Ramiz Mehdiyev served as Azerbaijan's Presidential Administration head for 24 consecutive years, making him arguably the most powerful unelected official in post-Soviet Azerbaijan until his dramatic fall in October 2025. Known as the country's "grey cardinal" or éminence grise, he wielded near-absolute control over domestic appointments, ideology and governance while remaining largely invisible to the outside world. His arrest on charges of treason, attempted coup and money laundering was a stunning reversal for a man who once midwifed the Aliyev family’s dynastic succession, crushed dissent for two decades and shaped Azerbaijan's authoritarian political system. 

His trajectory reveals how Soviet-era elite networks adapted to independent statehood, how pro-Russian orientations became liabilities in a changing regional order, and ultimately how even the most entrenched power brokers can fall when their utility expires. This is the story of a man who controlled who entered parliament, who got government positions, what policies were implemented, and what Azerbaijan's citizens were allowed to think, yet whose name remained largely unknown outside the country until his downfall.

Building a Soviet career in ideology and control

Ramiz Mehdiyev was born in Baku on April 17, 1938, into a family with roots in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic — a regional connection that would prove decisive throughout his career. After working as a maritime engineer, his Komsomol activism set him on a trajectory towards ideology and party work.

He studied history at Azerbaijan State University before pursuing doctoral studies at Moscow State University (1968-1972), where his PhD dissertation on "Lenin on the Interactions of Nationalism and Opportunism" foreshadowed his later role as chief ideologist.

The defining relationship began around 1965 when he first met Heydar Aliyev, then a high-ranking KGB official. Both men shared Nakhchivan origins, creating natural affinity in Azerbaijan's clan-based politics, involving extended family networks that dominate post-Soviet political and economic life. When Aliyev became first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in 1969, Mehdiyev returned from Moscow to support his agenda.

From 1972 onwards, Mehdiyev advanced through party structures focused on propaganda and ideology. By December 1983, he was appointed secretary of the Central Committee — one of the highest republican party positions, which he held until May 1988. His career progression exemplified Soviet nomenklatura patterns, building the networks and ideological skills he would later deploy in independent Azerbaijan.

When the Soviet system collapsed, Mehdiyev strategically moved to an academic role, maintaining influence whilst positioning himself to return to power with Aliyev.

The rise of the Grey Cardinal

Azerbaijan's declaration of independence on August 30, 1991, and the subsequent collapse of Soviet structures created a period of profound instability. The Communist Party formally disbanded on September 14, 1991, and the country cycled through presidents Ayaz Mutallibov and Abulfaz Elchibey amid economic crisis, the Nagorno-Karabakh war and threats of civil war. On June 15, 1993, as the country teetered on the edge of collapse, Heydar Aliyev was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet after an armed insurrection in Ganja. By October 3, 1993, he had won the presidency.

Mehdiyev's return to power followed quickly. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1993, then on February 4, 1994, appointed director of the General Issues Department of the Presidential Apparatus. On February 7, 1995, Aliyev appointed Mehdiyev as head of the Presidential Administration — a position he would hold for exactly 24 years, serving both father and son. The appointment reflected Aliyev's desire to consolidate power through trusted Nakhchivan advisers who had proven loyalty over decades.

The Presidential Administration under Mehdiyev became what one analyst writing for Commonspace.eu described as "the heart of government and political power in Azerbaijan". While presidents held public roles, Mehdiyev controlled the machinery. His powers were extraordinary and largely invisible to outsiders. He controlled all cadre appointments, deciding who entered the Milli Majlis (parliament), who became ministers, who led state institutions and who staffed the bureaucracy at every level. He heavily favoured natives of Nakhchivan in these appointments, perpetuating the clan networks built during Soviet times.

