Turkey, Nato member, but at the same time a Black Sea neighbour of Ukraine and Russia that throughout their war has set out to maintain amicable relations with both Kyiv and Moscow. Is it possible to imagine Turkish troops on the ground in Ukraine, serving as a reassurance force tasked with a core role in maintaining a ceasefire?

Turkey is of course one of the 34 countries that make up the British and French-led Coalition of the Willing, which have pledged a readiness to be part of a peacekeeping force to be deployed on Ukrainian territory. And on November 27, Russian deputy foreign minister Alexander Grushko said that any presence of Western troops from countries involved in the Coalition of the Willing would be “absolutely out of the question.”

Does that phrasing rule out Turkish forces and, if it does, might the position of Grushko and the Kremlin shift as the hard bargaining over a peace deal proceeds?

Ceasefire first

Turkey’s defence ministry itself commented on November 27 that a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia must be put in place first before there can be any talks on a possible Turkish troop deployment for a potential reassurance force.

Two days previously, French president Emmanuel Macron said he saw the force as having French, British and Turkish soldiers. 

That led to a cautious reiteration from the Turkish foreign ministry. “First, a ceasefire must be established between Russia and Ukraine. Afterward, a mission framework must be established with a clear mandate, and the extent to which each country will contribute must be determined,” it said at a press briefing.

Negotiating tactic or not, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov is by now sending out the message that the Europeans have failed all chances of participating in the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis.

Ankara, Moscow relations

But should some common ground offering hope of a deal be anyway found, there will be intensified scrutiny on the current state of Ankara’s relations with Moscow as the search for acceptable troop contingents continues.

As it happens, this week has seen two timely pieces of analysis published by analysts who write for think tank Carnegie.

In the first, Ruslan Suleymanov argues that ties between Russia and Turkey are faltering amid the stresses of the war.

In the second, Alper Coskun looks at how Turkey is staking its claim in the Ukraine peace process.

Suleymanov concludes: “Russia-Türkiye cooperation has weakened so significantly over the last three years because of Russia’s enormous expenditure of resources on the war in Ukraine, Ankara’s drift toward Washington, an end to the so-called Astana Format (made up of Russia, Türkiye, and Iran) set up to address the fighting in Syria, and the diversification of Türkiye’s foreign trade. The annual trade turnover between Russia and Türkiye increased 90 percent in 2022 to $65 billion. By 2024, it had fallen to $52.6 billion, and China had replaced Russia as Türkiye’s main source of imports.

“Of course, Moscow and Ankara still have a significant economic relationship—from atomic energy to oil and gas. It would therefore be impossible for them to fully break with one another overnight, even if they wanted to. It’s the same when it comes to international affairs, where Russian and Turkish interests are entangled in the South Caucasus, Syria, and Libya. But the scale of their bilateral ties is shrinking—and fast.”

In his conclusions, Coskun notes how “Ankara’s balancing act remains intact” as regards policy on Ukraine and Russia.

He observes how when it came to US President Donald Trump’s controversial twenty-eight point peace plan, widely seen as favouring Russia—since shortened to nineteen points following intense negotiations between American and Ukrainian delegations in Geneva—European leaders, together with Canada and Japan, signed a statement on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Johannesburg “calling for major changes to the initial version of the plan, going against Washington’s strong stance and Moscow’s tacit agreement to it. Notably, Turkey chose not to join this statement…”

Writes Coskun, Turkey’s “multiple political relationships with all the actors in a potential peace settlement means it must walk a fine line. Ankara’s historic ties and interdependence with Europe are important, but they are not the only factor determining its decisions on Ukraine”.

Capable and willing

Looking at what Turkey would gain from participation in a reassurance force, Coskun points to how “participation would allow it to demonstrate that it is a pivotal security provider and a capable and willing NATO ally. As European partners grapple with questions about future U.S. commitment to the continent’s defense and seek to build greater capacity of their own, Turkey sees involvement as a way of gaining a voice in these efforts”.

Yet there is no doubt that, particularly since Trump’s return in January this year to the White House and Ankara’s decision to push for a stronger chapter in relations with Washington, mutual suspicion between Moscow and Ankara has been growing.

Though Turkey sets out to keep contact with the Kremlin cordial, it does ship weapons to Ukraine and this fuels mistrust.

So while Turkish troops as part of the peace process might be one of the more attractive options available to Moscow, there are plenty of impediments that could scupper the idea.

As Suleymanov recounts: “Moscow has repeatedly expressed its objection to Türkiye supplying arms to Kyiv. Türkiye, for its part as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, is irritated by Russia’s approach to peace negotiations—particularly its maximalist demands and the low-level delegation it sent to Istanbul talks.

“Türkiye supports Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and backs Kyiv’s aspirations to join NATO. Ankara also insists Russian President Vladimir Putin must meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, for peace talks to progress: something the Kremlin rejects.”