Ever since the ceasefire talks kicked off in Riyadh on February 18 the talks between Moscow and Kyiv have been fraught. There has been little common ground over which to start negotiations and as the talks stumbled, Russian President Vladimir Putin has become progressively less willing to compromise as he believes he is winning on the battlefield.

Hopes that a breakthrough could be achieved reached an apex following the Alaska summit on August 15 between Putin and US President Donald Trump, quickly followed by a White House summit with European leaders a few days later. Trump even paused the meeting for an hour to telephone Putin personally and suggest a Budapest trilateral meeting, but that initiative failed at the last minute after Putin made it clear he would not offer any concessions at all at that meeting.

That looks like it might change now. At a press conference following the first day of the latest talks on November 23 to find a compromise on the new 28-point peace plan floated by the US last week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said a “great deal of progress” had been made and he was “very optimistic.” However, the process has just begun and that it’s an “ongoing process.”

“Today was the best day we have had in the entire ten months of these talks,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

He also acknowledged that the entire deal still needs to be put in front of the Kremlin. “Obviously there is the Russian side of the equation. They are players in this process,” Rubio said.

He wouldn’t be drawn on the details or how hard the November 27 deadline by US President Donald Trump is either. “We would love to have this done by Thursday, but it will take as long as it takes,” Rubio said. “There is only one real goal today, which is to take the points of the plan – 26 or 28 according to version – but the final version will still have to be approved by the presidents.”

Pointedly, Rubio gave no details on territory concessions of territory in the plan nor the proposed Article 5-like US security guarantees for Ukraine. But a mood of optimism was palpable and some common ground has appeared that makes close a deal possible.

Calls to end the war grow

Within Ukraine the majority of Ukrainians will not accept a ceasefire deal if it means giving up territory nor capping the size of the military, according to the latest polls and comments from Ukrainian MPs watching the process. But support for the continuation of the war has been slipping steadily over the last year and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy popularity falling, catalysed by the ballooning Energoatom corruption scandal.

A number of prominent voices are calling for Zelenskiy to accept the new deal. If Zelenskiy decides to compromise with Russian demands, it will remain a very hard sell to voters.

“Every subsequent deal for Ukraine will only be worse — because we are losing. We are losing people, territory, and the economy,” Iulia Mendel, Zelenskiy’s former press secretary said in a post on social media. “The EU (which by the way has paid Russia more than €311bn for energy and goods since February 2022) has no real strategy, no way to stop fuelling the Russian budget or support Ukraine enough to win, no direct dialogue with Moscow, and no meaningful leverage over either the Kremlin or Washington.”

“Arguments that “Russia has gained so little land” sound almost childish when you consider the human cost. We have lost more people in three years than some European nations have as the whole population,” she went on. “My country is bleeding out… Many who reflexively oppose every peace proposal believe they are defending Ukraine. With all respect, that is the clearest proof they have no idea what is actually happening on the front lines and inside the country right now… Human life is the highest good, and people — living, breathing people — are the ones who must be saved.”

The terms include some compromises

A lot of confusion reigns over who wrote the 28-point plan. It has been billed as a Russian call for a capitulation, but according to the Washington Post several of the more controversial ideas were floated by Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustam Umerov, who also met with US officials in Florida recently during the preliminary talks.

"According to the US officials, Umerov said in the Florida meeting that Zelenskiy might be ready to compromise on the crucial issue of swapping land in Donetsk for a peace deal, which has been a Russian demand. Umerov also said that Ukraine might be willing to cap its army at 600,000, the officials said. After that cap roused a storm of protest [on November 19], an official told me it might be raised or removed altogether — since it didn’t really affect the manpower balance, which strongly favors Russia in any event,” the Washington Post reported.

DMZ: In a major break with the past, Bankova has suggested that it is willing to give up some territory to get a real peace. Ceding some territory has always been on the cards. Previously the White House’s position for most of the war was not for Ukraine to win a victory, but in its more sober moments it said repeatedly the goal was to, “put Ukraine into the strongest possible position when the inevitable negotiations begin.” That always implied some territorial give-away was built in from the start.

Zelenskiy too has anticipated the need to cede territory. In the summer of 2024 he said that he wanted to bring the war to an end by the end of that year. In a pragmatic move to prepare the ground he proposed a referendum be held to give him the authority to cede some land to Russia, which is banned by the constitution. As the fighting continued, and after Trump came into office, Bankova’s position has hardened noticeably and that idea was dropped. Giving up land to Russia has become a red line that Zelenskiy until now would not cross.

The whole idea of the proposed demilitarised zone (DMZ) in the Donbas is confused and controversial, but possibly a workable compromise. The idea was first suggested as part of the 12-point Chinese peace plan floated on the first anniversary of the start of the war.

It’s not clear who came up with this idea, but it is likely to have been an American suggestion which has long experience with DMZs thanks to its alliance with South Korea. The idea will be unpalatable to Bankova, which is extremely reluctant to abandon its Fortress Line in Donbas into which it has invested heavily and will be extremely hard for Russia to take by force. Putin will also be reluctant to give up the bulk of the territory occupied by the Armed Forces of Russia (AFR) at the cost of so much blood and treasure.

