Iran's nuclear breakout capability survives Israeli assault

Iran's nuclear breakout capability survives Israeli assault
Iran's nuclear breakout capability survives Israeli assault / bne IntelliNews
By bnm Gulf bureau June 16, 2025

Iran retains the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons despite devastating Israeli strikes on its nuclear infrastructure in June 2025, though its timeline has been temporarily extended. The attacks represent a significant tactical success but fall short of eliminating Iran's nuclear threat.

As of May 2025, Iran possesses 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium – sufficient material for nine nuclear weapons if further enriched to weapons-grade levels. This represents a 50% increase since February and demonstrates Iran's accelerated production capacity despite international pressure. The Islamic Republic maintains 9,247.6 kg of total enriched uranium across all enrichment levels, dramatically exceeding the 202.8 kg limit under the abandoned nuclear deal.

Iran's enrichment infrastructure had reached unprecedented capacity before the strikes, with approximately 18,000 operating centrifuges producing 35-40 kg of 60% enriched uranium monthly. This production rate meant Iran could theoretically produce enough weapons-grade uranium for its first nuclear weapon within one week if it chose to break out.

Operation Rising Lion on June 13, 2025, marked Israel's largest military action against Iran since the 1980s Iran-Iraq War. The strikes achieved several critical objectives:

  • Complete destruction of Natanz's above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran's only surface facility producing 60% enriched uranium
  • Electrical infrastructure devastation at Natanz, knocking out power to underground centrifuge halls and potentially damaging thousands of centrifuges through uncontrolled shutdown
  • Key personnel eliminated, including nuclear scientists and senior military commanders
  • Supply chain disruption across multiple nuclear facilities

However, the strikes faced significant limitations. The deeply buried Fordow facility, housing Iran's most advanced centrifuges, appears largely intact. Military experts note that only the US military's 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator could reliably destroy such hardened underground facilities – munitions Israel does not possess.

US intelligence dramatically revised its assessment in 2024, removing longstanding assertions that Iran was not pursuing nuclear weapons development. Current intelligence indicates Iran has "undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device" including computer modelling and metallurgy experiments at civilian research institutes.

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that even before the strikes, Iran could produce weapons-grade uranium for multiple weapons within weeks. Post-strike analysis suggests Iran retains the capability to produce its first quantity of weapons-grade uranium at Fordow in 2-3 days once operations resume.

Iran's nuclear weapons programme builds on the AMAD Plan (1999-2003), which established critical technical foundations including warhead designs, implosion technology, and missile integration capabilities. Intelligence reports from 2024 suggest Iranian scientists are exploring "crude" nuclear weapon designs that could be completed within six months rather than the 1-2 years typically required for missile-deliverable warheads.

Key technical challenges remain manageable for Iran:

  • Uranium metallurgy: Converting enriched uranium gas into metallic cores
  • High explosives: Perfecting implosion systems for nuclear detonation
  • Engineering integration: Combining fissile cores with triggering mechanisms

Iran possesses the Middle East's largest ballistic missile arsenal, including systems specifically designed for nuclear delivery such as the Shahab-3, providing multiple delivery options for any future nuclear weapons.

Iranian officials immediately announced plans for a third enrichment facility following the strikes, along with installation of advanced centrifuges at existing sites. Nuclear experts assess Iran could restore basic enrichment operations within several months, as electrical infrastructure can be rebuilt relatively quickly and the core underground facilities remain intact.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) withdrew inspectors from Iranian nuclear facilities for safety reasons, creating an intelligence gap precisely when oversight is most critical. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi condemned the attacks as violations of international law while noting Iran's continued non-compliance with nuclear obligations.

The strikes may ultimately prove counterproductive by potentially accelerating Iran's nuclear timeline rather than delaying it. With conventional deterrence capabilities severely degraded through Israeli actions against its regional proxies, nuclear weapons represent Iran's most viable path to strategic deterrence.

Iran demonstrably retains the capability to produce nuclear weapons despite significant damage to its nuclear infrastructure. While the Israeli strikes achieved tactical success in disrupting enrichment operations and eliminating key personnel, they failed to destroy Iran's most critical underground facilities or eliminate its substantial uranium stockpiles.

The combination of preserved technical knowledge, existing weapons programme foundations, substantial fissile material stocks, and intact deep underground facilities means Iran's nuclear weapons timeline remains measured in months rather than years. The suspension of international inspections compounds this threat by reducing visibility into Iran's nuclear activities precisely when such oversight is most urgently needed.

Can Iran still make a nuclear bomb? Unequivocally yes. The question is no longer technical capability but political will and timing.

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