As Emerging Europe heads into 2026, rising economic pressures and voter disillusionment are fuelling support for right-wing populist parties and anti-establishment movements across the region.

Mak Kasapovic, Eastern Europe analyst at Oxford Analytica, commented during a webinar on November 20 that 2025 has been a “turbulent election year”. “It’s a mixed bag from the point of view of centrist mainstream parties, but I think the main takeaway is that populism, especially right-wing populism, is alive and kicking in East European countries in 2025, and in many we saw a resurgence.”

Much of the current political debate is now centred on Hungary, where parliamentary elections are scheduled for April. For Kasapovic, the vote is symbolically significant: “Hungary was the place where this started with the election of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party in 2010,” he said. “So the question now is: to what extent can Hungary be a harbinger of a reversal in this trend?”

There was similar speculation ahead of Poland’s 2023 elections, when the Law and Justice (PiS) party was expected to consolidate the populist wave; instead the vote led to the formation of a centrist government under current Prime Minister Donald Tusk. 

The Hungarian election is likely to be even more significant, as Kasapovic said: “Hungary is different because Orbán is seen as a lynchpin of this transnational illiberal movement — according to some, even including the US president and his political movement.”

A new challenger in Budapest

The biggest variable in Hungary’s political landscape is Péter Magyar, a lawyer and former government insider who rapidly emerged as the country’s most popular alternative to Orbán in 2024.

“Magyar emerged out of nowhere,” Kasapovic said.

His ascent began with a government scandal early in 2024 that forced high-level resignations. Magyar then embarked on tours of the countryside and mass rallies, Kasapovic said. “He’s very charismatic, and he leveraged social media to great effect — which neutralises Fidesz’s advantage in controlling most media in Hungary.”

In June 2024, Magyar’s party, Tisza, won 20% of the vote in the European Parliament elections — despite being only two months old. “It shows the popularity is not a fluke,” Kasapovic said.

Magyar’s own seat in the European Parliament may also serve a tactical purpose. “It was a smart move because of legal immunity,” the analyst said.

Fidesz on the defensive

Orbán’s party has responded aggressively. “Fidesz is throwing the kitchen sink at Tisza,” Kasapovic said, citing AI-generated smear campaign photos, bans on pride parades designed to provoke divisive social clashes, and referendums on tax hikes aimed at forcing Magyar into uncomfortable positions. However, he added, “None of this seems to be working.”

Hungary’s governing crisis, he said, is driven by two main factors: changing public perceptions of corruption and deep economic frustration. “There’s a perception of lavish lifestyles among the Hungarian elite,” he said. Meanwhile, the economy has suffered a downturn. Orbán promised 4% growth in 2024, but the European Commission projects just 0.4%.

“The economy has contracted quarter-on-quarter in six of the last eight quarters,” the analyst added. “Annual inflation is the third highest in the EU.”

According to Kasapovic, Fidesz’s popularity has always been tied to economic conditions rather than rhetoric. “It’s not all about culture wars,” he said. “Orbán came to power in 2010 after the financial crisis hit Hungary especially hard — so it makes sense that his fate is tied to the fate of the economy.”

Broader regional shift

Hungary’s struggle reflects broader regional dynamics. “The advance of far-right parties is a response to the state of the economy in many countries,” Kasapovic said. “They are portraying themselves as anti-establishment forces, so this is a broad-based anti-establishment backlash in Eastern Europe.”

Some of these leaders are veteran politicians repositioning themselves, such as Romania’s George Simion. “But they are able to effectively portray themselves as anti-establishment,” he said.

The shift is reshaping policy priorities across Europe — not just among far-right governments. “There’s a broader shift in how Europe faces climate, migration and EU integration,” he said. “Even pro-EU governments are not going along with everything Brussels proposes.”

Kasapovic pointed to Poland: “The government was supposed to be the pro-EU flag bearer — but Poland has not really gone along with everything Brussels proposes.”

He expects that the electoral momentum of far-right parties “will only accelerate the shift away from decarbonisation,” particularly as governments under pressure from populists “become more expedient and shift some of their policy positions.”