As chief ideologist, Mehdiyev defined the regime's worldview and messaging. He published over 250 scientific articles and more than 20 books (seven translated into multiple languages) on Azerbaijan's development, modernisation and national ideology (although there were rumours that he just ordered what to be written and his interns would write for him). His writings promoted what he called the "philosophy of Azerbaijanism" and justified authoritarian rule as necessary for stability and development. He chaired the editorial board of the Philosophy and Social and Political Sciences journal, giving him control over intellectual discourse.

His role as liaison with Russia and China positioned him as the regime's primary interlocutor with major powers. He served as what Pravda English would call the "conductor of the Russian line in Azerbaijan", creating media and academic structures in cooperation with Russian colleagues. His influence extended to managing electoral processes, all electoral commission appointments went through him, and controlling media appointments and content. Farid Guliyev, a postdoctoral fellow at Justus Liebig University Giessen, noted his power "could only be rivalled by the rising influence" of First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva, and even then, not until the mid-2010s.

The "Grey Cardinal" designation was apt. Mehdiyev rarely gave public speeches or media interviews, worked behind the scenes rather than seeking the spotlight, and built no personal cult of personality directed at the public. His power derived from institutional control of the Presidential Administration, not charisma. A Commonspace.eu analyst captured the stark contrast: despite being "for a long time considered as the second most important person in the country", most international observers knew little about him until his 2019 dismissal. His longevity was unprecedented; while US President Donald Trump had three chiefs of staff in three years and Russian President Vladimir Putin had six in 19 years, Mehdiyev served for 24 years across two presidents.

Mehdiyev played a critical role in the 2003 dynastic succession from Aliyev father to son. As Heydar Aliyev's health failed in 2003, Mehdiyev led what RFE/RL described as the “coterie" that ensured that Ilham Aliyev would succeed his father. Following a 2002 constitutional referendum making the prime minister next in succession, Ilham was appointed prime minister on August 4, 2003. When Heydar withdrew his candidacy two weeks before the October 15 election, Ilham won in a process widely criticised as fraudulent. 

From 2003 through roughly 2012, Mehdiyev maintained the same powers under Ilham that he had wielded under Heydar. He was described by The Tribune as an "untouchable grey cardinal" who controlled domestic politics while Ilham maintained a public profile and focused on foreign relations and energy deals. The young president appeared "detached from day-to-day decision-making on domestic issues”, which Mehdiyev managed. This period represented peak grey cardinal power — near-absolute control over governance machinery with institutional continuity spanning two presidencies.

From Western orientation to anti-Western crusade

According to RFE/RL, in December 2014, Mehdiyev published a pivotal 60-page Russian-language manifesto within the broader work on "double standards" that marked Azerbaijan's sharp pivot away from the Western-oriented policies of Heydar Aliyev's era. Armen Sahakyan, executive director of the Eurasian Research and Analysis (ERA) Institute, described it as "a foundational document for the beginning of a new phase of Azerbaijani politics”. In the manifesto, he accused the United States of plotting "colour revolutions" through a "fifth column" of NGOs and opposition elements, blamed America for the "current crisis in international affairs", and called for Azerbaijan to distance itself from the West while pursuing "balanced" foreign policy centred on "strong presidential power".

The manifesto used events in Ukraine's 2014 Maidan as proof of US "double standards" and interference, attacked Western-funded media, particularly RFE/RL, and characterised civil society organisations as agents of foreign subversion. The very next day after the manifesto's publication, prominent investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova was arrested — one of over 90 activists, journalists, and opposition figures detained in the 2014-2015 crackdown that Mehdiyev orchestrated. In December 2014, his manifesto specifically named Ismayilova as a public enemy, accusing her of "defiance" and "destructive attitude" for exposing corruption involving the Aliyev family and senior officials.

This marked Mehdiyev's emergence as "ideologue-in-chief of the regime that increasingly leaned in favour of anti-Western messaging" according to the University of Southern California’s (USC’s) Institute of Armenian Studies fellow Emil Sanamyan. Raids on RFE/RL's Baku bureau followed in December 2014. He accused critics of Azerbaijan of "collusion with Armenia" and working as foreign spies. His worldview, shaped over 28 years in the Soviet Communist Party apparatus (1961-1989), was informed by classic Soviet frameworks: viewing democracy promotion as Western subversion, perceiving NGOs as tools of intelligence services and characterising media freedom as destabilising foreign interference.

