Armenia is heading toward a high-stakes 2026 parliamentary election that observers say could determine whether the small South Caucasus country continues its pivot toward the West or reverses course under pressure from Moscow and powerful diaspora networks.

In a new commentary for Carnegie Europe, senior fellow Thomas de Waal says the vote is shaping up to be “a plebiscite on its future geopolitical trajectory”, in a similar style to Moldova’s recent general election. The campaign, although officially months away, has already become “ferocious”, he writes in the commentary, titled “Armenia's Election Is a Foreign Affair”, as domestic and foreign actors manoeuvre to influence the outcome.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power in a 2018 revolution, is expected to centre his campaign on a platform branded “Real Armenia”. As outlined by de Waal, this project aims to “reopen the country’s borders, lower dependence on Russia and diversify its foreign and economic profile by normalising relations with traditional adversaries Azerbaijan and Turkey.”

Pashinyan secured a breakthrough in August 2025, when a US-brokered summit at the White House resulted in a framework peace agreement with Azerbaijan. De Waal describes this as “the first big success” of the Real Armenia agenda and cites a June 2025 poll by the International Republic Institute showing that 47% of Armenians already support a peace treaty with Baku, outnumbering the 40% who oppose it.

Russia and the diaspora mobilise

But external forces are now rallying against the prime minister, particularly elements of the Armenian diaspora — long influential in national politics — and Russia, which once saw Armenia as a reliable ally.

“These two forces took on a single face last week,” de Waal writes, when right-wing US commentator Tucker Carlson, known for his pro-Kremlin views, hosted Nareg Karapetyan — nephew of jailed Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan — on his podcast.

In the interview, the younger Karapetyan accused Pashinyan of attacking traditional values. He claimed the government was pushing “an LGBTQ agenda” and “a war against Christianity”, while telling Armenians to “forget history” and surrender the nation to Turkey.

De Waal argues the messaging echoes the Kremlin’s broader regional playbook. The discussion, he says, “amplified… the message Moscow uses across Eastern Europe: that the decadent West seeks to sow chaos and destroy traditional religious values.”

Despite the growing disinformation fight, de Waal notes that Russia’s standing in Armenia “has plummeted over the last five years”, and the argument for peace still resonates with parts of society exhausted by conflict, especially after the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.

Yet Pashinyan’s political vulnerability remains. His “erratic way of communicating — long monologues without much dialogue — will cost him support,” de Waal warns. Crucially, progress on foreign policy relies on unpredictable counterparts: Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United States.

A core challenge is Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia revise its constitution — removing indirect references to unification with Nagorno-Karabakh — before finalising the treaty. That change will require a national referendum held separately from the parliamentary vote, a risky move in an already polarised environment.

The second major pillar — normalising ties with Turkey — is seen as strategically vital but remains contingent on Ankara’s calculus. De Waal writes that many analysts believe it is in Turkey’s “strategic interests to act now,” but President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continues to defer to Azerbaijani priorities.

Uncertain roles

Washington has taken a leading role through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — a joint plan to rebuild railway links between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave, via Armenia. De Waal argues TRIPP could “ensure economic interdependence between the two countries, remove the threat of war, and reintegrate both Nakhchivan and Armenia.”

But implementation will be difficult. Armenia “lacks the strong capacity to plan and complete big infrastructure projects in a short time frame,” while US staffing for the initiative remains limited.

For Europe, the challenge is broader: supporting Armenia’s state-building while avoiding political missteps during a volatile electoral season. De Waal warns that meaningful EU engagement will require “substantial funding as well as a change of mindset in the Pashinyan government,” which still governs through a tight inner circle shaped by its revolutionary origins.

For now, the commentary concludes, Armenia’s future remains uncertain. “Before that [engagement],” de Waal writes, “Armenia’s future is up for grabs.”

As campaigning intensifies — with Russia-backed messaging, diaspora influence, and geopolitical bargaining all in play — Armenia’s 2026 election is expected to become one of the most consequential in the post-Soviet region since Ukraine’s 2014 turn westward. Whether Pashinyan’s Real Armenia vision survives post-election, de Waal suggests, will depend not only on domestic politics, but on whether Europe, the United States and regional partners can deliver visible results before Armenians head to the polls.