When Vladimir Putin first came to power, Russia was grappling with a demographic crisis. A quarter of a century later, the country faces another one—this time more severe, more complex, and more resistant to the tools previously used to contain it.

“At first glance, the situation resembles that of the late 1990s: declining birth rates, population shrinkage, and persistently high male mortality,” Salavat Abylkalikov, political analyst wrote in a note for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “But this time the challenges are deeper, structural, and exacerbated by the consequences of war.”

Putin’s efforts to boost the population got off to a good start, as bne IntelliNews reported in a feature on Putin’s babies. In the middle of his term the population actually began to grow as the country flourished in the boom years of the noughties, but this decade the growth slowed, then reversed.

The war in Ukraine has accelerated Russia’s demographic decline, adding to long-standing problems and introducing new ones. According to Rosstat, just 1.22mn children were born in 2024—just above the 1999 record low of 1.21mn. “That record will not hold for long,” Abylkalikov noted. “Births are expected to fall by 3–5% annually for the rest of the decade.”

Russia’s demographic patterns follow historical waves driven by the catastrophes of the 20th century—particularly the Second World War. With each population trough repeating on a 25- to 30-year cycle, the country is again entering a period of contraction. To merely stabilise, the total fertility rate must rise from the current 1.4 to at least 1.7 or 1.8. “That would require sustained and unprecedented spending on family policy—something that appears politically and fiscally implausible,” Abylkalikov said.

In the past, Russia relied on immigration to counterbalance natural decline. Between 1992 and 2023, the country recorded a natural population decline of 16.8mn, but immigration offset over 73% of that. “That compensation mechanism is no longer working,” he said. “Labour migrants now have alternative destinations. Russia is becoming less attractive economically and socially.”

Interior Ministry data shows a fall in legal migrant workers from around 5–7mn in the early 2010s to just 3–3.5mn today. Meanwhile, emigration—particularly of skilled professionals—has accelerated. “The 650,000 who left after the Ukraine invasion mark the largest outflow in two decades,” Abylkalikov noted. “And more waves could follow if mobilisation or repression intensifies.”

Staff shortages are already affecting the economy. In late 2024, Russian companies were short some 2.2mn workers, with nearly 70% of firms citing labour scarcity. Compounding the problem is a historically high dependency ratio: over 18% of the population is now over 65, a share set to rise to 24% by mid-century.

“An ageing population without new workers creates a critical burden on pension and healthcare systems,” Abylkalikov said. “The collapse of the social security system is no longer unthinkable.”

The war has also taken a heavy demographic toll. Independent media outlets estimate at least 219,000 Russian soldiers have died since 2022. The indirect losses—wounded, disabled, and traumatised veterans—are likely far greater. “This leads to rising alcoholism, domestic violence, and social instability,” he warned.

With sanctions and budget constraints curbing investment in public health, excess mortality will likely rise. “The result could bemns of preventable deaths over the next decade,” he said.

The contrast with the early 2000s is stark. Then, the Kremlin pursued rational pro-natalist policies, albeit with limited spending. “Now, those strategies have been replaced by ideological campaigns and coercive policies,” Abylkalikov said. These include restrictions on abortion, bans on the “LGBT movement,” and proposals to reinstate Soviet-era childlessness taxes.

“Setting aside the ethics, these measures are demographically useless,” he said. “The abortion rate had already dropped sixfold without bans. These policies only heighten social tensions.”

Perhaps most worrying is the distortion of official data. Abylkalikov cited “the poor quality of the last census, distorted migration statistics, and the classification of demographic data” as signs of a government intent on managing perceptions rather than outcomes.

“According to my estimates based on UN forecasts, if migration falls to zero, Russia’s population could fall to just 90.8mn by 2100—or even 57.4mn in a worst-case scenario,” he said.

“Russia is ending the demographic cycle of the Putin era under far more dangerous conditions than it began. The next generation of leaders will inherit not just an ageing country, but an increasingly empty one.”