Yet even as Mehdiyev reached the peak of his ideological influence in 2014-2015, power dynamics were shifting. From 2012 onward, a "decade and a half of see-saw action pitted appointees close to Ilham Aliyev and his wife Mehriban against senior officials he inherited from his father," according to Sanamyan. The first lady, from the powerful Pashayev clan began demanding more positions and influence for her family members. Mehdiyev's "old guard" faction, Soviet-era apparatchiks who worked under Heydar, found themselves increasingly competing with younger, often Western-educated technocrats favoured by the first lady.

By 2016, the balance had begun to tilt decisively. A constitutional referendum that year created the position of first vice president, explicitly curbing Mehdiyev's authority. In February 2017, Mehriban Aliyeva was appointed to this new position — a move widely interpreted as preparing for eventual succession and empowering her to place loyalists throughout the government. Mehdiyev attempted to defend his position by creating four deputy positions within the Presidential Administration in 2012 to limit succession intrigue and block reform efforts from technocrats connected to the first lady. But the 2015 economic crisis following the oil price collapse created pressure for changes that Mehdiyev resisted, making him increasingly seen as an obstacle to necessary modernisation.

Demotion disguised as an honour

On October 15, 2019, President Ilham Aliyev delivered a blistering speech accusing unnamed senior officials of undermining his reform efforts, calling the situation “unbearable". "Some members of government are blackmailed by other members of government. If people think we will tolerate this, they are mistaken," he said bluntly. Though Mehdiyev wasn't named, everyone in Azerbaijan understood the target. Eight days later, on October 23, 2019, a presidential decree dismissed Mehdiyev from the position he had held for 24 years, seven months and 16 days as head of the Presidential Administration.

The dismissal was part of what Sanamyan called "the biggest domestic political change in Azerbaijan since Ilham Aliyev succeeded his father 16 years ago". The same day saw the removal of prime minister Novruz Mammadov, two deputy prime ministers and multiple ministers — a wholesale purge of the "old guard”. 

Yet Mehdiyev's exit was carefully choreographed to maintain face. On October 23, he was awarded the Order of Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's highest state honour (he was only the second Azerbaijani politician after President Ilham Aliyev to receive it). He was appointed president of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (ANAS). Laws were amended to make him a permanent Security Council member regardless of his position. At a public ceremony, Aliyev thanked Mehdiyev for "long and loyal service" and suggested he should "give way to the younger generation".

The elaborate ceremony masked the reality: Mehdiyev had lost. Multiple factors drove the decision beyond just power struggles with the first lady. The 2015 economic crisis had damaged regime legitimacy and created demands for reforms that Mehdiyev blocked. Younger technocrats were needed to project modernisation and attract investment. Geopolitical considerations loomed large — in a comment for New Eastern Outlook, political scientist Alexandr Svaranc linked the personnel changes to "a purported Turkish recommendation to prepare for a second Karabakh war, as Ankara considered the former Soviet official Mehdiyev a likely ally of Moscow". Removing pro-Russian elements before the 2020 war enabled closer alignment with Turkey and Israel.

His ANAS presidency from October 23, 2019, to February 19, 2022, was clearly a face-saving position that removed Mehdiyev from real political power while preserving some status. While the Presidential Administration was the heart of government and political power, ANAS was primarily ceremonial. During his tenure, he claimed to implement "cardinal structural changes" and modernisation, creating new institutions like the Scientific and Ideological Centre of Azerbaijanism and the Scientific Centre for Caucasian Albanian Studies. In 2020, ANAS conducted 1,618 research works on 157 scientific problems. But these activities were far removed from his former position, controlling every significant government appointment and policy decision.

