For Islamabad, India is more than a regional rival across the border. It is the defining political, military and psychological axis around which much of Pakistan’s identity, policy and most importantly, day-to-day insecurity revolves.

The “India-shaped chip” on its shoulder is not a relic of history; it is an active force, perpetuated by repeated crises, as well as mutual misgivings and shifting regional dynamics. As tensions rise and fall over Kashmir, water supplies, and more often than not Pakistan initiated nuclear posturing and cross-border violence, the prospect of durable peace in the coming years, even decades, appears increasingly remote.

Since Partition in 1947, Pakistan’s security raison d'être has been almost entirely India-centric. Little if any real attention is paid to their eastern border with Iran or their 2,600km border with Afghanistan to the north and northwest. All eyes are on India.

The wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971 in addition to the Kargil conflict of 1999, entrenched the notion that India must be kept in check. Over time, this has become a permanent fixture of the country’s institutions and political culture. As a result, the Pakistani military, more than any other organ of the state, has little incentive to downplay the Indian threat. The narrative of an ever-looming adversary to the East justifies vast defence spending, extensive surveillance and an outsized role in domestic governance under the pretext of protecting the nation.

Political leaders, whether in uniform or in suits, long ago learnt that any demonstration of softening toward New Delhi is a fast route to accusations of betrayal, possible prison sentences, and being ousted.

And the weight of that chip on the shoulder has been more evident in recent years.

Islamabad has repeatedly warned of “full-spectrum retaliation,” including nuclear strikes, should India attack. The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty by New Delhi in April 2025, justified on national security grounds following a terror incident from within Pakistan provoked alarm in Islamabad with the control of river flows viewed as a question of survival.

A few weeks later the 2025 India–Pakistan conflict saw a brief four day cross-border exchange of missiles, shelling and drone attacks by both sides. Air strikes by India followed until a ceasefire was agreed on May 10 and still holds. But each episode – large and small - reinforces the conviction in both capitals that the other cannot be trusted, and that hostility towards the neighbour is the natural order of things.

Diplomatic mistrust between the two is now institutionalised and each gesture is met with suspicion.

India doubts Pakistan’s willingness or ability to reign in non-state militants operating inside or near its borders. Pakistan meanwhile fears India will use counterterrorism or water security as cover for aggression.

Even ceasefires in Kashmir are interpreted not as signs of progress but as tactical pauses before the next escalation. What might once have been pathways to negotiation are now regarded as traps.

The nuclear factor

The nuclear dimension only deepens the instability. Pakistan continues to modernise its arsenal, guided by the view that India poses an existential threat. Its leaders speak openly of using “the full spectrum of power” if provoked and have never ruled out a first strike.

Every military manoeuvre, and every political speech made in both Islamabad and New Delhi is filtered through layers of fear and worst-case assumptions by the other side. Small misjudgments could easily ignite a larger conflagration. To date, fortunately, this has not happened.

Compounding all this is the collapse of meaningful diplomacy.

Since 2016, high-level dialogue has withered. In both countries, nationalism rewards confrontation. Indian politicians win votes by promising to stand firm against terrorism and Pakistani provocations while Pakistani leaders survive by vowing to resist Indian “aggression” and defend Kashmir.

Any civilian government in Islamabad that dares to pursue rapprochement risks being undermined by the military and often public opinion – stoked by a largely anti-India media.

China

Regional alignments harden this impasse. Pakistan’s increased reliance on China to the northeast, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as well as defence partnerships emboldens its stance against India. But with India-China relations thawing over territorial claims in the Himalayas, just how China plays New Delhi and Islamabad off against each other is a question many are already asking.

Ties to Pakistan mean little to Beijing in the larger scheme of things and Islamabad pretending they do would be naive.

Conversely, India’s strengthening ties with the United States, Japan and Australia under the Quad framework reinforce its sense of strategic superiority and its suspicion that Pakistan remains a regional proxy for Beijing.

Yet while both sides may yet stumble into a period of temporary calm, and ceasefires, crisis hotlines, and perhaps even a revival of “track-two” diplomacy championed by civil society or business groups may make headlines for brief periods, suspicion will remain.

Even as external powers in Europe and the US, fearful of nuclear escalation or regional instability push for restraint, such periods of quiet are likely to be very brittle. As such ,without fundamental shifts in doctrine, perception of the other side, and politics, India and Pakistan are destined to collapse back into confrontation sooner or later.

For peace to become more than a fleeting truce between New Delhi and Islamabad, both nations would have to undertake transformations that seem almost impossible today.

They would need formal risk-reduction measures and transparent communication about nuclear postures. But who will propose such?

Both India and Pakistan would have to separate domestic politics from regional diplomacy and confront hard questions about Kashmir’s future that neither is ready to answer as of Autumn 2025.

Pakistan would need to dismantle or permanently neutralise militant networks that operate across borders – a move that would almost certainly cost the careers and possibly lives of political leaders in the years ahead, while India would have to temper its rising nationalism and ease restrictions in disputed territories.

Both would need to revisit crucial water-sharing frameworks and invest jointly in climate adaptation. None of these steps are likely any time soon given current political realities.

The Pakistan chip

Because of this, the “chip” on Pakistan’s shoulder is not just an emotional burden or a product of historical grievance. It is the architecture of its state and the foundation of its national narrative. It is a persistent belief – as wrong as that may be - that survival depends on opposition to India.

Even a recent international cricket match – won by India – saw behaviour that would not be tolerated in other sports around the world. The Indian team refused to take the trophy from Pakistani national and Asian Cricket Council president Mohsin Naqvi; also Pakistan’s Interior Minister and Pakistani cricket chairman. At the same ceremony, Pakistan captain Salman Ali Agha threw the runners-up cheque to the ground.

To this end, unless a major external shock forces both countries to rethink their assumptions - an economic crisis, a climate disaster or a transformative third-party initiative by US President Donald Trump or similar perhaps - the next decade will look very much like the last: uneasy ceasefires punctuated by confrontation, then rhetorical wars followed by real conflicts.

For Pakistan, however, the deeper challenge is existential. To make peace, it must first redefine how it sees India - not solely as a threat to be contained but as a neighbour with whom coexistence is unavoidable. That psychological leap has eluded generations of Pakistani leaders, constrained by ideology, the military’s dominance over politics, and the weight of national myth.

Until it happens, the India-shaped chip will remain firmly lodged on Pakistan’s shoulder, and South Asia’s uneasy peace will stay as fragile as ever.