Nicolás Maduro's theatrical display of his new Huawei phone, allegedly a personal gift from Xi Jinping, during a recent public speech was more than diplomatic pantomime. As the Venezuelan president mimicked a satellite call to Beijing, punctuating his performance with "ni hao" and "xiexie," he was sending Washington a not-so-subtle message: Venezuela has powerful friends.

Yet as US destroyers patrol Caribbean waters and the Trump administration doubles its bounty on Maduro's head to $50mn accusing him of being "one of the largest narco-traffickers in the world”, Beijing's muffled response suggests China's decades-long commitment to its Latin American ally has distinct limits, particularly when it comes to military confrontation with Washington.

As usual, last week’s deployment of the USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Sampson, alongside 4,000 marines, prompted diplomatic protests from Beijing. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning warned that China "opposes the use or threat of force in international relations and the interference of external forces in Venezuela's internal affairs.”

But experts who spoke to bne Intellinews following Maduro’s disputed re-election in July 2024 paint a starkly different picture of Beijing's actual intentions.

"China fears that a transition to democracy or the rule of law would necessarily mean declining bargaining leverage in Venezuela," explains Javier Corrales, professor of political science at Amherst College. “They fear a Western-aligned government would revise their contracts and potentially expose embarrassing dealings.”

However, Corrales doubts Beijing would actively intervene to preserve Maduro's grip on power. "China today will often care so much about being present that it will accept significant economic losses," he notes. "That said, Venezuela continues to deliver oil and to pay the debt [estimated at around $10bn in 2024], so it's not like China is experiencing profound economic losses."

The Venezuela-China axis has seemingly strengthened recently, with Communist Party of China delegates visiting Caracas in June to establish “doctrinal training” programmes for the Bolivarian ruling socialist party. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil hailed these party-to-party exchanges as efforts to construct "societies based on social justice" aimed at building "a new international order."

Such multipolar rhetoric resonates well with BRICS principles. But the burgeoning, Beijing-led trading bloc remains a pipe dream for Caracas, as its membership bid was blocked by Brazil last year over the contested election which saw Maduro claiming victory amid widespread allegations of fraud. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly supported Venezuela’s entry at the Kazan summit in October 2024, whilst China remained notably silent. Eventually, Maduro left Kazan empty-handed: Venezuela failed to secure even the novel “partner country” status granted to fellow Bolivia and Cuba.

Following May's China-CELAC summit, where Xi pledged cooperation on energy and trade plus massive investments in Latin America, both governments claim to be preparing more than 600 agreements for 2025, covering technology, investment and agriculture. The younger Nicolás Maduro, the president's son, has made multiple trips to China this year alongside Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to advance these initiatives.

But the paradox of China-Venezuela relations lies in the gap between political rhetoric and a much harsher commercial reality. Whilst Xi elevated the relationship to an "all-weather strategic partnership" during Maduro's 2023 visit to Beijing – the highest classification in China's diplomatic hierarchy – Chinese businesses tell a different story.

"Since [former president Hugo] Chavez died, the Chinese have been much more cautious with Venezuela. They haven't provided any new loans," Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program at Rice University, tells bne Intellinews. "They have had a very bad experience in Venezuela... They know that giving money to Venezuela is an absolute disaster, a terrible idea."

Beijing's wariness stems from the spectacular failure of previous development loans that flourished after Chávez met former Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2008. Venezuelan mismanagement of these funds left numerous infrastructure projects incomplete and contributed to the economic chaos that economists trace to 2012, Chávez's final election win before his untimely passing. Beijing halted new disbursements in 2015 as hyperinflation took hold. At its peak, Venezuela absorbed nearly half of all Chinese development funding for Latin America, according to the China-America Research Center of the Andrés Bello Foundation, forcing Beijing to restructure payment terms and fundamentally reconsider its lending practices across the developing world.

"I would be very surprised if the agreements announced with China include disbursements of funds through a credit line," Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado, director of the China-America Research Center, told El País. Instead, he expects Beijing to focus on Special Economic Zones—tax-advantaged industrial areas that Xi has discussed with Maduro. These zones require minimal capital whilst offering Beijing control over production using inexpensive Venezuelan labour, D'Sola explains.

The numbers support this assessment. Whilst Chinese development banks have extended $59.2bn to Venezuela—nearly double Brazil's allocation—commercial banks have virtually abandoned the country. Chinese foreign direct investment turned negative in 2019, with net outflows continuing through 2022. According to Nikkei, IEIT Systems, a Shenzhen-listed IT firm which operated in the South American nation, has written off nearly $41mn in Venezuelan receivables as unrecoverable.

China's official investment guide for Venezuela, compiled by its commerce ministry, contains unusually blunt warnings. It describes Venezuela as "a country with relatively high business risks," specifically citing US sanctions that could "create various obstacles" for Chinese companies. The guide warns of Venezuelan counterparties being "unable to pay off their liabilities on time."

Even in the oil sector, the cornerstone of bilateral trade, China's engagement remains circumscribed by sanctions concerns. Chinese state oil company CNPC produces approximately 90,000 barrels daily in Venezuela, merely about 10% of national output, according to Monaldi. But Venezuelan crude destined for China takes a circuitous route through Malaysian intermediaries, arriving at independent refineries rather than state facilities.