Mehdiyev's academic credentials provided some legitimacy for the position. Yet his scholarship was heavily ideological, focused on justifying state policies rather than independent inquiry, and most of his books were published by his son's company, raising obvious conflicts of interest.

A major public controversy erupted in January 2022, just weeks before his resignation. At a January 19 Praesidium meeting, Mehdiyev sharply criticised the Institute of History's activities. The next day, director-general Prof. Karim Shukurov publicly rebutted the criticism, accusing Mehdiyev of engaging in "household intrigues" rather than "intellectual-level dialogue typical of the heads of national academies". Shukurov announced his intention to resign in protest. After emergency consultations, ANAS leadership refused to accept the resignation, but the incident highlighted management dysfunction and strained relationships. On February 19, 2022, the general meeting of ANAS formally accepted Mehdiyev's resignation. No official explanation was provided, but the timing suggested the Institute of History dispute precipitated his departure.

Public humiliation

The event that shattered Mehdiyev's remaining prestige occurred on August 18, 2020, when he hosted a lavish wedding reception for his granddaughter Fidan Aliyeva at his country home in Novkhany near Baku. The timing could hardly have been worse — Azerbaijan was under a strict COVID-19 lockdown that had banned all weddings and social gatherings since March. Video footage of the maskless celebration with prominent guests quickly circulated on social media, causing massive public outrage among Azerbaijanis exhausted by months of quarantine restrictions.

Among the guests were some of Azerbaijan's most powerful figures according to JAMNews: MP and deputy executive secretary of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party Siyavush Novruzov, his wife human rights commissioner Sabina Aliyeva and former Baku State University rector and MP Abel Maharramov. The groom's father was Rovshan Mustafayev, a commander in the State Security Service. The bride's father was Ilham Aliyev — not the president, but Mehdiyev's son-in-law and former MP sharing the president's name.

The government's response weaponised the scandal. On August 22, 2020, both fathers were jailed for 15 days for violating lockdown, with state TV broadcasting videos of them in handcuffs — an unprecedented humiliation for people of their status. Multiple guests received fines of AZN400 ($237), including the MPs, the human rights commissioner and two of Mehdiyev's grandsons. On August 24, Novruzov received a written reprimand and resigned as deputy executive secretary of the ruling party, claiming Mehdiyev had "deceived" guests by saying he had the president's permission for the event. MPs Etibar Aliyev and Fazail Aghamali called for Mehdiyev to resign. On September 8, 2020, he was dismissed as chairman of the Presidential Pardon Commission — another position stripped away.

What happened next revealed either a genuine fracture in the ruling elite or carefully orchestrated political theatre. On August 24, Mehdiyev published a lengthy, bitter statement on the ANAS website complaining of "double standards”. He claimed other officials held weddings, but only his family was targeted, noted his relatives were handcuffed while other violators were not, and never apologised or admitted guilt. The statement was so controversial that it crashed the ANAS website and was subsequently removed. Over the following days, he published multiple defensive articles threatening to sue 16 MPs for "slander" and complaining about "gangsters" who were "no friends of the state". 

State media amplified the attacks. Real TV anchor Mirshahin Aghayev made an on-air speech praising President Aliyev for showing "the law is the law for everyone" and declaring "Mehdiyevism has lost its age and maturity". On August 31, Aliyev delivered a veiled warning: "No one can be above the law, no one can have any privileges." The message was unmistakable. Yet observers noted selective enforcement — footage of other officials' weddings, allegedly including Prime Minister Ali Asadov's daughter, circulated but received no official response. Anar Mammadli, head of the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre (EMDS), stated Mehdiyev was "chosen as a target" by people hostile to him, using the event to completely remove him from the political arena.

Family wealth and business dealings

Throughout his 24 years controlling Azerbaijan's government machinery, Mehdiyev's family accumulated substantial wealth through business interests that created obvious conflicts of interest, according to an investigation by YeniAvaz. Azerbaijan's lack of meaningful asset declaration requirements for senior officials — legislation exists but hasn't been enforced since 2005 — ensured these dealings remained largely opaque until investigative reporting exposed them.

