Pakistan’s new defence accord with Saudi Arabia is framed as a strategic partnership aimed at strengthening security ties and military interoperability by the two nations. While the practicality of the pact is doubted in New Delhi’s policy circles, it adds a fresh layer of complexity to South Asia’s security environment and creates potential ripple effects across the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have long maintained close security relations. Since the 1960s, Pakistani military officers have trained Saudi armed forces, advised the kingdom’s defence ministries, and supplied military personnel for sensitive deployments. In turn, Riyadh has provided crucial financial assistance and preferential oil arrangements that helped Islamabad weather repeated financial downturns. What distinguishes the present pact is the timing and scope. According to joint statements, the agreement includes commitments on joint exercises, counterterrorism cooperation, technology transfers, and logistical frameworks to facilitate rapid deployments.

In an era when Saudi Arabia is reorienting its security policy beyond traditional reliance on the US and exploring defence diversification, Pakistan which is nuclear-armed and experienced in both conventional and asymmetric warfare, and heavily invested in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, becomes a natural partner. Analysts note that this tightening of defence ties is occurring amidst shifting alliances. Saudi Arabia is exploring diplomatic outreach with Iran while simultaneously bolstering its military preparedness.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is recovering from years of fiscal strain and political instability, seeking renewed security relevance and economic lifelines. The pact satisfies both needs, it secures Saudi support in international forums for Pakistan and ensures Pakistan remains a key beneficiary of Gulf funding.

For India, the development is troubling. New Delhi has carefully nurtured relations with Riyadh over the past decade, with successive Indian prime ministers visiting the kingdom and signing strategic agreements on energy, counterterrorism, and infrastructure. The relationship was often seen as a counterweight to Pakistan’s historic ties with Saudi Arabia.

The new pact threatens to tilt that balance. India’s main concerns lie in three areas. The first is the security environment in Kashmir and the risk of intensified militancy. India fears Saudi funding or indirect military support channelled through Pakistan could embolden extremist networks across the Line of Control. 

Even if Riyadh pledges neutrality, Islamabad may interpret the pact as diplomatic cover for its security policies. The second concern is the regional balance of influence. India has invested heavily in Gulf partnerships, from oil import agreements to renewable energy projects. Riyadh’s renewed embrace of Pakistan complicates these efforts, especially as India strengthens ties with the US and Israel.

Finally, there is the challenge of strategic encirclement. Indian planners already grapple with the implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which stretches to Gwadar port. A deeper Saudi-Pakistan partnership could reinforce the maritime footprints of Indian rivals in the Arabian Sea, directly affecting India’s naval strategy. New Delhi’s official reaction has so far been muted, with statements highlighting India’s ongoing cooperation with Riyadh in trade, diaspora welfare, and counter-radicalisation.

Yet behind closed doors, officials acknowledge that the pact introduces uncertainty at a time when India is seeking to position itself as a central player in Indo-Pacific security. In Washington, however, the pact may be seen less as a threat and more as an opportunity. For the US Central Command, which oversees operations across the Middle East including critical bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, the Saudi-Pakistan partnership could yield tangible benefits. The US maintains defence cooperation with both countries, though relations have occasionally been strained. Washington relies on Pakistan’s geography as a land and air corridor linking the Gulf to South Asia and Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia remains the largest purchaser of American weaponry in the region. A formalised defence relationship between Riyadh and Islamabad brings advantages.

Joint exercises also reduce the burden on US trainers, as Pakistani forces are already familiar with doctrines derived from NATO standards. Counterterrorism coordination also receives a boost since both states face persistent threats from extremist groups. And most importantly, a stronger bilateral framework prepares the ground for contingencies such as protecting oil installations or maintaining freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, where CENTCOM planners have long worried about overstretch. 

The pact thus indirectly complements Washington’s longer-term aim of balancing Chinese influence in West Asia. While Pakistan is aligned with Beijing, its experience in operating US-supplied platforms allows a useful level of interoperability.

This gives the Pentagon room to manoeuvre, rather than ceding the Saudi defence market entirely to China. For India, this triangular alignment raises uncomfortable questions about its own partnerships. While the US increasingly values New Delhi as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific, American generals also recognise Pakistan’s continuing military relevance within CENTCOM’s remit.

This convergence leaves India facing a narrowing of options. Its diplomats are likely to intensify outreach in Riyadh, emphasising the advantages of India’s vast market and its rising economic weight. New Delhi may also accelerate defence partnerships with the US, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, creating new mini-lateral frameworks that offset any loss of leverage in the Gulf.

Defence procurement, intelligence collaboration, and naval deployments in the Arabian Sea could become central to this recalibration. Whether the pact develops into a transformational alliance or remains largely symbolic will depend on how rigorously it is implemented. Past agreements between Riyadh and Islamabad did not always lead to lasting operational outcomes. Crucial markers to watch include the scale of joint exercises, the degree of equipment transfers, and whether logistical arrangements for troops in the Gulf are activated during crises.

Pakistan’s ability to deliver consistent support will also be tested against its internal political and economic volatility. Still, the pact arrives at a moment when the strategic geography of the Middle East and South Asia is rapidly evolving. Saudi Arabia seeks stable yet flexible partners, Pakistan yearns for renewed relevance and funding, and Washington is looking for ways to maintain security commitments without expanding its own footprint.

For India, the challenge is to chart a response that preserves its growing clout while recognising the shifting loyalties at play. In this equation, it is the US military’s regional command that may feel the most immediate benefits, as Saudi and Pakistani forces build layers of cooperation that fit neatly into existing American planning for one of the world’s most volatile regions.