The Kremlin used to tread softly when exercising its influence in the countries along its southern border, but by expanding the powers of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff and former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko it is going on the offensive and following a much more aggressive strategy.

Kiriyenko is Putin’s first deputy chief of staff and longtime overseer of domestic political affairs. Now he has quietly—but decisively—expanded his remit to include some foreign policy tasks and extended his power to cover Russia’s dealings with Armenia, Moldova, and the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“Under Kiriyenko, Russia’s interference is not only much more public, it is central to Russian strategy in what it terms its ‘near abroad’,” Andrey Pertsev, a journalist with Meduza said in a recent paper for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This marks a departure from the approaches of previous Kremlin envoys such as Vladislav Surkov and Dmitry Kozak, who operated with more discretion and treated interference in post-Soviet nations as a tool to be used selectively.

His predecessors, Vladislav Surkov and Dmitry Kozak, took a much more muted approach, especially playing down any suggestion of overtly interfering in the domestic politics of another country.

Kozak was Putin’s special envoy to Ukraine before the war and negotiated and got a deal from Kyiv in September 2021 that would have avoided the war. The Ukrainian-born senior presidential aide, Kozak recommended that Putin accept the deal, which would make the need for a large-scale war unnecessary, but Putin rejected it as his war goals had already expanded to the taking of all Ukraine.

As bne IntelliNews reported in 2020, this was part of Moscow’s “new foreign policy rules” where the Kremlin switched from focusing on supporting individual “friendly” leaders to promote ties, to keeping countries at some distance and refocusing on what were in Russia’s best national interests. The change was abrupt and dramatic, as the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs backed off, but now since the start of the war in Ukraine it appears the pendulum has swung back the other way.

To formalise his new powers, Kiriyenko’s team has reportedly lobbied for the creation of a dedicated foreign policy department within the presidential administration, Pertsev reports —an institutional shift that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago, when the separation between domestic and foreign policy was still strictly observed.

Kiriyenko consolidates new powers

Kiriyenko’s bid to consolidate power began in earnest during the 2024 political crisis in Abkhazia. “Kiriyenko grabbed the opportunity, arguing that Russian political strategists had experience of working in the region, and got the overseeing of Abkhazia transferred to him instead of Kozak,” Pertsev said. He added that Kiriyenko personally visited the region, promised social handouts, and was publicly associated with pro-Kremlin candidate Badra Gunba, who later won the presidency despite opposition claims of electoral fraud. That backing is a return to the old policies of focusing on individuals, rather than the previous change to arms-length objectivity focused on Russia’s interests.

That success bolstered Kiriyenko’s standing. “Now, in addition to the occupied parts of Ukraine, it includes oversight of relations with South Ossetia, Moldova, and Armenia,” Pertsev stated, noting that Kiriyenko has also taken on responsibility for certain African states.

Surkov and Kozak had diverging strategies in managing the Kremlin’s interests in the post-Soviet space, says Pertsev: Surkov pursued secret negotiations to insert pro-Russian influence into Ukraine’s political system, while Kozak opted for open dialogue with Western partners. Both approaches failed to deliver lasting gains and were eventually abandoned.

“Under Kiriyenko, things are different. Direct interference has evolved from being just one option in Moscow’s armoury into its main weapon,” said Pertsev. In regions like Transnistria, Kiriyenko has attempted to apply the same playbook used in Abkhazia, acting as both benefactor and political overseer.

But these methods are unlikely to succeed in countries like Moldova and Armenia, where the elites are married to the idea of European values and possible membership and retain a deep prejudice against Russia.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu is committed to Europe and her country was made a candidate country along with Ukraine in 2022 and has now started accession negotiations. Moreover, Russia has occupied the Transnistria region and maintains a force of 1,400 soldiers on Moldovan territory.

Much further from Europe, Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan has a more difficult job and is cognizant of the realities imposed by geography; Russia remains a major economic partner and security threat so he has gone out of his way to maintain good relations with the Kremlin. But that relationship was ruined by the Azerbaijan “anti-terrorist operation” and recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. As the guarantor of regional security, Pashinyan called on Russia for help, and Moscow ignored him. Since then Pashinyan has said he wants to join the EU too.

“The demands of Kiriyenko’s day job as ‘curator’ of Russian domestic policy mean he cannot engage in lengthy negotiations with Yerevan or Chisinau,” Pertsev noted. “Instead, the approach that Kiriyenko has apparently sold to Putin is simple: Russia should stop being coy about interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries.”

Some in Kiriyenko’s circle have even joked that “Russia’s borders are endless,” a euphemism for the Kremlin’s growing reach through its political operations unit. Pertsev reported that individuals close to Kiriyenko have openly discussed the possibility of running interference campaigns to undermine the now estranged Armenian government.

If these operations are effective, Kiriyenko may be entrusted with more ambitious targets. Pertsev pointed to France as a possible test case, citing allegations in 2024 that Kremlin-linked strategist Ilya Gambashidze had orchestrated disinformation campaigns there.

“For his part, Kiriyenko will be keen to add more countries to his portfolio,” said Pertsev. Greater scope would bring not only enhanced institutional authority but also closer access to Putin—“and in Russian politics, personal access to the president is the most valuable asset.”

Still, risks abound. “He and his team have gotten used to Russia’s docile political system where elections are easy to manipulate,” Pertsev said, adding that Kiriyenko’s tactics may falter in competitive democracies. His team reportedly sees limited chances of swaying Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections, as despite his setbacks, Pashinyan remains popular and trusted by his voters.