Mehdiyev's son, Teymur Ramiz oghlu Mehdiyev, serves as major general and deputy minister for emergency situations while simultaneously controlling business interests. He owns 96.5% of Sharg-Garb OJSC, a publishing and printing company that originated from the privatisation of Baku Book Printing House No. 4 in 2001. Both Teymur and Ramiz were registered at the same Baku address. In 2022, this company reported total profit of AZN8.35mn and net profit of AZN1.39mn, with total profit increasing 2.5 times y/y. The company operates related entities, including LLC Sharg-Garb Properties, LLC Sharg-Garb Printing House and LLC Global East West.

The obvious conflict was that most books authored by Ramiz Mehdiyev were published by this family-owned publishing house. The arrangement allowed the head of Presidential Administration to profit from publishing his own ideological works using his son's company, with government institutions likely purchasing these books. Teymur's marriage to the daughter of Ismayil Sadigov, head of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Cabinet of Ministers, further entrenched the family in elite networks.

His daughter-in-law, Nigar Mehdiyeva (Nigar Ismayil gizi), controls 74.99-75% of shares in Bank BTB, serving as a member of the bank's supervisory board. This ownership placed the Mehdiyev family within a broader network where government officials' families controlled major banking assets. According to a 2015 Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) investigation, the Aliyev family and close advisors controlled assets worth over $3bn in at least eight major Azerbaijan banks, profiting from high-interest loans — averaging 18% in 2014 — taken by struggling citizens.

The most egregious conflict emerged in 2019 when ANAS signed an AZN10.4mn contract with Sharg-Garb OJSC, the company owned by Mehdiyev's son, while Mehdiyev himself headed ANAS. The Accounts Chamber applied to the Prosecutor General's Office, requesting an investigation, stating the contract "contained criminal content".

The 2020 wedding scandal also exposed the family's wealth. The lavish country home in Novkhani, where the granddaughter's reception occurred, suggested significant property holdings. Video footage showed opulent surroundings far beyond what a government salary would support. Family members were registered at premium Baku addresses, indicating substantial real estate investments. In 2022, Eldar Amirov, head of secretariat at ANAS and a relative of Mehdiyev, was arrested and held for 30 days after complaints he was getting people jobs for money, suggesting the family's patronage networks extended to outright bribery schemes.

Power and loyalty

The relationship between Mehdiyev and Heydar Aliyev, spanning from their 1965 first meeting through Heydar's death in 2003, was characterised by nearly complete loyalty and mutual benefit. Both men were products of the Soviet system, shared Nakhchivan regional origins creating clan affinity, and built their careers through the Communist Party apparatus. When Heydar became first secretary in 1969, he facilitated Mehdiyev's career advancement. When Mehdiyev returned from Moscow in 1972, he aided Aliyev's plans to improve education, increase ideological rigour and target corruption. The relationship was patron-client but also a genuine partnership — Mehdiyev managed ideology and education while Aliyev focused on the broader transformation of Soviet Azerbaijan.

During Heydar's presidency (1993-2003), Mehdiyev served as his most trusted advisor. He was part of the inner circle from 1994 and helped stabilise Azerbaijan after civil strife and the first Karabakh war. He implemented Aliyev's neopatrimonial system, where all key appointments were made by the president himself, and all power flowed from the presidential apparatus with Mehdiyev as gatekeeper. He managed domestic politics while Aliyev focused on oil deals and regional diplomacy. No evidence suggests significant tensions — the relationship remained one of unwavering loyalty until Heydar's death. Mehdiyev's most crucial service came in 2003 when he "midwifed Aliyev to power as his autocratic father lay dying”, as detailed by RFE/RL, orchestrating Ilham's appointment as prime minister and managing the October 2003 election that brought him to the presidency after a brutal crackdown on protesters. 

