Is Kazakhstan’s Tokayev planning to rule 'forever'?

Is Kazakhstan’s Tokayev planning to rule 'forever'?
Tokayev seen alongside Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi during a visit to Japan in December 2025. / Cabinet Secretariat, Japan, cc-by-sa 4.0
By Nizom Khodjayev in Astana August 4, 2026

In Central Asia, the spectacle of a president going on and on, and on, as if they plan to rule forever is a norm, not an exception. Thus, a Constitutional Court ruling that Kazakhstan’s 73-year-old president of seven years Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is eligible to seek another term in office under the country's newly adopted constitution came as little surprise.

It was Tokayev himself – the handpicked successor of the first president of post-Soviet independent Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled for very nearly three decades and was 78 when he announced his resignation in 2019 – who requested the court clarification of constitutional provisions that shape his options. Consequently, analysts are now engaged in a big debate over which path Tokayev will take. And some are less than impressed by what the constitutional “reset” signals.

Dosym Satpayev, director of the Risk Assessment Group, argued in comments reported by Azattyk that countries relying on such constitutional remoulding typically share weak institutions and limited political competition.

"They lack a solid political foundation. It is like constructing a skyscraper on a swamp. Behind-the-scenes manoeuvring flourishes, while the system always risks losing its balance once the central decision-maker departs," said Satpayev, adding: "The classic scheme of extending presidential rule through the adoption of a new constitution has been used before, both in Kazakhstan and in other political systems of this type, including many Central Asian states."

Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, contended in an article published on July 17 that the whole point of aspects of the constitutional reform masterminded by Tokayev was to generate succession ambiguity for the elites.

Leaving space for ambiguity

“The main lesson Tokayev appears to have drawn is from Nazarbayev's fate. His predecessor revealed the mechanics of his succession too early and in too much detail, ultimately losing control of the process. Tokayev's strategy, therefore, is to avoid having a concrete plan, or at least a publicly articulated one,” Umarov wrote.

Nazarbayev ruled for nearly three decades, changing the constitution as he went along, to make it possible (Credit: kremlin.ru, cc-by-sa 4.0).

He added: “The president could seek another term in 2029, or he could instead call an early election before then. He could appoint a successor—perhaps one reason the post of vice president has been restored to the constitution—or he could refrain from doing so. Alternatively, he may devise some form of collective governing body to succeed him.”

Even if Tokayev, tipped by some to become the next UN secretary-general, was to ultimately choose the most straightforward course of action and seek another term allowed by the constitutional reset, preserving uncertainty serves an important political function, Umarov emphasised. As long as competing elite groups believe several succession scenarios remain possible, the president retains greater leverage over the political system, he said.

‘Time not on Tokayev’s side’

“Time, however, is not on the current president's side. Nazarbayev did not choose a relatively elderly successor by accident,” Umarov added. “Although Tokayev appears younger than Nazarbayev did at a comparable stage, 73 is nevertheless an advanced age for building a fully-fledged personalist regime or laying claim to the role of a new Elbasy ["Leader of the Nation", the title bestowed on Nazarbayev but then stripped from him as he fell from grace after the unrest and recriminations of 2022].”

Political analyst Marat Shibutov observed that uncertainty over the presidential succession has historically encouraged factional competition within Kazakhstan's ruling elite.

"History has repeatedly shown that expectations of an imminent transfer of power often serve as a trigger for the premature intensification of intra-elite competition and a rise in political uncertainty," Shibutov wrote on Telegram.

The Constitutional Court's ruling, he said, was intended to eliminate uncertainty over presidential term limits and discourage speculation about the future of the presidency.

"Today, the Constitutional Court removed any ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the number of presidential terms, sending a clear signal to the political elite to stop any speculation about the future of the institution of the presidency. The confirmed possibility of the incumbent president running for office again should be regarded as an additional factor contributing to political stability and the preservation of domestic stability."
Tokayev’s confirmed right to run for another presidential term stems from the court ruling determining that the constitution retains a limit of a single seven-year presidential term, though, crucially, terms served under the previous constitution do not count in applying that restriction.

Familiar pattern

Several independent analysts have made the case that preserving Tokayev's ability to remain in office was in fact the central purpose of the adopted constitutional reforms.

Nazarbayev repeatedly amended the constitution to remain in power. Similar constitutional changes have enabled Tajikistan's Emomali Rahmon, Uzbekistan's former leader, the late Islam Karimov, Karimov’s successor Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Belarus's Alexander Lukashenko, Russia's Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev to prolong their presidencies by removing or circumventing term limits, resetting previous mandates or extending presidential terms.

The practice reinforces executive dominance by allowing incumbent leaders to remain eligible for re-election well beyond the point at which they would otherwise be required to step down.

Political analyst Dimash Alzhanov has argued that the wording of Kazakhstan’s revised constitution had always left room for the interpretation ultimately adopted by the Constitutional Court.

Ozodlik on July 14 quoted Alzhanov as noting that public debate over the constitutional draft was steered towards secondary questions, including the composition of parliament, while more consequential issues concerning presidential authority attracted less scrutiny.

"The issue of consolidating and centralising power was already on the agenda immediately after the 2022 [“Bloody January”] protests. The president and his administration have been moving towards that goal step by step," Alzhanov said.

Ekaterina Schulmann, a political scientist at the Carnegie Centre in Berlin, said it was "highly unlikely" that Tokayev would decline to contest the next presidential election, according to Ozodlik.

"Kazakhstan is following a path typical of all autocracies. The defining objective of personalist authoritarian systems is to retain power for as long as possible," she said.

Constitutional safety valve

Some Kazakh political analysts have interpreted the Constitutional Court's ruling less as confirmation that Tokayev will seek another term than as a mechanism designed to reassure the political establishment that the current system of power will remain intact, reducing the risk of elite rivalry ahead of any eventual transfer of the helm.

Gaziz Abishev, a Kazakh political analyst, argued that the court decision functions as a political safeguard rather than as an electoral declaration.

"Given that the next scheduled presidential election is due to take place in three years, in September 2029, this effectively serves as a political safeguard against the system fragmenting," TengriNews quoted Abishev as saying. "According to the Constitutional Court's interpretation, President Tokayev has the right to run for re-election, although that does not necessarily mean he will do so. What it does mean is that he will have that lever at his disposal."

Some observers have linked this interpretation to plans to restore the office of vice-president, abolished in 1995, which would establish a constitutionally recognised successor should a president become unable to serve. The position is widely viewed by Kazakh analysts as a means of signalling Tokayev's preferred successor more clearly to both the public and political elites. Under that reading, the option of seeking another presidential term would remain a contingency should succession plans fail to unfold as intended.

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