One of our quirkier rituals is to write every year about why Russians view August as some sort of cursed month and to highlight what could happen this year. Or, to paraphrase (ex US Secretary of Defence) Donald Rumsfeld, the “known knowns” and, possibly, the “known unknowns”. But, of course, it is the “unknown unknows” that tend to define August and confirm its place as the most significant legacy-forming month in the calendar year.

Of course, since early 2022, one might argue that August is not what it used to be, i.e. not longer a uniquely transformational month, because hardly a week goes by with some major geopolitical, social or economy event because the continuing intensity of the fighting with Ukraine and the treadmill of sanctions from the EU/G7, especially from Brussels which is now preparing its 22nd package of sanctions.

As August 2026 starts, the consensus view is that not much should change, i.e., within the “known knowns”. The economy is drifting along with near-zero growth, but still a long way from a financial or sectoral crisis. The tit-for-tat drone and missile exchanges are now viewed as an endless routine, and Washington remains on the sidelines with little obvious interest in returning to the active mediation role it had before the start of the Iran war. The consensus view is that we will probably still be talking about these same issues coming into August next year, just as we were ahead of August last year.

But, while acknowledging the clear evidence in support of the consensus view, one should also not forget the golden rule: the “August surprise” is rarely about what the news is at the start of the month. Two years ago, we had a similar assured complacency which lasted for five days when, on August 6, Ukrainian forces invaded the Kursk region – only the second foreign military to do so in over 100 years. The occupation lasted approximately six months, but the legacy of that August event continues to this day. The once powerful Rotenberg brothers, members of the super-elite Ozera Cooperative group or Putin’s closest and most trusted friends, are now under attack for their alleged involvement in the corruption that failed to result in any of the border defences being built.

The most significant legacy event from August last year was the Alaska summit (August 15) which (at the time) justified a rise in our “Optimism Tracker” as it seemed that both Moscow and Washington had agreed the outline of peace terms which the US side presented to Kyiv and which led, after a near-serious stumble in October, to a rise in the frequency of meetings (in Florida, Vienna, Istanbul and Abu Dhabi) and a spike in optimism just ahead of the Iran attacks on February 28. Since then, the legacy of Alaska has been shredded with accusations of misinterpretations on both sides.

So, what could change in August 2026? On the face of it, nothing. But beyond the headlines, there is a growing sense in Moscow that “something is about to change”. The change in Ukraine’s military tactics and the successful deployment of long-range drones targeting commercial infrastructure are significant. This time last year, most people in Moscow did not talk much about the conflict – it was a long way off. But this year, that has been changing. In January, the so-called SMO lasted longer than the Great Patriotic War, something which received widespread notice. The on-off attempts to disrupt mobile internet services and restrictions on messaging services (now almost back to normal) caused a lot of public push-back. This year also, several senior figures within government and in state agencies have been unusually pubic in their warnings about the long-term damage to the economy and calling for an end to the conflict so that the economy can start to readjust.

Now we have the very visible attacks on refineries, which led to long queues at Moscow gas stations for several weeks (now returned to near normal operations), and the continuing attacks against the Wildberries distribution centres.

Why does this matter? It does because we have observed on many occasions where President Putin moves quickly to address issues of concern to the broader population or when those events risk undermining public support for, and trust in, his leadership. Since his arrival in late 1999, it is clear that Putin’s two critical priorities are national security and public support.

Everything else results in a slow and more flexible response.

Assuming the high-profile attacks continue, then the pressure for the Kremlin to either massively escalate its military (i.e., aerial) response to force a change in Kyiv’s tactics or to signal a more serious intention to return to a peace process will grow. Beyond the headlines, August 2026 looks more and more like an imminent tipping point for the Kremlin’s response.

There are several other factors to add to the mix: Putin will meet President Xi, Prime Minister Modi, and other leaders of the BRICS group in New Delhi in September. It is more widely commented in both Beijing and New Delhi that pressure is growing on Moscow to find an endgame to the conflict because both want to continue buying Russian energy but do not want to face the risk of the “sanctions from hell” bill, which will be presented for a vote in the US House of Representatives, also in September.

Looking beyond current events and assumptions. It is worth reminding ourselves as to why August is viewed as the most dangerous month in Russia. Historically, August has been a month when significant military and geopolitical events have taken place. The Molotovp-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in August 1939, and construction of the Berlin Wall started in August 1961. Soviet troops entered Prague in August 1968, and, in August 2008, the Russia-Georgia war provided the backdrop to the Beijing Olympics.

Then there was the August 1991 attempted coup to overthrow Gorbachev and to stop the breakup of the Soviet Union (the subject of a recent book by Robert Service, “The August Coup” – to our Eurasia Books Published 1H26 and which can be downloaded free from the homepage at www.macro-advisory.com). The failure of that coup accelerated the end of the USSR and the arrival of Boris Yeltsin.

The current economic slowdown (albeit the continuing Iran War provides budget funding relief, and the consumer economy remains “relatively” robust – i.e., the main concern for Putin) reminds there has almost always been a concern about the economy or the currency in August. This is because of the default (on domestic debt – foreign debt payments were delayed but not defaulted) and the start of a steep ruble devaluation, which occurred in August 1998. This marked a turning point for Russia, both economically and politically. Vladimir Putin formally entered the corridors of power when he was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999.

The fact that the person who was Prime Minister in August 1998, and who took the fall for the crisis, Sergey Kiriyenko, is today one of the most important people in Putin’s Kremlin, shows how difficult it is to be kicked out permanently. That would require crossing a different set of red lines.

Nature has also regularly been very unkind to Russia in August. In 2002, widespread fires raged in the peatlands around Moscow and blanketed the city in a toxic haze. August 2013 brought very destructive flooding to much of Russia’s Far East, which led to both expensive economic disruption and loss of life. The worst weather-related disruption came in August 2010, when large swathes of the country were hit with high temperatures and forest fires. That combination contributed to drought conditions across much of the farming belt and led to a big drop in the year’s harvest. In fact, it was this combination that persuaded Putin that the country’s reliance on imported food (55% of consumption that year) and medicines was not only bad economics but a national security issue. The origin of what we now refer to as the ‘localization’ policy was in August 2010, although it was boosted from August 2014 when Western sanctions escalated, and the Kremlin responded with a ban on most food from European sources.

August can be an accident-prone month, such as in August 2000, when there were several serious accidents, including the sinking of the Kursk submarine and a fatal fire in Moscow’s landmark Ostankino TV tower (still the tallest free-standing structure in Europe). In August 2006, 170 people died in an airplane crash on a flight from the Black Sea resort of Anapa to St Petersburg. In August 2009, one of the country’s largest hydropower stations suffered a catastrophic explosion in which 75 people died.

The only surprise about August 2026 would be if nothing dramatic or legacy-leaving event occurs. As there is a strong sense that we are close to a tipping point, not because of the now routine deadly drone and missile exchanges or any economic issue, but because of the perceptible change in public mood in Moscow and the possibility/probability that the deterioration will continue. We have seen for almost twenty-six years that this matters more to President Putin than anything else other than national security.

So, the main advice? Buckle up and be prepared for a surprise or two.