The outbreak of hostilities between Thailand and Cambodia earlier this month has raised alarm across Southeast Asia, not only for its humanitarian implications but also for the serious risk it poses to energy infrastructure and long-term power security in both nations.

Though the border clashes began as a political and territorial confrontation, their ripple effects could severely disrupt energy production, especially in areas near the conflict zone where solar installations, grid lines, and fuel transport corridors lie exposed.

In recent years, both Thailand and Cambodia have invested heavily in diversifying their energy sources, with solar power playing an increasingly central role. The flat terrain and abundant sunshine of their shared border provinces - such as Thailand’s Sa Kaeo and Cambodia’s Banteay Meanchey - have made them ideal for solar farms. Yet it is precisely these solar assets, many of which lie within artillery range of one another, that now stand at risk of damage, neglect, or weaponisation.

Thailand’s solar boom, part of its broader ambition to increase renewable energy's share to 30% of total electricity generation by 2037, has seen considerable progress in the northeast and regions close to the Cambodian border. Several private developers have established solar parks in border districts, supplementing the country’s hydropower and natural gas-dominated energy mix.

Likewise, Cambodia, though more modest in scale, has made notable strides in solar adoption. The 60-MW National Solar Park in Kampong Speu and smaller arrays in Banteay Meanchey and Battambang were commissioned with support from the Asian Development Bank and other international donors to reduce the country’s dependence on electricity imports from Vietnam and Thailand.

These installations, however, were built with assumptions of peace and economic cooperation, not military confrontation. The sudden militarisation of the border has placed these assets in jeopardy. Any prolonged conflict could lead to the evacuation of technical staff, supply chain disruptions, and deliberate or accidental damage to photovoltaic infrastructure. In turn, this would effectively plunge local areas into darkness and reverse years of development.

Equally concerning is the fragility of the grid infrastructure. In border regions, both Thailand and Cambodia have built interlinked networks that allow for limited cross-border electricity trading and load balancing. While not massive in scale, these interconnections are crucial for regional resilience, particularly during peak demand periods or dry seasons when hydroelectric production falters.

The escalation of hostilities as appears likely at time of typing according to Newsbase sources in the region - despite claims of peace by US President Donald Trumo, could prompt either side to sever these links.

Whether for strategic reasons or due to physical destruction matters little. Any severance would only serve to isolate vulnerable areas and increase the likelihood of blackouts.

Moreover, conventional power generation is not immune to disruption. Thailand’s natural gas-powered plants, which supply over 60% of the nation’s electricity, rely on pipelines and transport corridors that could become logistical chokepoints should the conflict spread north along the Laos border region. There are already reports that the area at which Laos, Cambodia and Thailand comes together has been affected by shelling.

Cambodia meanwhile still relies significantly on diesel and heavy fuel oil for distributed generation in rural areas. Any interruptions in fuel transport, whether by land or through the port of Sihanoukville, could bring essential services to a standstill.

The broader economic implications are equally unsettling. With factories and special economic zones on both sides of the border dependent on stable electricity supplies, a prolonged energy disruption would jeopardise industrial production, jobs, and exports.

In Sa Kaeo’s Aranyaprathet district, garment and electronics manufacturers will face increased costs due to diesel generator reliance and delays in maintenance services. In Cambodia’s Poipet too, light industry operators, many of whom rely on predictable power for production cycles tied to overseas orders would be affected.

Then there is the issue of foreign investment. Solar development in both countries has been largely driven by international capital, often through public-private partnerships or concessional finance. As such, a perceived rise in geopolitical risk could cause investors to reconsider future energy projects, delay disbursements, or even trigger insurance-related claims if force majeure conditions are met. South Korea has already advised its citizens regrain from travel to the regions. Other nations are expected to follow suit. For Cambodia in particular, which has relied on donor-supported green energy initiatives to improve energy access and meet climate commitments, this represents a serious setback.

The conflict also undermines regional ambitions under the ASEAN Power Grid initiative, which seeks to promote cross-border electricity trading and integrated energy planning. The standoff between Thailand and Cambodia could harden attitudes across the region, encouraging more insular and security-driven energy policies at the expense of cooperative frameworks.

This is something ASEAN is keen to avoid. With climate change already stressing water resources and fossil fuel markets remaining volatile, Southeast Asia can ill afford such fragmentation.

In the short term therefore, mitigation efforts will depend on the ability of local authorities and international mediators to establish buffer zones or demilitarised corridors to protect energy infrastructure. Remote monitoring technologies, where available, might allow limited control over key solar installations, but without on-site maintenance, even the most sophisticated systems are prone to degradation.

Emergency energy imports, particularly from Laos or Vietnam, may become necessary if large portions of the grid are compromised, although transmission capacity and political willingness may limit their feasibility.

As is, neither Thailand nor Cambodia anticipated that their investments in renewable energy could become entangled in armed conflict. But the events of July 2025 and perhaps August and beyond serve as a stark reminder that energy systems, while designed for stability, remain deeply vulnerable to political upheaval.

The promise of solar power in Southeast Asia remains real and urgent. Yet unless peace is restored swiftly and securely, the very light these systems were meant to provide may be dimmed by the smoke of conflict.