The relationship with Ilham Aliyev evolved through distinct phases from initial dependency, through growing tension, to ultimate rupture. In the first phase (2003-2012), the 42-year-old Ilham inherited Mehdiyev along with the entire power structure and initially "lacked the authority that his father had," forcing him to "rely on a coterie of older advisers and ministers," according to Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specialising in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region.

The middle phase (2012-2016) saw the emergence of power struggles. Mehdiyev's "old guard" faction competed with appointees close to Ilham and his wife, Mehriban. In 2013, videos emerged allegedly implicating Mehdiyev in corruption, damaging his reputation. The 2016 constitutional changes, creating the first vice president, explicitly curbed his authority. When Mehriban was appointed to this position in February 2017, it signalled the balance "tilting towards the Pashayevs”, her family clan, according to an earlier analysis by bne IntelliNews. Mehdiyev blocked reform efforts from technocrats close to the first lady and was accused of creating "artificial obstacles for President Aliyev's reforms".

The final phase (2016-2019) saw declining influence as younger technocrats gained ground, the economic crisis created pressure for changes Mehdiyev opposed, and the first lady's appointees increased throughout the government. Ilham Aliyev's October 15, 2019, speech — accusing officials of undermining reforms and calling the situation “unbearable" — preceded Mehdiyev's October 23 dismissal by just eight days. The elaborate ceremony with the highest state honour couldn't mask the reality: after tolerating him for 16 years, Ilham had finally accumulated sufficient power and confidence to remove his father's most powerful lieutenant.

Yet the wedding scandal revealed the relationship remained complex even after Mehdiyev's dismissal. When the August 2020 COVID violation resulted in humiliating arrests and public attacks, Mehdiyev responded by publishing statements asking critics, "Is my president different from your president?” — suggesting a genuine fracture or at least willingness to imply it. RFE/RL's Andy Heil argued that Mehdiyev was "playing his last role for the regime" by creating controlled opposition that allowed Ilham to appear reformist by contrast. Others saw genuine fissures between Mehdiyev's old guard and the Pashayev clan. Regardless of interpretation, the incident marked the complete end of the deference once shown to Heydar's closest advisor.

The pro-Russian ideologue?

Mehdiyev's 28 years in the Soviet Communist Party apparatus (1961-1989) fundamentally shaped his worldview, making him structurally opposed to Western democratic engagement and instinctively pro-Russian in orientation.

Throughout his career, he maintained Russian connections and promoted Russian cultural influence. He oversaw the creation of at least 20 Russian-language schools in Azerbaijan by 2012 and received Russian honours, including the Premium of Yuri Andropov. In 2008, he publicly stated: "At present, Azerbaijan is home to the largest Russian community in the South Caucasus. The Russian community is a real link between Azerbaijan and Russia" and "Russia remains friendly and interested in Azerbaijan", according to Azertag. As the Presidential Administration head, he served as liaison with Russia and China, positioning himself as Moscow's primary contact within the regime.

His December 2014 manifesto marked the high point of this orientation. The document accused the United States of plotting colour revolutions, blamed America for international crises, attacked Western-funded NGOs as "fifth column” and called for Azerbaijan to distance itself from the West. The manifesto applied classic Soviet frameworks: viewing democracy promotion as subversion, seeing civil society as intelligence tools, and characterising media freedom as foreign interference. Former US ambassador to Azerbaijan, Richard Kauzlarich, noted that "Ilham Aliyev's silence on what seems to be a major change in Azerbaijani foreign policy is notable", suggesting either Ilham approved or Mehdiyev felt empowered to make this move independently.

This orientation ultimately became a liability as Azerbaijan's geopolitical position shifted. The 2020 Karabakh war victory, achieved with Turkish and Israeli support rather than Russian mediation, reduced dependence on Moscow. Energy partnerships with Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor, the deepening "one nation — two states" alliance with Turkey, and Russia's weakness as exposed by the Ukraine war all created opportunities for Azerbaijan to assert independence. 

