China’s continuously growing leverage over Russia is not in question and reports in recent days have continued to stress the point.

For instance, Beijing has apparently flexed a muscle by declining to provide marine propulsion systems needed for Russia's planned expansion of the Northern Sea Route, while negotiations over the proposed Power of Siberia 2 major gas pipeline appear to have stalled amid claims that China wants rock bottom prices from the Kremlin on gas delivered.

A July 20 report published by euobserver suggests that amid Russia’s worsening Ukraine war and economic difficulties, Moscow’s traditional allies, as well as more neutral countries such as Turkey (see late June IntelliNews report, Steadily but surely, Erdogan has broken with Putin), are starting to abandon it, while Beijing’s bargaining power over Russia and its economy continues to grow at the same time.

The report indicated that Beijing is seeking a domestic Chinese pricing formula for Power of Siberia 2 gas, far below the level Moscow has pushed to secure. Russia has turned East to secure more gas sales as it continues to endure a narrowing of its pipeline gas export opportunities. Sales to Europe are to one day fall to zero if Brussels sticks to its intention to eventually rid itself of any need for Russian gas.

Another big energy industry headache for Russia is that Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on its refineries have increased Moscow's dependence on imports of refined petroleum products from China.

The euobserver report also highlights how ex-Soviet countries have been growing increasingly bold in their pursuits of policies that contradict Russia’s interests. Azerbaijan, for example, has publicly expressed support for Ukraine, while Armenia has decided to restore rail sections near its border with Turkey and Azerbaijan, because Russia, the nominal owner of Armenia’s railways, has shown no willingness to do so in spite of repeated requests from Yerevan.

Also among developments is Kazakhstan’s introduction of a measure that from July 27 places a six-month ban on most wheat imports.

Declining EEU viability 

Although the grain import restriction applies to all wheat source markets, Russia is expected to bear almost all of the commercial impact of the move. Kazakhstan's Grain Union lately estimated that nearly all the country’s imported wheat in the current marketing year has originated from Russia.

The government says the protectionist measure is intended to support domestic farmers and reduce pressure from large carryover stocks ahead of this year's harvest. The order prohibits wheat imports by road, rail and water from both members of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and third countries, while allowing limited rail imports for poultry farms, grain processors, licensed grain elevators and the state Food Contract Corporation. Grain imported under these exemptions cannot be resold domestically or exported, while rail transit across Kazakhstan remains unaffected.

The measure is primarily meant to address longstanding concerns over undeclared wheat imports.  Kazakhstan’s Grain Union analyst Evgeny Karabanov has described cases in which trucks crossing the border declared significantly smaller cargoes than they were actually transporting, allowing cheap Russian wheat to enter the market outside normal controls, Forbes.kz reported.

For Kazakhstan's grain producers, lower-priced Russian imports have created intense competition by depressing local prices before farmers can market their own harvest. 

The new measure is not without precedent – Kazakhstan introduced a broad wheat import ban in 2024 after Russian grain continued entering the country as lighter restrictions, introduced prior to the ban, failed to do the job. More than 1.1mn tonnes had been imported within six months before tighter controls were introduced.

Russia subsequently moved to impose restrictions on imports of several Kazakh agricultural products, citing phytosanitary concerns. Exporters said the effects extended beyond the officially listed products, with some trucks reportedly being turned back at the border. The dispute continued in 2025, when Moscow again restricted imports of Kazakh wheat, flaxseed and lentils while continuing to allow sealed rail transit.

That history does not necessarily mean Russia will respond in the same way this time, The Times of Central Asia’s editor and head of investigations, Stephen M. Bland, argued in a report on July 20. Kazakhstan's latest order applies equally to all foreign suppliers and preserves exceptions for specific industries. Previous Kazakhstan-Russia trade disputes have often been managed through border inspections, certification requirements and plant-health regulations rather than through formal retaliatory measures.

The latest dispute also highlights broader challenges within the EEU, Bland posited. The organisation was established to promote the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour among Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, with the treaty entering into force in 2015 following an earlier Customs Union. As this year's rotating chair of the EEU, Kazakhstan has repeatedly called for removing internal trade barriers and improving transport links. However, member states of the bloc have continued introducing national restrictions whenever domestic market conditions or food security concerns arise. Bland believes that the wheat ban illustrates these tensions.

Similar exceptions and temporary restrictions have been adopted in the past by other EEU members, underscoring the gap between the bloc's common market principles and national economic priorities, fundamentally violating the bloc's commitment to barrier-free trade, according to Bland.

