For decades, the United States has been the principal arms supplier to Taiwan, a self-governing democracy that China regards as a breakaway province across the Taiwan Strait. American military sales to Taipei are often framed in Washington as a moral imperative – a commitment to help a democratic partner defend itself.

But beneath this well-worn rhetoric lies a more complex story: one shaped by global power dynamics, shifting military technology, and persistent economic incentives oftentimes forced upon a US-friendly outpost on the Western Pacific.

Since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 – the same year Washington formally recognised the Communist People’s Republic of China – the US has pledged to provide Taiwan with “defensive articles and services” sufficient for self-defence. This strategic ambiguity, designed to deter both Chinese aggression and a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, has given the US wide latitude in its arms transfers.

As a result, over the past four decades, the result has been a steady stream of weapons systems, training and logistical support from American defence firms to Taiwan’s armed forces. Yet critics argue that not all of this assistance has been necessary in countering the military threat posed by China.

A long history of arms sales

Taiwan’s earliest American-made equipment, including F-5 fighter jets and Knox-class frigates, reflected Cold War-era military thinking: a conventional force prepared to repel an amphibious invasion. But over time, the nature of the Chinese threat evolved – and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernised at an astonishing pace.

Today, China fields a military force that dwarfs Taiwan’s. The PLA Navy is now the largest in the world by number of ships. Its missile arsenal includes precision-strike systems aimed at Taiwan’s command centres and airbases. In the skies, China’s J-20 stealth fighters and radar-evading cruise missiles place Taiwan’s ageing fleet of American F-16s and Indigenous Defence Fighters at a marked disadvantage.

Against this backdrop, though, the US has continued to sell and in many ways force Taiwan to buy arms – some of them cutting-edge, others less so. Recent packages have included HIMARS rocket systems designed over a quarter of a century ago, Harpoon anti-ship missiles and upgraded F-16V fighters with advanced avionics and radar. In 2020, the Trump administration approved over $5bn in arms sales to Taipei, a figure sustained by the Biden administration through a series of smaller, more targeted deals, often framed as “fast and asymmetric”.

But not all Taiwanese leaders are convinced.

Pressure and procurement – the American way

There is a growing sense in Taipei that Washington’s insistence on certain purchases is driven as much by domestic industrial interests as it is by strategic necessity for Taiwan.

American lawmakers, particularly those from districts hosting defence contractors, are known to lobby vigorously for foreign military sales. The result, according to some analysts, is a pattern in which Taiwan is ‘encouraged’ to purchase systems that benefit US industry but do not necessarily match Taiwan’s own defence strategy.

The controversial purchase of M1A2 Abrams tanks is a case in point. The deal, approved in 2019, was worth nearly $2bn. Yet many defence experts questioned whether the 70-ton vehicles which are designed for open warfare in the deserts of the Middle East are appropriate for the mountainous terrain and dense urban environments of Taiwan.

And these were the first new tanks received by Taiwan in almost 25-years after a shipment of M60A3 TTS tanks crossed the Pacific in the late 90s through to 2001.

On the waves, Taiwan has also been offered older-model naval ships and aircraft parts that some critics describe as “second-tier”. While not obsolete, these systems require significant maintenance and upgrades to remain in any way viable in a high-intensity conflict.

Strategic realism or symbolic support?

The US, however, insists that its arms sales to Taiwan are tailored to help the island adopt a “porcupine strategy” in making any potential Chinese invasion so costly that Beijing is deterred from acting in the first place.

Taipei has increasingly leaned into this model, investing in mobile Stinger missiles, improved radar networks and indigenous drone and missile production. In this context, US sales of precision-guided munitions and support systems appear more relevant.

Still, there remains a fundamental and glaringly obvious financial imbalance: China spends more on defence in a month than Taiwan does in a year. The PLA continues to rehearse blockade scenarios, cyber-attacks, and joint air-sea operations that outstrip Taiwan’s capacity to respond on its own.

And while the US remains Taiwan’s security partner of choice, it is not a formal treaty ally. On paper, the US does not even recognise Taiwan as a full diplomatic ally.

Because of this ambiguity over how, if at all, the US would react were China to invade hangs over every arms deal and defence conversation. American weapons might buy time in the event of a Chinese assault – but they do not ensure direct US intervention.

Hegseth’s warning – and the 2027 timeline

Amid growing concern over the cross-Strait balance of power therefore, the US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth recently drew headlines for his stark warning of an “imminent” Chinese move against Taiwan. Hegseth, citing internal Pentagon estimates, suggested that a potential conflict could unfold “sooner than many think”.

It was a claim that many before have made, albeit not at the level held by Hegseth.

However, while Hegseth’s comments underscored the urgency felt in some US defence circles, they also referenced a projected timeline of 2027 – not next week as many media outlets have implied in recent days. Besides drawing the scorn of more astute Taiwan watchers, the date aligns with prior US intelligence assessments that highlight the PLA’s goal of achieving the capability to invade Taiwan by the end of the current decade.

As ever, such forecasts are not predictions but planning scenarios. Nonetheless, they do influence defence postures, congressional rhetoric, and the cadence of US arms sales to Taiwan – reinforcing a climate of urgency that is both strategic and, at times, politically convenient.

Beyond questions of military strategy, there is the simple reality that arms sales are big business. The US defence industry relies heavily on foreign military sales to sustain production lines and support high-skilled jobs. Taiwan, given its strategic significance and political alignment with the West, represents a relatively secure and dependable market.

Defence giants such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing have all been involved in Taiwan deals.

China, for its part, routinely retaliates by placing sanctions on these firms – a largely symbolic gesture, but one that illustrates the geopolitical stakes.

This blend of economic self-interest and strategic signalling is hardly unique to Taiwan. But on the island – where every sale is interpreted as a message to both Beijing and Washington – it carries disproportionate weight.

Reality on the ground

The US-Taiwan defence relationship is thus a marriage of pragmatism and politics. On one hand, Taiwan urgently needs modern capabilities to deter an increasingly assertive and aggressive China.

On the other, US arms packages are shaped as much by congressional lobbying and industrial incentives as they are by military planning and as long as cross-Strait tensions persist, and voices like Hegseth’s amplify the sense of looming confrontation, the economic pressure on – some say bullying of - Taiwan to keep buying American military hardware, will very likely intensify.