Removing pro-Russian elements enabled the closer Western, Turkish and Israeli alignments necessary for the 2020 military victory. "By falling out with the Kremlin, Azerbaijan's authorities are trying to score points both at home and internationally… The standoff with Moscow is designed to show that Azerbaijan is not in fact an authoritarian ally of Russia, but a strategic partner of the West in the global confrontation with Russia, especially in the energy sector," Azerbaijani journalist Bashir Kitachaev noted in his analysis.

The December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines crash, where Russian air defence shot down a plane killing 38 people, created a major diplomatic crisis. When Russian forces arrested and killed Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg in June 2025, anti-Russian sentiment reached new heights.

"Treason", "coup" and the final reckoning

As reported, on October 14, 2025, at 87 years of age, Mehdiyev was placed under four months of house arrest by the Sabail District Court of Baku on charges that would have been unthinkable just months earlier: treason (Article 274), attempted violent seizure of power (Article 278.1) and money laundering (Article 193-1.3.2). The charges carry maximum penalties of 12-20 years imprisonment or life imprisonment, though life sentences cannot be imposed on men over 65, limiting their maximum exposure to 20 years at age 87.

The timing followed an extraordinary sequence of events. On October 9, Putin and Aliyev met in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, during a CIS summit — their first meeting in over a year. Putin apologised for the December 2024 AZAL plane crash, stating, "The tragedy happened in our airspace, and we take responsibility." Aliyev thanked him for "keeping the matter under personal control”, maintaining a careful diplomatic tone. Just five days later came Mehdiyev's arrest, announced by Azerbaijan's State Security Service with the court decision issued between 22:24 and 22:39 UTC+4 on October 14.

The allegations were sensational. According to Azerbaijan's state news agency APA, citing government sources, Mehdiyev "devised a plan for a state coup with support from Russia" that sought to "exploit tensions between Baku and Moscow" following the aircraft crash. The plan allegedly proposed creating a temporary "State Council" to govern during a "transitional period" after a forcible power takeover, with Mehdiyev himself heading this council. Specific incidents were cited as evidence: a secret dinner hosted by Mehdiyev in summer 2024 at his Novkhany home with a group of former officials during peak Azerbaijan-Russia tensions, and a May 9 incident in the Ismayilli district where a Council of Elders head raised the Soviet flag, wore a St. George ribbon and praised the USSR and Russian Empire. He was subsequently arrested and allegedly linked to testing pro-Russian sentiment for Mehdiyev's plans.

Most explosively, APA's report claimed: "The Kremlin itself revealed Mehdiyev's plan to the Azerbaijani leadership during the Baku-Moscow meeting in Dushanbe" and "The Russian side personally informed Baku about Ramiz Mehdiyev's proposal and the network of conspirators." The alleged motive for Putin's betrayal: "The 87-year-old veteran had exhausted Moscow's patience with his constant pleas and persistence. Russia saw no further use in Mehdiyev and therefore completely abandoned him."

Calls emerged for his immediate removal from the Security Council. "His membership should not be suspended or frozen, but directly terminated,” said Arif Rahimzade, chairman of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party's Veterans Council. He announced the party leadership would meet to discuss expelling Mehdiyev from party ranks. Reports indicated he may lose all state awards and honours, including the Order of Heydar Aliyev, awarded just six years earlier.

The charges completed the pattern of Mehdiyev's falling dominoes: dismissed as Presidential Administration head in October 2019, humiliated in the August 2020 wedding scandal, removed as Pardon Commission chairman in September 2020, resigned from ANAS presidency in February 2022, and now facing treason charges in October 2025. From second most powerful person in the country to house arrest in six years represents one of the most dramatic reversals in post-Soviet political history.

