Central Asia is moving to convert its vast reserves of critical minerals into economic and geopolitical leverage as governments seek to position the region at the centre of global supply chains increasingly shaped by competition between China, the US and Europe.

The push comes as demand soars in the increasingly politicised business of supply minerals essential to electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, semiconductors and defence technologies. With concerns mounting over the China’s monopolistic control of the supply and processing of these elements, policymakers and investors are looking to a region long known for its natural resources but often overlooked in global manufacturing networks.

According to an OECD review, Central Asia holds 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc and 9% of titanium reserves. Kazakhstan alone can export 21 of the 34 critical raw materials identified by the European Union, while Kyrgyzstan possesses the world's third-largest antimony reserves and Uzbekistan ranks eleventh globally for copper reserves, The Times of Central Asia reports.

Kazakhstan has emerged as the region's most ambitious player. The government plans to spend approximately $500mn over the next three years on geological exploration and infrastructure modernisation, including seismic surveys, digital geological databases and the creation of a geological cluster in Astana. Officials aim to expand the country's geological survey coverage to 2.2mn square kilometres.

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has tied the sector to broader industrial development goals. In his 2025 state-of-the-nation address, Tokayev said the mining and metallurgical complex still had “significant growth potential, particularly in the production of high-value-added products.”

Recent discoveries have strengthened that narrative. Kazakhstan's industry ministry announced the identification of the Zhana Kazakhstan rare earth deposit, estimated to contain more than 20mn tonnes of resources including neodymium, cerium, lanthanum and yttrium. Officials have also highlighted the Kuirektykol deposit in the Karaganda region, where confirmed reserves are estimated at 795,800 tonnes and total resources at 935,400 tonnes.

Uzbekistan is pursuing a parallel strategy focused on copper production and downstream processing. In March, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev inaugurated Copper Concentrator No. 3 at the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex, a $2.7bn facility designed to process 60mn tonnes of ore annually and produce around 900,000 tonnes of copper concentrate. Once fully operational, the project is expected to more than double daily concentrate output from 2,400 tonnes to 5,000 tonnes.

International interest has followed. In February, Uzbekistan signed a memorandum with the US on critical minerals and rare earth supply chains, while the US International Development Finance Corporation later established a Joint Investment Framework intended to “promote cooperation to advance shared economic interests, and encourage joint investment in strategic sectors including critical minerals, infrastructure, and energy.”

The European Union has also stepped up engagement. At the first EU-Central Asia summit, Brussels and Astana endorsed a 2025-26 roadmap covering critical raw materials, batteries and green hydrogen. In May, the Asian Development Bank launched a Critical Minerals-to-Manufacturing Financing Partnership Facility in Samarkand aimed at supporting mineral processing, manufacturing and recycling projects across the region.

Yet Central Asia faces a challenge familiar to many resource-rich economies: extracting minerals is easier than processing them. The International Energy Agency estimates that China is the leading refiner of 19 out of 20 key strategic minerals, with an average market share of around 70%. In rare earths, China accounted for more than 90% of refining and magnet manufacturing capacity in 2024.

That has encouraged Western governments and development institutions to support efforts to build local processing capacity. Projects are beginning to emerge. In Kazakhstan, privately held Cove Kaz has acquired a majority stake in Severniy Katpar LLP, which holds licences for the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten projects. Development costs are estimated at $1.1bn, with potential backing of up to $900mn from the US Export-Import Bank. Meanwhile, Eurasian Resources Group is investing $20mn to launch gallium production from bauxite ore in Kazakhstan, targeting OECD markets.

Whether the region can realise its ambitions may depend as much on environmental governance as geology. Rapid mining expansion risks increasing pressure on water resources, biodiversity and land use. At the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana in April 2026, Central Asian governments adopted the Environmental Solidarity of Central Asia declaration, committing to cooperation on biodiversity, chemicals management, waste, air quality and desertification.

The challenge for Central Asia is no longer attracting attention. It is converting mineral wealth into industrial development while navigating the competing interests of global powers and avoiding the environmental costs that have accompanied previous resource booms elsewhere.