However, both parties might be willing to consider a DMZ. Ukraine is facing the prospect of the collapse of its entire eastern front defences if the key logistic hub in the battle for Pokrovsk falls. Putin may consider it as he started the war in order to protect Russia’s security interests. The occupation of all of the Donbas would create a buffer zone that would protect Russia’s vulnerable southern flank, the original reason for the Russian invasion. But a DMZ in Donbas would serve the same purpose.

It is an idea the Kremlin has already suggested: in May Putin ordered the creation of a buffer zone all the way along the Ukrainian border. And the EU also suggested the creation of a 40km wide buffer zone in August.

The question of who would monitor this DMZ remains untouched. While Western military forces in Ukraine are excluded by the 28-point plan, several Global South countries have already offered to play a mediating rule. Turkey could be one possibility and has a large army.

Military restrictions: Western leaders said they were "concerned by the proposed limitations on Ukraine's armed forces, which would leave Ukraine vulnerable to future attack," in their joint statement from the G20 summit on November 22. The initial reports from Geneva say that Ukraine and its allies are insisting that the “cap” on its military be raised from 600,000 as per the first draft of the deal, to 800,000. Earlier this month Zelenskiy said that currently the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has 880,000 men in the field.

The new cap on Ukraine’s forces of 800,000 is in effect no cap at all, as that is almost as many men as Ukraine already has in the field. The chances of Kyiv increasing that to Zelenskiy stated goal of 1mn men under arms is highly unlikely, given the poor performance of the compulsory conscription program and the mushrooming number of desertions.

As bne IntelliNews reported, just the cap of 600,000 men is actually an extremely generous limit, suggested by Umerov, that would leave Ukraine with by far the largest army in Europe – almost twice as large as Turkey’s 335,000 men. Several analysts questioned if Ukraine can even afford such a large military force.

It should be enough to deter Russia, which has 1.3mn men under arms, (and will also struggle to pay for such a large force in peacetime). A back of the envelope calculation suggests it should be sufficient: typically, an attacking force loses three men to each defender. In Russia’s attacks on Bakhmut and more recently the battle for Pokrovsk the ratio has been closer to 5:1 or more. Currently, Russia is reportedly losing 1,000 men a day in the attack on Pokrovsk to Ukraine’s 200 or less.

With this death ratio, that suggests a force of 450,000 would be sufficient to hold off a Russian army of 1.3mn men. But assuming Russia has a death ratio of attackers’ vs defenders of 5:1 and it reduces its army to 750,000 post war, the minimum acceptable size of the AFU needed to deter Russia would shrink to only 150,000 men – less than the AFU started the war with, which indeed has been enough to successfully prevent Russia from overrunning the whole country. However, clearly Russia's superiority in missiles, fighter jets, artillery, and funding play an important role too.

According to the Washington Post, the idea of the 600,000 cap on the size of the military was discussed by Ukraine’s Defence Minister Umerov with his US counterparts and the number remains an open topic.

“Trump might raise or remove a proposed 600,000-person cap on Ukraine’s army, for example. And to bolster postwar deterrence, officials are considering supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles if a peace agreement is reached,” David Ignatiev of the Washington Post reported.

If the cap was a US or Ukrainian suggestion, and not Dmitriev’s idea, then that suggests that the list was produced with input from both sides, as Rubio has said. The EU has billed the 600,000 men limit as a problem, but the problem could be that Putin will reject it as it is too big, not too small.

A “600K cap on the size of Ukrainian army - Moscow is not going to tolerate a force half the size of all European armies combined on its porch. It’s exactly what it tried to prevent by launching the aggression,” journalist and bne IntelliNews columnist Leonid Ragozin said in a social media post.

Security guarantees: the inclusion of a US security guarantee in the 28-point plan is a key new development. Until now, the White House has refused to offer Ukraine any kind of security guarantee whatsoever, but while the details on the terms of the new offer remain thin, now the White House is proposing to offer a real decade-long guarantee that includes possible military assistance for Ukraine if Russia attacks again, Axios reports.

bne IntelliNews has been very critical of previous security “guarantee” offers by Europe, which did not include an Article 5-like collective security deal, but were simply “security assurances” – promises of long-term supplies of money and arms, but stopped sort of committing Europe’s military support in the face of a renewed Russian attack. The lack of Europe’s commitment to real security deals is what killed off the 2022 Istanbul peace deal. Trump’s offer of real Article 5-like security guarantees is new.

While Trump is not offering US boots on the ground this time either (although this remains possible under the terms of the proposal), the commitments are serious. If adopted, it should act as a real deterrent to more Russian aggression but will also limit Ukraine’s desire for revenge. A leaked text, published by Axios, included the following points:

The guarantee is explicitly voided if Ukraine launches attacks on Russia;

It obligates specific Nato members to enforce the guarantee in concert with the US;

Limited to ten years but will be "renewable by mutual agreement;" and

The potential aggressor, Russia, would be a signatory to the deal.