The credibility of the coup allegations remains contested. The timing immediately after the Putin-Aliyev reconciliation meeting raises questions. The "Putin betrayal" narrative seems designed for domestic consumption to demonstrate Azerbaijan's independence from Russia while avoiding a total break with Moscow. No independent verification of coup plot details exists — with Azerbaijan having expelled most foreign journalists in recent years and 24 journalists currently detained (the highest number since 2003), independent reporting is nearly impossible. The charges may represent genuine security concerns, or a convenient pretext to neutralise the pro-Russian faction and scapegoat the old guard for regime failures.

What is certain is that the arrest signals major shifts in Azerbaijan's power structure and geopolitical orientation. Whether genuine conspiracy or political theatre, the charges against the architect of Azerbaijan's authoritarian system demonstrate that no one, regardless of decades of loyal service, remains above the reach of the Aliyev family's consolidation of absolute power.

Moreover, the story brings a new fear to the Azerbaijani opposition. The opposition is now in danger of being labelled Mehdiyev's tools, accused of being in the "fifth column" and facing a total wipeout. Exiles from Azerbaijan in the West are now in fear of a new Kristallnacht in Azerbaijan. They wonder if the EU will hand over the remaining political asylum claimants and critics of the Azerbaijani regime in Europe to Aliyev, believing Mehdiyev was the source of all evil in Azerbaijan, a bad boy behind a good tsar.

The dynasty endures 

Mehdiyev's trajectory from Soviet apparatchik through a quarter-century as Azerbaijan's grey cardinal to house arrest at 87 illuminates fundamental truths about post-Soviet authoritarianism. His career demonstrated how Communist Party networks adapted to independent statehood, how neopatrimonial systems concentrate power through informal patron-client relationships, and ultimately how even the most entrenched power brokers become expendable when their utility expires or liabilities exceed their value.

The three phases of his career reveal the evolution of Azerbaijan's political system. His Communist Party years (1960s-1980s) built the ideology, methods, and networks he would later apply to independent Azerbaijan. His Presidential Administration tenure (1995-2019) saw him transform from Heydar's indispensable enforcer to Ilham's inherited burden, wielding near-absolute control over domestic governance while remaining invisible to outsiders. His ANAS presidency (2019-2022) marked a face-saving demotion from real power to a ceremonial position, culminating in his complete marginalisation.

The controversies that defined his downfall, the wedding scandal's public humiliation, the family business dealings enriching his clan through conflicts of interest, and the wealth accumulated through 24 years of controlling appointments and patronage, exposed both the corruption endemic to Azerbaijan's system and the selective enforcement that characterises authoritarian rule. That similar violations by others went unpunished while Mehdiyev's family was subjected to arrests and handcuffs broadcast on state TV revealed power politics dressed as rule of law.

His relationships with both Aliyevs showed the limits of loyalty in dynastic authoritarianism. Decades of unwavering service to Heydar, successfully orchestrating the 2003 succession, and initially dominating the young Ilham all proved insufficient when geopolitical shifts, economic crises, and elite power struggles made him a liability. The first lady's rising profile, demands for modernisation and reform, preparations for the 2020 war requiring Turkish and Western support, and Azerbaijan's post-victory confidence in asserting independence from Russia all contributed to his dispensability.

The October 2025 treason charges, whether substantiated conspiracy or manufactured pretext, complete the transformation from indispensable grey cardinal to criminalised scapegoat. The allegations position his arrest within Azerbaijan's broader geopolitical repositioning away from Russia toward closer Western, Turkish and Israeli alignment. Using the old pro-Russian elite as scapegoats allows the regime to demonstrate sovereignty to Western partners while managing relations with Moscow by claiming it was Russia itself that revealed the alleged plot.

Mehdiyev's fall demonstrates that in Azerbaijan's system, institutional positions matter less than personal relationships with the ruling family, that even 57 years of political service cannot guarantee security, and that the Aliyev dynasty's consolidation of absolute power tolerates no competing centres of influence — even those that once ensured the dynasty's very existence. The grey cardinal who controlled who entered parliament, who got government positions and what Azerbaijanis were allowed to think ultimately learned that in authoritarian systems, the enforcer is always expendable but the dynasty endures.