In many ways, the EEU (and its precursor the Customs Union), has always functioned as a tool of Russian political influence, despite hiding under the veneer of an economic bloc. Originally promoted as a Eurasian integration project, the Moscow-led trade bloc functioned as a de facto attempt at rallying ex-USSR nations under one banner.

It is worth noting that before the Ukrainian uprising in 2014, known as the Euromaidan, which led to the removal of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and, eventually, to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Moscow tried to pressure Ukraine into joining the Customs Union. As such, both the Customs Union and the EEU represented Moscow’s ongoing post-USSR dominance over the nations that exited the USSR in 1991 – and as seen in Ukraine’s case, the alternative to joining the Russia-led bloc was part of the path to a gruelling war. Under this frame of observation, ongoing trade disputes between EEU members may not be as damaging to Russia’s ongoing political grip over EEU nations as it may seem at first sight. 

Nevertheless, Moscow’s long war in Ukraine and Kyiv’s drone strikes have done plenty of damage to both Russia’s economy and its geopolitical dominance over Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region as a whole. In neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, another EEU member, the reins in trade and investment and associated influence are increasingly being handed over to China, though not without protests from the local population.

Amid the flux in changing relations, as previously mentioned, Russia itself is growing increasingly reliant on China. Will it get to the point that Moscow may have to eventually yield its historic backyard?

Waning influence in nuclear

Signs of Russia's declining regional influence may soon emerge in its nuclear energy projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Rosatom, Russia's state nuclear corporation, recently announced that it would reduce its investment programme by almost 50% this year because of what it described as difficult economic conditions, while also aiming to cut operating costs over the next 18 months.

Rosatom director General Alexei Likhachev said the company had postponed or cancelled several projects based on their expected financial returns through 2030, although he did not identify which projects would be affected.

Kazakhstan selected Rosatom in 2025 to build the country's first nuclear power plant, near Lake Balkhash, while Uzbekistan has signed preliminary agreements covering a moderately sized nuclear power complex. The latest announcement by Rosatom could raise fresh questions about the viability of these projects.

Things in the emerging Central Asian nuclear field could get awkward for Russia, given that both countries are also exploring cooperation with other international partners, including China, as they seek to diversify their energy development options. Astana has already reached an agreement with a Chinese company for two nuclear power stations. Rosatom’s financial troubles might suggest that an agreement with China for the third is not far off. On top of the Rosatom difficulties, the chairman of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency, Almassadam Satkaliyev, went on an extended tour of China’s nuclear-power facilities earlier this month. The tour took place shortly after the head of China’s National Energy Administration, Wang Hongzhi signed a protocol on future nuclear energy cooperation between Kazakhstan and China.

On July 16, Kazakhstan and China signed more than 70 commercial agreements and memoranda worth over $15bn spanning artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, transport, manufacturing, energy and critical minerals. The signing took place as part of Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev’s working visit to Shanghai.

Is Kazakhstan truly turning away?

Given the multiple latest developments, it is clear there is no shortage of examples of where Russia is gradually losing influence to China over Kazakhstan and Central Asia. But does that mean Kazakhstan is truly turning away from its northern neighbour and former colonial master?

Earlier this month, with the Russian motorist in many places facing petrol shortages caused by the Ukrainian targeting of refineries, Kazakhstan agreed to a surprise request from oil-rich Russia for 50,000 tonnes of petrol in July and August. The fuel shipment is seen as humanitarian aid and it is indeed largely symbolic as Russian petrol consumption typically exceeds 110,000 tonnes per day during summer.

Kazakhstan as a provider of aid to Russia is a rather uncommon sight and, on some level, the move signals a slight shift in power dynamics.

It also demonstrates that Kazakhstan remains open to continued cooperation with Moscow, despite its disapproval of the Kremlin’s commitment to waging war against Ukraine. To conclude, it would make no sense for Kazakhstan to truly turn its back on Russia.  Purely in an economic sense, given that 80% of the country’s vital oil exports rely on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) infrastructure that runs through to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, it would be irrational to deliver such a kick to the butt of Vladimir Putin.

Russia also remains the largest source of Kazakhstan’s imports, supplying around 32% of imported goods. In this sense, Russia is likely to maintain substantial leverage over Astana for years to come.

Though it may appear as clear as day that through relentless engagement Beijing is on course to replace Moscow as Kazakhstan’s preferred regional partner, Kazakhstan is unlikely to move for stark in-your-face change. It looks set, instead, to keep its options open for as long as Russia remains a military power and major trade partner.