After Moldova was nearly derailed from its EU accession path in last year’s presidential election, the authorities have taken controversial steps to prevent this happening again ahead of the September 28 general election. 

In recent months, the Moldovan authorities have unveiled illegal financing schemes to support pro-Russian parties, and criminal organisations channelling money to buy votes and organise anti-government protests. They also exposed sophisticated online campaigns involving bot farms and influencers linked to Russia. The authorities in Chisinau responded actively, including with strategies that would, under normal circumstances, be considered on the verge of unconstitutional. 

This began with the dissolution of the Șor Party led by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor in June 2023 on grounds that were seen as flimsy at the time. Now, Shor’s role in the country’s elections is better documented. Sentenced in Moldova to 15 years of prison for financial fraud, he is openly organising and financing the pro-Russian opposition in Moldova, while also helping Russian authorities to bypass Western sanctions through cryptocurrency arrangements, as announced by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) earlier this year.

On September 26, two opposition parties, including Inima Moldovei (Heart of Moldova) led by former governor of Gagauzia Irina Vlah, one of the three parties in the main opposition coalition, were banned from running in the election just two days before the vote.

Like former president Igor Dodon, Vlah has regularly met Russian President Vladimir Putin and argued for equal collaboration with both the EU and Russia. Her party had not yet been found guilty of illegal financing activities. However, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) decided to suspend the party’s activity for 12 months on “reasonable suspicions” of illegal financing, at the request of the Ministry of Justice. The decision can be appealed, but its effects were enforced before the appeal, starting with the September 28 election.

The new party led by former prosecutor Victoria Furtună was also suspended for 12 months, allegedly for connections with Shor.

In another controversial previous move, the Moldovan authorities restricted the civil rights of opposition leaders, including Vlah, primarily by freezing their bank accounts. These measures were based not on court rulings but on sanctions imposed by Western countries for “active support of Russia”. The Constitutional Court allowed the intelligence services to impose such civil rights restrictions based solely on political sanctions set by foreign states.

Also on September 26, the CEC decided to relocate five voting stations initially designated for voters in Transnistria. Originally announced to be located within the separatist region, the stations were moved to territory controlled by the constitutional authorities only two days before the ballot.

Opposition parties claimed that construction works on bridges across the Dniester River, separating the two sides of the country, had been initiated by the authorities deliberately before the elections in order to prevent pro-Russian voters from reaching polling stations.

On election day, the authorities reported the organised transport of Transnistrians to polling stations across the Dniester as a breach of electoral procedures.

This year, the number of voting stations in Russia, home to a significant part of the Moldovan diaspora, has been severely restricted. Moldovans in areas far from Moscow were transported to Belarus to vote in Minsk, reportedly organised by Șor. Moldovan authorities also reported this operation as a violation of electoral regulations.

In another unusual move, President Maia Sandu became actively involved in supporting the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), which she founded, despite constitutional provisions.

With strong support from EU institutions, she campaigned for the country’s EU accession while criticising other pro-EU parties as covert Russian vehicles. A side effect of this strategy was the lack of political allies for the PAS, which will have to secure the majority of votes in order to remain in office. The authorities’ limited engagement with the Russian-speaking population during the EU accession process was evident and created space for pro-Russian propaganda.

Not only President Sandu, but also the public administration, has engaged in supporting the pro-EU parties.

In its first monitoring report on the September 28 parliamentary election, civil society organisation Promo-LEX stated that abuse of administrative resources is a “systemic phenomenon”, tolerated and still practised despite the existing legal framework.

“Without real sanctions, legislative clarifications, and a genuine delimitation between party and state, this type of abuse risks becoming normal,” warned Promo-LEX experts.

Conditions in Moldova have been far from normal since Russia invaded Ukraine, and especially in recent weeks.

This follows a turbulent period in Moldovan politics since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Shortly afterwards, it was revealed that pro-EU politicians were involved in the $1bn bank fraud scandal that bankrupted the country’s three largest banks, adding some 8% of GDP to public debt and complicating EU accession efforts.

The parliamentary election of November-December 2023 and the presidential election and EU accession referendum in September 2024 marked a gradual increase in activity by pro-Russian politicians operating in coordination with the Kremlin.

The pro-EU authorities in office since 2021, headed by Sandu, have been caught between economic pressures generated by the war in Ukraine and Russia’s energy leverage on one hand, and resistance to reform from the judiciary on the other. The latter has prevented firm prosecution of corruption, including what Sandu has described as electoral corruption.

Moldova’s proactive response must be viewed in the context of the hybrid war waged by Russia in cooperation with a significant part of the local population. Court rulings should be based on the evidence available at the time, but the complexity of digital tools poses serious challenges in addressing electoral criminality.

The elections in Moldova, carried out under hybrid attacks from the Russian Federation, illustrate the need for a revised set of best electoral practices in light of new financial, media and communication instruments. Ballot reruns, as seen in Romania, or reactive policies may provide short-term fixes, but they remain debatable and insufficient for ensuring genuine elections in which the rights of all candidates are respected.