A chill seems to be creeping into Uzbek-Russian relations at a time when the Kremlin needs all the friends it can keep. 

A major factor for the sudden frost in relations appears to be Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s tendency to react vindictively when developments aren’t to his liking. 

The clearest sign of Putin’s displeasure with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev can be seen in a curt, one-sentence statement issued by the Kremlin following their August 31 bilateral meeting in Kyrgyzstan. 

The entirety of the statement read: “Following the opening ceremony of the VI World Nomad Games, a meeting took place between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev.” 

The account’s brevity and terse tone contrasted sharply with Kremlin statements issued following Putin’s meetings with other leaders on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO’s) annual summit, including China’s Xi Jinping, India’s Narendra Modi, and Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

It’s not like Putin and Mirziyoyev didn’t have much to talk about. According to an Uzbek readout of the meeting, the two touched on “topical issues on the bilateral agenda,” and explored ways to “further the expansion and strengthening of their comprehensive strategic partnership.” It went on to characterise economic relations as “dynamic.”

So why does Putin appear peeved with Uzbekistan?

There may be a couple of reasons, all of them containing suggestions of Kremlin weakness, something that Russia’s strongman cannot abide.

Perhaps the foremost cause is Uzbekistan’s evident reluctance to help Russia dig out of a deepening economic hole caused by Putin’s decision to launch an unprovoked attack on Ukraine, sparking a war now in its fifth year. Underwriting the war effort has sapped Russia’s economic resilience, and the pressure on Putin has sharply increased in recent months due to the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drone campaign, which has left Russia’s energy infrastructure in tatters while disrupting the country’s military-industrial complex.

The Kremlin in recent weeks put out feelers to Uzbekistan to help Russia mitigate the effects of Kyiv’s drone success, including potential arrangements to manufacture and repair arms for Russia’s use in Ukraine. Uzbekistan appears uninterested in such a plan.

Uzbek officials also likely vexed Putin with a recent major purchase of Chinese fighter jets, a move that highlights Russia’s weakening grip on regional arms sales. The Uzbek Defence Ministry showed off the new Chinese jets in Tashkent the day before the Putin-Mirziyoyev meeting, touting them as “modern fighter jets guarding our country's airspace.” 

Mirziyoyev additionally is arguably the Central Asian leader most prominently trying to cultivate closer relations with the United States. To Putin’s probable chagrin, the Uzbek president undermined the image of SCO solidarity by meeting with US officials in Bishkek amid summit-related festivities.

On a more emotional level, Putin was likely angered by a late August ceremony in Tashkent attended by Mirziyoyev honouring Uzbeks who resisted “Soviet repression” of the Uzbek nation. During the commemoration, Mirziyoyev called attention to the State Museum Dedicated to the Memory of Victims of Repression, which details Tsarist- and Soviet-era methods to coerce Uzbekistan’s obedience to Russian rule.  A presidential statement also noted that in “the 1980s, thousands of our compatriots were subjected to political repression based on fabricated charges linked to the so-called ‘Cotton Affair’ and the ‘Uzbek Affair.’” 

Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court, seeking “historical justice,” has “exonerated more than 1,200 compatriots who had fallen victim to repression,” the statement adds.

Putin, who has downplayed the Soviet Union’s reliance on repression and glorified the Red Army’s triumph in World War II as a means of buttressing the legitimacy of his own rule, has demonstrated an intolerance of anyone who seeks to expose the dark past of the Communist era. This tendency was underscored by the Kremlin’s efforts to shut down Memorial, a home-grown nonprofit organisation dedicated to exposing Stalinist-era crimes committed against the Soviet people.

For his part, Mirziyoyev would seem to have grounds for dissatisfaction with Russia. Uzbekistan has engaged Rosatom, the Russian state-controlled nuclear entity, to build the country’s first nuclear reactors to help provide the power needed to fulfil the Uzbek government’s economic growth agenda. Construction, however, has faced delays widely attributed to cash-flow difficulties experienced by Rosatom.

Mirziyoyev’s account of his August 31 meeting with Putin conspicuously contained no specific mention of the Rosatom projects.

This article was first published on Eurasianet here.