casualties on both sides.
The AFF claimed to have killed 21 Taliban fighters and wounded 37 others. Some of the latter were evacuated by helicopter to medical facilities in the provincial capital Faizabad. The Taliban reported killing five AFF troops.
The Taliban accuse Pakistan of supporting the AFF and allowing its fighters to enter Zebak district from the Pakistani region of Chitral.
Besides these two anti-Taliban groups, there is also the National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Masoud, son of legendary Mujaheddin commander during the Soviet occupation and later prominent military and political figure Ahmad Shah Masoud.
Since the arrival of independence in 1991, Tajikistan’s government has supported both the Masouds and their mainly ethnic Tajik forces. After the Taliban returned to power, Tajik authorities allowed the NRF to open a representative office in the Tajik capital Dushanbe.
Since August 2021, the NRF has attacked Taliban forces in several northern Afghan provinces, including Badakhshan in spring this year.
The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP, or ISIS-K) has also carried out attacks in Badakhshan, notably the June 2023 bombing of a mosque in Faizabad during the funeral of a provincial Taliban official, which killed at least 11 people.
Already a shaky situation
Badakhshan Province is located where three mountain ranges – Pamir, Hindu Kush and Karakoram – meet. An estimated 1.2mn people are scattered across valley areas.

Afghanistan's border with China lies at the end of Badakhshan Province's Wakhan Corridor (Credit: GMT, cc-by-sa 3.0).
The eastern part of the province is the
Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip of land in an elevated mountain valley, at the end of which is Afghanistan’s border with China. It was formed when diplomats in the late 19
th century agreed to create a buffer zone between territories of the British and Russian empires. It now separates Tajikistan and Pakistan.
The majority of Badakhshan’s people are ethnic Tajiks. They are mainly herders and farmers, and growing opium poppies has been a source of income for generations.
After reclaiming power in August 2021, the Taliban vowed to eradicate opium poppy cultivation.
In a village in Badakhshan’s Jurm district in May 2025, Taliban forces arriving to destroy poppy fields were met with
resistance from farmers and local ethnic Tajik Taliban fighters. Shooting broke out. One villager was killed and six were wounded.
The next month, shooting erupted in Khash district when the Taliban brought three tractors to plough up opium fields. Locals burned the tractors, sparking a gun battle. Eight protesters were
reportedly killed and 27 wounded.
Increasingly, fresh Taliban forces sent to Badakhshan are mainly composed of ethnic Pashtuns, something which predictably draws the ire of the Tajik native population.
Gold mining in Badakhshan has taken off since the Taliban’s return to power. More recently, a growing number of mining facilities have appeared on the Tajik side of the border.
Locals in Tajikistan say gold-mining operations on the Afghan side of the river that divides the two countries – the Pyanj – are changing the current of the river, flooding some villages in Tajikistan.
Tensions over this appeared to be the cause of a
clash between Tajik border forces and Taliban fighters in late August 2025 that left one Taliban fighter dead and four others wounded.
Another
shootout between Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters took place two months later. It resulted in an unspecified number of casualties on both sides of the border.
On November 26, 2025, someone on Badakhshan’s side of the border launched a primitive drone attack on a gold-mining camp in Tajikistan’s Shamsuddin Shohin district, killing three Chinese workers.
On November 30, two Chinese roadworkers in neighbouring Darvoz district were shot dead by someone on the Afghan side of the border.
Eyes on Badakhshan
The current instability and the possibility of worse to come in Badakhshan is a concern for not only the Taliban, but for Tajikistan, Pakistan, and China too.
China has been
working on a possible trade route through the remote Wakhan Corridor. That plan would presumably be postponed or dropped altogether should unrest spread throughout other areas of Badakhshan Province.
Pakistan is already entangled in this problem.
The Taliban’s accusation of Pakistani involvement comes amid a protracted conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan that has already lasted for many months, leaving hundreds of people dead and wounded on both sides of the border.
It would not be surprising if Pakistan were aiding the AFF.
Tajikistan, meanwhile, was the only Central Asian country to publicly
voice alarm at the return to power of the Taliban five years ago.
The Tajik government was reluctant to even engage in a dialogue with the Taliban, though the other Central Asian states were relatively quick to open lines of communication.
Tajikistan moved to allow the younger Masoud to stay frequently in Dushanbe and there were
allegations in 2021 that the Tajik government was sending weapons to NRF fighters in Afghanistan.
Since 2025, Tajikistan has quietly been holding talks with the Taliban, mainly on Tajik electricity exports that have continued to flow to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s return, but more recently about violence along their border.
Still, the Taliban will undoubtedly be watching to see if the Tajik government reverts to its traditional stance and helps anti-Taliban ethnic Tajik forces in northern Afghanistan.
If ethnic Tajik anti-Taliban groups are able to seize and hold territory in Badakhshan, especially along the Tajik border, it will be interesting to see how the Tajik authorities respond.
Generally, this will be true for all of Central Asia.
Establishing ties with the Taliban was based on the feeling that Taliban rule was a reality and since there was nothing that could be done to change that, it was best to make the most out of a tough situation.
If it looks like the Taliban is losing control of Badakhshan, will that change calculations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as in Tajikistan?