Ukraine has been hitting Russian refineries and caused a fuel crisis that has spread across multiple regions. The headline figure is that oil refining has been reduced by 38% since August, but digging into the details and the reduction is probably less, says Sergey Vakulenko, an independent energy analyst in a paper for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

According to bne IntelliNews estimates, based on available data of a reduction from total refining capacity by 4mn barrels a day, Russia’s refined oil production volumes has been reduced by 30.4%, not 38%, over the summer.

Other analysts have also downplayed the extent of the damage to Russia’s refinery capacity. “Media reports suggest that drone strikes have impacted somewhere in the region of 10-20% of Russia’s 6.8mn bpd of refining capacity. Global crude prices have hardly reacted,” Kieran Tompkins, Senior Climate and Commodities Economist at Capital Economics said in a note.

• Nominal refining capacity: 327mn tonnes per year (6.5mn barrels per day)
• Refineries hit by drones (August–September): 16 facilities with combined capacity of 123mn tonnes/year (38% of total)
• Actual annual output: Up to 270mn tonnes—meaning at least 22% of capacity is typically idle
• Domestic oil product consumption: Approximately 120mn tonnes per year
• Surplus production:
  • Petrol: 16% more than domestic demand
  • Diesel: Almost double domestic demand
  • Naphtha: Could meet 60% of petrol needs if blended into Euro-3 grade
• Effect of damage on refining output:
  • Gasoline production down by 10% (Kommersant)
  • Estimated current refining rate: just under 5mn barrels/day; a 38% reduction would be 4mn barrels/day
• Recovery times short: Refineries like Volgograd restored operations within weeks after multiple drone strikes

There has been growing speculation about the extent of damage caused by Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries, with some reports suggesting that as much as 38% of the country’s refining capacity has been knocked offline. While that figure has a formal basis, the true situation is far more nuanced and the true reduction in output is less, albeit still painful.

“On paper, Russia can refine 327mn tonnes of oil annually, or 6.5mn barrels per day,” writes energy analyst Vakulenko. “The capacity of the 16 refineries hit in August and September totals 123mn tonnes a year—38% of the national total. But this is only the upper limit of potential damage.”

According to Vakulenko, the current wave of strikes poses a greater challenge for Moscow than similar attacks carried out in the spring and summer of 2024.

“Now, Ukrainian drones can fly further, carry bigger payloads, and strike more frequently,” he explains. “Refineries in Volgograd, Novokuibyshevsk, Ryazan, Saratov and Salavat have each been hit multiple times—far beyond the occasional raids on border-adjacent refineries like Krasnodar and Rostov earlier in the war.”

Nevertheless, the reductions are real and the Russian government has issued restrictions in the last few weeks on diesel exports and extended an existing ban on gasoline exports until the end of the year.

However, a meaningful assessment must consider more than just which facilities were targeted. “Three questions must be asked,” Vakulenko notes. “Were these plants operating at full capacity before the attacks? Was the damage partial or total? And has it been repaired, or is throughput still affected?”

While reliable public data is limited, experience from the 2024 campaign suggests most facilities continued to function at least partially and resumed full output within weeks. As part of the Soviet legacy, most refineries were “hard-topped” during the Cold War to protect them from Nato attack. At the same time, Ukraine has only just started to produce its own Flamingo cruise missile that could do significant damage and the long-distant drones it has been using are still not powerful enough to flatten a refinery.

“Volgograd refinery, for instance, restored operations by August 25, just 11 days after sustaining multiple drone strikes.”

Vakulenko also warns against conflating capacity with output. “Russia typically refines up to 270mn tonnes of crude annually—meaning at least 22% of its capacity is always idle, due to ageing infrastructure that hasn’t been decommissioned.”

Domestic demand is around 120mn tonnes a year, with the remainder exported. Surpluses exist across all product categories. “Russia produces 16% more petrol than it needs and nearly double the amount of diesel,” he says. “Naphtha output alone could cover 60% of domestic petrol requirements if needed.”

Even damage to primary distillation units does not translate directly into reduced fuel supply. “Destroying one of two atmospheric distillation columns might reduce petrol output by 30%, not 50%,” Vakulenko clarifies, due to existing overcapacity in primary processing and bottlenecks in secondary refining.

These nuances are beginning to emerge in production statistics. “Kommersant reports petrol output has dropped by 10%,” he notes. “Some analysts estimate refining is down to just under 5mn barrels per day—far from the 4mn barrels implied by a 38% capacity loss.”

The long-term impact depends on Ukraine’s ability to sustain or escalate its campaign.

“That could mean targeting more refineries, using larger drone payloads, or increasing the frequency of strikes,” Vakulenko writes. “Russia’s refineries are like a man being repeatedly punched—not killed by any single blow, but gradually worn down.”

Air defences are struggling to keep pace. “It’s easier for Ukraine to shift targets than it is for Moscow to reposition anti-air systems,” he says.

If Ukraine manages to scale up its attacks, or start using its more powerful missiles, or even take delivery of the US-made Tomahawks, then the impact on Russian oil product production could be much more significant.

“Russia doesn’t have vast crude storage facilities, so any lasting damage to refineries would lead to some combination of three outcomes. First, with export infrastructure seemingly sustaining less damage than refineries have so far, it could lead to greater crude supply available to export. Second, Russia could utilise floating storage as a temporary solution to house a rise in crude inventories until refinery capacity is reinstated. Third, some curtailment of crude production may have to be enforced,” says Tompkins.

Some facilities have adopted makeshift anti-drone defences, including netting and covers, which, though often mocked, have shown effectiveness in frontline deployments.

In the meantime, available evidence suggests that there has been some compensating increase in crude exports, albeit perhaps by less than how much refining activity has fallen. Indeed, according to reports, Russia actually raised its crude oil export plan from Western ports by 0.2m bpd in August. What’s more, available ship tracking data suggests that seaborne crude exports from Russia have risen noticeably in recent weeks.

Whether Russia can continue to absorb these strikes without significant disruptions remains uncertain. “While the 38% figure may have a basis in fact, it doesn’t reflect the complexity of the situation,” Vakulenko concludes.

“As it stands, the disruption to the oil market so far from Russia’s drone strikes seems minimal and it seems that investors’ perceptions are for that to remain the case,” Tompkins adds. “It is unclear how widespread and permanent the damage to Russia’s refining capacity is, or whether Ukraine’s strikes will intensify further.”