This proposal is in effect the basis for a new pan-European security deal that the Kremlin has been calling for since 2008 and would, if signed by all of the European Nato powers, negate the need for Ukraine to join Nato.

The draft outline for the US’ security guarantee has been leaked and is surprisingly strong, including the possibility of military by the US against Russia, should it breach the peace:

This Framework establishes the conditions for an armistice between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and provides a security assurance modelled on the principles of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, adapted to the circumstances of this conflict and the interests of the United States and its European partners.

The United States affirms that a significant, deliberate, and sustained armed attack by the Russian Federation across the agreed armistice line into Ukrainian territory shall be regarded as an attack threatening the peace and security of the transatlantic community. In such an event, the President of the United States shall, in exercise of constitutional authority and after immediate consultations with Ukraine, Nato, and European partners, determine the measures necessary to restore security. These measures may include armed force, intelligence and logistical assistance, economic and diplomatic actions, and other steps judged appropriate. A joint assessment mechanism with Nato and Ukraine will evaluate any claimed breach.

Nato members, including France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, and Finland, affirm that Ukraine's security is integral to European stability and commit to act in concert with the United States in responding to any qualifying violation, ensuring a unified and credible deterrent posture.

This Framework enters into force upon signature and shall remain valid for ten years, renewable by mutual agreement. A Joint Monitoring Commission led by European partners with US participation will oversee compliance.

These are the strongest security guarantees yet, but according to reporting by the Washington Post they still leave a lot to be desired and may not be acceptable to Bankova or the Kremlin.

“US officials close to the negotiation told me Saturday that the administration recognizes that “security guarantees are not strong enough yet” in Trump’s 28-point peace proposal,” correspondent David Ignatius reported.

Reparation loans: The new peace plan has thrown a new spanner in the increasingly difficult effort to get the EU plan to make Reparation Loans of €140bn to Ukraine using the frozen Russian cash held in Euroclear in Brussels. The US-sponsored plan suggests the frozen Russian assets will be unblocked, taking them off the table for backing the controversial loan.

Of the frozen money, €100bn will be earmarked for a Ukraine rebuild fund (and America will take half the profits this fund earns) and the rest will be put into a US-Russia joint investment fund for “mutual investment projects.”

Without the frozen funds, Europe is left with no other way to continue to fund the war other than dip into its own taxpayers money – something none of the member states can either afford or want to do. Indeed, the plan suggests the EU should contribute an additional $100bn of its own money towards the rebuild fund.

Point 14 of the plan says, "$100bn in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine. The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will add $100bn to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine's reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen."

As bne IntelliNews has long argued, Trump wants to do business with Russia as part of his new transactional approach to international relations. The joint fund is the manifestation of that, except, the US will make these mutual investments by exclusively investing Russia’s own money. According to the text of the deal there is no provision for the US to contribute anything to the joint US-Russia fund. Privately, officials and diplomats concede the US peace plan, drafted without European input, seriously risks derailing the EU's strategy and leaving the bloc powerless, Euronews reports.

100 days elections: This demand has widely been seen as the US and the Kremlin’s demand that Zelenskiy leave office. Putin has many times questioned Zelenskiy’s legitimacy after his presidential term in office expired in May, but supporters counter that it is illegal to hold elections while the country is under martial law according to the constitution.

Elections would have to be called anyway if a ceasefire is agreed and martial law ends. But according to the Washington Post, US officials see elections as a de facto referendum on the legitimacy of the deal.

“Because of Ukraine’s political instability, US officials included a proposal for national elections in Ukraine within 100 days after an agreement is signed, which would amount to a public ratification or rejection of the agreement,” the Washington Post reported following interviews with numerous US officials. “They also added a clause providing postwar amnesty, at Ukraine’s request, to reassure Zelenskiy and members of his government that they wouldn’t face prosecution if the current [Energoatom corruption scandal] widens.”

Sanctions relief: This is likely to be a problem for the Kremlin too. As part of Trump’s “final offer” deal presented in London in April, Trump included a demand for limited sanctions relief, specifically for sanctions on Rosselkhozbank to be lifted, the state-owned bank that deals with grain exports. That was rejected. At the Alaska summit on August 15, Putin broached the topic of sanctions again saying he expected “limited” sanctions relief as part of any deal, but clearly had the financial sanctions, and especially the SWIFT sanctions, in mind.

Lifting sanctions will be a key point in the discussions. While the new plan explicitly says Russia will be “reintegrated into the global economy” and sanctions lifted on a “case by case” basis, the timetable will be key.

“Gradual, case-by-case lifting of sanctions after peace is reached. Moscow remembers how Jackson-Vanick poisoned relations after 1991,” Ragozin said, referring to the Jewish emigration sanctions imposed in the Soviet-era in 1974 that took 38 years to lift.