India is navigating a complex diplomatic landscape as it seeks to deepen engagement with key Islamic nations to safeguard its economic and strategic interests, even as anti-India rhetoric and actions from Pakistan and radical elements in Bangladesh grow louder following political changes in Dhaka. 

New Delhi's outreach to the Islamic world has intensified in recent years, particularly towards the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which are pivotal to India's energy security, diaspora well-being, and trade balance. At the same time, Indian policymakers must manage persistent antagonism from Pakistan, which continues to internationalise the Kashmir issue and portray the Indian state as hostile to Muslims. 

Compounding the challenge is the rising assertiveness of Islamist factions in Bangladesh following the exit of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government, long regarded by India as a stable partner against extremism in South Asia. 

India’s Gulf outreach is rooted in pragmatism. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are major suppliers of crude oil and natural gas. Over 9mn Indians reside in the Gulf region, sending home billions of dollars annually in remittances that help stabilise India's current account. 

Beyond energy and expatriates, these countries have become increasingly important investors in Indian infrastructure, technology, and financial markets. 

New Delhi’s goal is to insulate these relationships from ideological interference and keep them grounded in mutual economic benefit. India has succeeded in institutionalising ties with most Gulf monarchies. Strategic dialogues, defence partnerships, and sovereign wealth fund flows into Indian assets have expanded steadily. India’s neutral stance on conflicts within the Islamic world - most notably between Saudi Arabia and Iran - has enhanced its profile as a credible, non-aligned partner. It has also avoided entanglements in intra-Arab disputes, focusing instead on bilateral ties. 

However, this carefully constructed balance is increasingly strained by developments in South Asia. 

Pakistan continues to push anti-India narratives across multilateral Islamic forums, often painting New Delhi’s domestic policies as oppressive to Muslims. 

While many Middle Eastern capitals have refrained from amplifying Pakistan's claims, the information war over Kashmir and minority rights in India has found traction in sections of Arab social media. This has occasionally spilled into diplomatic sensitivities, prompting Indian missions to increase public engagement and rebut misinformation campaigns. 

Complicating India’s calculus further is the changing political dynamic in Bangladesh. With Sheikh Hasina’s political influence in retreat, previously marginalised Islamist organisations have found renewed voice in Dhaka’s policy corridors. This resurgence has coincided with a spike in anti-Hindu violence and inflammatory rhetoric targeting India. Radical networks once suppressed under Hasina’s rule are now seeking to challenge secular structures and promote a regional Islamic identity hostile to Indian influence. 

This ideological shift in Dhaka presents both a security threat and a strategic dilemma for India. A porous border with Bangladesh makes infiltration by extremist elements a persistent concern for Indian security agencies, particularly in states such as West Bengal and Assam. 

Moreover, the radicalisation of political discourse in Bangladesh could erode bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and regional connectivity - areas that had seen improvement under the previous regime. 

To counteract these pressures, India has stepped up its multilateral diplomacy with moderate Islamic nations, seeking their support in isolating violent extremism while projecting itself as a pluralistic democracy with millennia-old ties to the Islamic world. 

From expanding trade with Egypt and Indonesia to securing defence cooperation with Oman and Central Asian republics, India is crafting a broader partnership framework not overly dependent on any single region or ideology. 

Most Gulf leaders for their part have also chosen to reciprocate India’s initiatives and prioritise long-term economic and strategic objectives over ideological commentary. Indian construction firms, digital platforms, and renewable energy developers are increasingly active across Gulf and 

North African states, building soft power in a region once shaped almost entirely by religious affiliation. At the multilateral level, India’s participation in forums such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) remains limited due to Pakistani opposition. 

Still, India has maintained back-channel links and increased engagement with individual member states. India’s inclusion as a guest of honour at the OIC foreign ministers’s meeting in 2019, hosted by the UAE, was a diplomatic breakthrough signalling wider acceptance. 

Nevertheless, India’s balancing act remains precarious with India’s challenges in reinforcing economic interdependence with moderate Islamic states while containing the influence of radicalised neighbours. Diplomatic agility, targeted investment diplomacy, and internal cohesion will be critical to ensure that New Delhi’s outreach to the Islamic world does not falter amid provocations from within its immediate periphery.