Russia’s deepening fuel crisis is spreading beyond filling-station queues into freight, agriculture, retail and public services, threatening to deliver a fresh inflationary shock as the country enters its peak harvest season.
The shortages, aggravated by Ukraine’s sustained campaign of drone attacks against Russia’s oil refineries and oil depots, are not yet critical across the entire economy. As IntelliNews reported, Russia’s oil production is battered but not broken. But their cumulative effects are beginning to reinforce one another, raising transport and production costs while squeezing consumers and already strained regional budgets, Bear Market Brief reports.
More than 50 attacks have been launched against Russia’s 30 major refineries and every single one has now been hit at least once – many of those closer to Ukraine’s borders have been hit multiple times since March.
Gasoline output has fallen by at least 13.5%, according to Sergey Vakulenko, an independent energy analyst, and probably by more in the last month. Roughly a quarter of the country’s refining capacity has been taken offline, prompting Moscow to restrict exports and seek emergency imports. Russia temporarily banned diesel exports until July 31 and has imported at least 60,000 tonnes of petrol from India.
Russia remains structurally long diesel and, in aggregate, should still be able to cover domestic demand. But refinery outages, damaged distribution networks and regional bottlenecks have made it increasingly difficult to move fuel to where it is needed.
The pressure is particularly acute because diesel consumption traditionally rises during the summer harvest season. In recent years that seasonal squeeze has been intensified by heavy military demand resulting from the war in Ukraine that caused a fuel shortage last year as well, although that was less widely reported than this year’s more dramatic shortage.
Deputy prime minister Alexander Novak acknowledged this month that the shortages were directly connected to the strikes.
“The shortage is due to obvious reasons, because our oil refineries are partially out of order for repairs due to [Ukrainian drone] arrivals,” Novak said, admitting for the first time that the shortages were caused by Ukraine’s attacks. Previously, the Kremlin only pointed to “supply disruptions” as the cause of the shortages. The government has created a task force to secure diesel for agriculture and prioritise fuel for vehicles delivering food to large retail chains.
Freight squeeze
The first significant transmission channel into the broader economy has been road transport.
Russia’s FTL, or full truckload, freight index, calculated by the ATI.su freight exchange from rates on 100 heavily used routes, rose 17.5% in six weeks to reach a record 2,086 points in July. Year-on-year freight costs were up almost 29%, as cited by BMB.
Some routes between major cities have recorded increases of more than 50%. Fuel accounts for roughly 30% of the cost of a typical long-haul journey, while shortages also force drivers to spend additional time queuing at petrol stations. In some regions the situation has been made worse due to rationing limits of 100 litres per truck at petrol stations, forcing drivers to make more frequent stops along the way.
Switching cargo to rail offers only limited relief because of shortages of available wagons and congestion on important routes. The result is likely to be higher prices for food, manufactured goods and building materials over the coming weeks as part of an inflation shock that was already under way thanks to the Gulf War.
Public transport has also been affected. Several regions have increased fares, reduced schedules or urged residents to travel less as operators struggle with higher fuel costs and uncertain supplies. Disruptions have been reported in at least four Russian regions and Russian-occupied Crimea.
Consumers pull back
Higher fuel costs are also beginning to weigh directly on discretionary spending.
The Union of Shopping Centres estimates that large destination malls, which depend heavily on customers arriving by car, could lose an additional 3-7% of spontaneous visitor traffic over several months if transport costs remain elevated.
Driving-dependent domestic tourism faces a similar squeeze, while restaurants and delivery companies are increasing minimum order values or reducing delivery areas to protect margins.
Russia’s car market has also weakened. New passenger-car sales fell 16.2% week on week between July 6 and 12, to 25,900 vehicles, according to Avtostat. Although the decline followed two unusually strong weeks, analysts described the drop as a poor signal for a sector already struggling with high borrowing costs and weak household demand.
