The recent announcement by British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer that the UK will formally recognise a Palestinian state in September – unless Israel agrees to a ceasefire and re-engages with the two-state solution – has triggered a new wave of diplomatic ripples globally, not least across Asia. With more than 140 UN member states already recognising Palestine, including many from Asia, the question now is which remaining countries in the region might follow suit, and which are unlikely to do so – and why.

Likely supporters

Among Asian nations, several are strong candidates to either reaffirm or extend support for Palestinian statehood. Foremost among them is Malaysia, which has long maintained a pro-Palestinian stance grounded in both public sentiment and official foreign policy.

Successive Malaysian governments have not only recognised Palestine but have also refused to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Kuala Lumpur’s support is driven by a blend of Islamic solidarity, anti-colonial sentiment and regional alignment with other Muslim-majority nations.

Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, is another staunch backer of Palestinian self-determination. The country has consistently advocated for Palestinian rights at international forums and has refused to normalise relations with Israel. With President-elect Prabowo Subianto expected to continue this policy line, Jakarta’s recognition is secure and influential among the Global South.

Pakistan, too, remains firmly in the pro-Palestinian camp. Historical ties, ideological alignment with the Islamic world and strong anti-Israel public opinion ensure that Islamabad maintains its recognition of Palestine. Pakistan’s strained relationship with India – an ally of sorts of Israel – only strengthens its position on the matter.

Bangladesh is another likely endorser. Having already extended diplomatic support to Palestine, the country’s foreign policy generally aligns with broader Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) positions. Dhaka is unlikely to deviate from its traditional stance, particularly given growing domestic sensitivity to the situation in Gaza.

Among non-Muslim nations too, China has shown increasing sympathy for the Palestinian cause, motivated less by ideology and more by strategic calculation. Beijing supports a two-state solution and has recognised Palestine since 1988. Its position serves as a counterweight to US dominance in the Middle East and bolsters its influence among Arab and Muslim-majority nations. The UK’s recognition, particularly if joined by France and perhaps even Canada, will likely offer Beijing more diplomatic cover to speak out more assertively on the issue.

The hesitant backers

On the other side of the equation in Asia lie countries whose ties with Israel -whether strategic, economic or military – make Palestinian recognition diplomatically fraught. It is no coincidence that the countries hesitant to back Palestine have strong US links or rely heavily on the US for trade; sometimes both.

India recognised Palestine in 1988 and has historically supported a two-state solution. However, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has drawn increasingly closer to Israel, particularly in defence cooperation and intelligence sharing. Delhi maintains a careful diplomatic balancing act on many issues and Palestine is but one example: expressing concern over civilian casualties in Gaza while continuing robust ties with Tel Aviv. While formal recognition of Palestinian statehood already exists, India is unlikely to take any fresh symbolic or political step that could upset its deepening relationship with Israel – and Washington.

Japan, although traditionally supportive of a two-state solution and a significant donor to Palestinian development efforts, is also unlikely to recognise Palestinian statehood independently. Tokyo’s foreign policy remains closely aligned with Washington, and it tends to follow US-led diplomatic timetables on sensitive geopolitical matters such as Middle Eastern politics.

South Korea, like Japan, maintains close security and economic ties with the United States. Seoul has focused its Middle East diplomacy on energy security and trade, steering clear of contentious political alignments. It has supported humanitarian aid for Palestinians but avoids overt gestures like state recognition without broader international consensus.

Vietnam and the Philippines are two more countries in East Asia which, though sympathetic to the Palestinians’ plight in principle, prioritise their bilateral relations with the United States.

The Philippines has, at times, supported Israel at the United Nations and has diplomatic and commercial exchanges with the country. For both, recognition of Palestinian statehood remains diplomatically unlikely in the near term – especially with US President Donald Trump being trigger happy with the threat of tariffs in recent months.

As a result, with Britain poised to join the growing chorus of countries recognising Palestine, Asia presents a patchwork of positions.

Muslim-majority nations and those seeking to expand their influence in the Middle East such as China will likely support or reaffirm recognition. Meanwhile, countries deeply embedded in US strategic frameworks or enjoying robust ties with Israel are expected to remain cautious or abstain outright from symbolic actions.

Whether these stances shift will depend largely on how the situation in Gaza evolves, on broader international realignments, and crucially on whether the United States begins to soften its longstanding opposition to Palestinian recognition.

Until then, Asia’s response will remain split as historic solidarities, emerging alliances, and realpolitik calculations dominate.