"CNPC is a global company listed in international markets that has business in the US," Monaldi explains. "Venezuela's oil, since the first Trump Administration, has been the subject of secondary sanctions. So it's more like Iranian oil."

Future Chinese investment in Venezuelan energy appears unlikely. "The chances of Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil are slim," Monaldi says, noting that CNPC has repeatedly declined PDVSA's investment proposals for new fields, citing previous payment disputes and disagreements.

Chinese oil interests have instead shifted to neighbouring Guyana, where the business environment proves more attractive. China's CNOOC is a minority partner (25%) in Guyana’s Stabroek block, which is operated by ExxonMobil and also includes Hess Corporation. However, the small, oil-rich country is locked in a century-old dispute with Caracas over the Essequibo region, which makes up two-thirds of Guyana's internationally recognised territory. Tensions were dormant under Chavez, but reignited after ExxonMobil’s discovery of substantial crude reserves there in 2015. Over the past year, Maduro and the opposition alike have ramped up claims over the territory, seeking to exploit nationalistic sentiment to advance their respective goals. Thus, the Asian superpower's investments in Guyana are directly at odds with Venezuela's territorial ambitions.

Overall, China's strategic calculus appears driven more by long-term geopolitical positioning than economic benefit. "Xi Jinping became a bit more geo-strategic than his predecessor Hu Jintao," Corrales tells bne Intellinews. "In addition to wanting to expand the influence of Chinese businesses abroad and obtain raw materials, he also wanted to have a greater political presence abroad, regardless of the economic costs."

And Venezuela, home to the world’s largest oil reserves, offers Beijing unique advantages in Latin America – a continent further drifting into China’s orbit of influence following the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency. "The Venezuelan government was not very accountable to any local group, so it could offer China anything China wanted," Corrales explains. "China could not find any other country in the Americas, other than Cuba, where it could call the shots to the same degree."

This freedom from scrutiny has proved valuable as Chinese projects, often part of Beijing’s signature Belt and Road initiative, face increasing opposition from civil society across Latin America. "By the late 2010s, many groups in civil society in Latin America were questioning many Chinese deals, especially extractivist projects as well as non-transparent deals," Corrales notes. "But in Venezuela, the state insulated China from any of that scrutiny."

Yet even this privileged position has not prevented Beijing from hedging its bets. As Venezuela's economy collapsed after 2014, driving nearly 8mn citizens to flee over the past decade, China's response has been calculated. While extending enough credit to prevent a sovereign default, Beijing has simultaneously opened channels to the opposition. Chinese government-linked entities have quietly hosted opposition figures, whilst advisers to opposition economists report exploratory meetings with Chinese officials about post-Maduro scenarios.

"They basically, of course, will deal with whoever is in power," Monaldi says. "I don't think they will do anything to push Maduro out. They did, I think, signal Maduro that he shouldn't mess with Guyana. That's the only thing in which I think they have done some signalling."

The latest US military deployment, framed as an anti-narcotics operation targeting the "Cartel of the Suns" allegedly led by Maduro, is yet another thorn in Beijing’s side. Speaking to SCMP, Denny Roy of the East-West Centre notes the warships demonstrate that Washington – which recently re-authorised Chevron to pump oil in Venezuela in a bid to shift crude exports away from China and back to the US market –  "has the capability of cutting off Venezuela's oil supplies to China."

Some analysts suggest the pressure might paradoxically boost China-Venezuela ties in the short term. Zhao Xijun, a finance professor at Renmin University, argues that sanctioned countries "will feel they might be sanctioned, so they'd think of ways to join forces."

Beijing's measured response, meanwhile, reflects a broader pattern in Chinese foreign policy. As Gabriel Pastor of Uruguay's CERES think tank observes in an interview with CNN, China's statement is "politically correct" but "does not mean that China is going to intervene in the conflict by supporting Venezuela."

Indeed, a democratic transition might ultimately serve Chinese commercial interests better. "If there is a stable and more competent government in Venezuela led by the opposition and sanctions are lifted, I think they will be more willing to invest, actually," Monaldi suggests, pointing to China's successful partnerships with non-leftist governments across Latin America.

The situation lays bare the limits of anti-American solidarity. Whilst Maduro can brandish his Xi Jinping-gifted phone and invoke China in his rhetorical battles with Washington, Beijing's actual support appears unlikely to extend beyond diplomatic statements and continued oil purchases through Byzantine arrangements.

"China is not willing to do a lot to keep Maduro in power," Monaldi concludes. "They are not doing that much, but they are also not gonna push him out in any way."

As Maduro claims to mobilise around 4.5mn militia members nationwide in response to perceived US threats, Beijing's stance remains coolly pragmatic. In the great power competition playing out in Venezuela's coastal waters, China seems content to watch from the sidelines, maintaining its investments whilst avoiding any moves that might escalate confrontation with Washington.

For Maduro, frantically working his satellite phone, the message from Beijing is clear: symbolic support, yes; military intervention, absolutely not. In the hierarchy of China's global priorities, preserving an unprofitable Latin American ally ranks well below avoiding direct conflict with the United States.

As Corrales summarises China's ultimate willingness to back Venezuela: "More than Colombia and Brazil, far less than Russia and Cuba." But Moscow remains consumed by its war in Ukraine, and Cuba faces an unprecedented economic crisis, which leaves little room for manoeuvre. In the end, Maduro may find that all the "ni haos" in the world will not summon the cavalry he desperately needs.