Consumer confidence is deteriorating more broadly. Pollster, the Levada Centre’s Consumer Sentiment Index, fell to 94 points in June, dropping below the 100-point dividing line between optimism and pessimism for the first time since October 2022.
Harvest at risk
The greatest immediate economic risk is to agriculture.
Farmers in the Altai and Irkutsk regions, southern Russia, the central Black Earth region and the Volga district have warned of difficulties securing enough diesel to operate harvesting machinery. Altai officials have discussed emergency measures, while Irkutsk declared a state of high alert and imposed purchase limits at some filling stations.
The shortages are uneven and the harvest is unlikely to stop nationwide. But small farms with limited storage capacity or working capital are particularly exposed to price rises and interrupted deliveries.
The problem is compounded by disruption to grain exports through the Sea of Azov. Farmers in the Rostov region have reported sharply reduced buying interest and margins approaching unprofitable levels. Russia’s wheat exports could fall by between 5mn and 10mn tonnes if maritime routes are not restored, according to industry estimates cited by Reuters.
Public services under strain
The shortage is also spreading into the state sector.
The number of cancelled, unsuccessful or reissued government tenders for fuel used by hospitals, fire services and municipal utilities tripled in May and June compared with the same period last year, according to Izvestia.
Suppliers are increasingly unwilling to fulfil fixed-price contracts agreed before the latest price rises. Some regions have also reported interruptions to rubbish collection and other municipal services, threatening additional pressure on local budgets.
Rubbish tips is a potentially explosive social issue, as rubbish piling up at tips in the past has sparked rare public protests in the past. Picking up rubbish is an issue that the Kremlin takes very seriously, as while it is dismissive of protests based on liberal ideology and calls for more democracy, it takes protests based on social issues like pensioners’ bus passes, parks and rubbish very seriously.
Regional governments have limited room to respond. Independent outlet Verstka reported that federal authorities had forbidden governors from independently searching for fuel on the open market. Reselling petrol online has also been banned to prevent speculation. Regional leaders were instead told to distribute volumes allocated by Moscow, control queues and explain the shortages to residents.
Peripheral regions are the most vulnerable because of long supply routes and weaker public finances. Moscow has so far prioritised fuel deliveries for emergency services, agriculture and food distribution, but doing so risks shifting the shortage elsewhere rather than resolving it.
Interest-rate dilemma
The crisis presents a new problem for the Central Bank of Russia.
Between January 1 and July 6, petrol prices increased 13.9% and diesel prices rose 14.7%, compared with an overall increase in consumer prices of 4.5%, according to Rosstat data. That is adding to an inflation shock that is already complicating the CBR’s attempt to cut rates in order to boost flagging economic growth.
The central bank cut its key interest rate by just 25 basis points to 14.25% in June, less than many economists had expected, citing mounting pro-inflationary risks from fuel shortages and the federal budget. At the next policy meeting on July 24, the CBR is expected to leave rates on hold, although CBR governor Elvia Nabiullina is under extreme pressure to make at least a token 25bp cut after Russian President Vladimir Putin made a rare call for accelerated monetary policy easing for the second time in two months last week.
“The inflation rate in June will be affected by the spike in fuel prices that has occurred,” Governor Nabiullina said after the decision. Government measures were under way, she added, but “it might take some time for supply to rebound”.
If fuel prices continue to feed into freight, food and services, the central bank could slow or halt its rate-cutting cycle. Since the end of 2025, the CBR has made 550bp of rate cuts, but that momentum is now running out. In a more severe scenario, it could be forced to tighten policy again.
That would compound the pressure on manufacturers, farmers, retailers and regional governments that had been counting on cheaper credit to refinance debt and are facing a growing debt crisis.
The fuel shortage is therefore becoming more than an inconvenience for motorists. As the harvest gathers pace, it risks turning into a broader supply shock — raising prices, depressing consumption and worsening the squeeze on Russia’s slowing real economy.