The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS), released quietly on the White House website on December 5, outlining Donald Trump’s foreign policy, sets out in unambiguous terms America’s intent to maintain the unipolar world.

That puts him in direct conflict with the multipolar worldview that both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have joined forces to advance, suggesting the conflict between them will only worsen.

America first

In typical brash terms, the document says that the US must remain “the strongest, richest, and most successful country in the world for decades to come.”

The document combines classic realist principles, sovereignty, deterrence, balance of power, with a Trumpian fusion of economic nationalism and isolationist instincts – an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine that does not allow for rivals to the US primacy, albeit one still anchored in military strength and expansive global reach. It’s a declaration of “America First” and, by implication, “Everyone else second,” which has caused widespread resentment among many countries in the Global South, but not only, spawning multiple spoofs across the Global North.

It is a poignant restatement of America’s desire to run the world in the new economic paradigm that the transactional Trump has brought to the global economy. And it comes at a time when Washington’s dominance is being openly challenged, most directly by Russia and China’s shared vision of a multipolar world, but also by the “rise of the rest” as the Global Emerging Markets (GEMs) rise the adjusted ranking of the world’s largest economies.

For example, despite the most extreme sanctions regime ever imposed, Russia still managed to overtake both Japan and Germany in the last two years to become the world’s fourth largest economy in adjusted PPP (purchase power parity) terms. And it is increasingly being joined by other rising stars like Indonesia and Brazil, while the stalwarts of the international community like Britain and Germany inexorably slide down the table.

Europe

The new strategy has downgraded Russia’s rhetorical profile compared to previous editions. In his first essay on foreign policy, the then newly appointed US Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Russia an “enemy” and China a “rival”. In Trump’s version, Russia has been demoted to “Europe’s problem” and is no longer a direct competitor. This may reflect the Western perception that Russia’s military power has been denigrated by an almost four-year-long brutal war in Ukraine, which will take a decade to recover from. Nevertheless, the NSS's overall tone towards Russia is not conciliatory.

The section entitled “Advancing European Greatness” belittles Europe by emphasising not only its economic but also its cultural and civilizational problems. It is the policy formation of the now notorious speech at a defence summit in Brussels in February, where he laid out a MAGA agenda and told Europe it could no longer rely on the US security umbrella.  

“The more serious challenges facing Europe include the activities of the European Union and other transnational structures that undermine political freedom and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and sowing discord, censorship and suppression of political opposition, declining birth rates, and the loss of national identity and self-confidence,” the document says. Russia is mentioned in the document ten times, Ukraine – three times.

The document links explicitly the war in Ukraine to the broader objective of restoring “strategic stability” and ensuring Ukraine’s survival “as a viable state.” It calls for a “rapid resolution” to the war, one that prevents escalation, contains Russia, and protects Europe’s economic viability. But again, the document goes on to argue that the ongoing conflict is increasing Europe's external dependence. Specifically, Germany’s dependence on China and Russia is cited: "Today, German chemical companies are building some of the world's largest processing plants in China, using Russian gas, which they cannot obtain at home."

In another marked shift from Blinken’s version, the NSS drops the language of "containment" and instead speaks of "restoring conditions of stability in Europe and strategic stability with Russia" — an implicit signal that Washington sees Moscow’s ambitions as manageable rather than existential. That stands in sharp contrast to Europe, which has been sounding the klaxon of a potential invasion by Russia, possibly by 2029, according to a recent assessment by Germany’s intelligence services.

Notably, some of the points tally closely with the Kremlin's talking points. Trump has already pulled back from NATO and suggested that the US would not come to the aid of a country that does not spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. But the NSS goes further and says part of the goals in Europe are to “end the perception of NATO as an ever-expanding alliance” – Putin’s complaint, used to justify the invasion of Ukraine.

The US also wants to prevent a hostile power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies and the choke points through which they pass, while avoiding "forever wars."

Asia

By contrast, the section on China remains uncompromising, which retains its position as the US’ chief international rival. The document mentions China 20 times and frames it as the central strategic challenger, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. The NSS suggests that the US will scale back its presence in the region and rely more heavily on “regional partners,” as well as the need to “reconsider approaches to its military presence in the region.”

What is proposed is a doctrine of deterrence and economic self-sufficiency, aiming to “prevent military conflict in the region” while preserving dominance in advanced technologies and supply chains. Mixing the message again, Taiwan is singled out not only for its semiconductor capacity but as a geopolitical hinge: “Given that a third of global shipping passes through the South China Sea annually… deterring conflict over Taiwan… is a priority.”

To achieve its geopolitical goals, the NSS also focuses on domestic rejuvenation to produce the industrial and economic bases to support the US’ position. Themes of reindustrialisation, energy dominance, trade fairness, and rejection of mass immigration are woven through the security narrative.

Commercial diplomacy

In typical style, Trump’s concept is cut through with business that is at the core of his worldview, which is dubbed “commercial diplomacy.”

The US will prioritise trade and economic security, with natural resources as its foundation, and specifically names rare earth metals (REMs) and critical minerals as tied to America’s national security issues. The NSS presents foreign policy as an extension of Trump’s domestic agenda, with little distinction between national and international interests. Countries are seen as little more than companies, with resources and assets that are there to be exploited or seized.

Vedomosti went on to list the principles the concept is built on:

The basic principles of American foreign policy:

• a clear understanding of national interests,
• peace through strength,
• a predisposition to non-interference in the affairs of other states (while emphasising that for a country like America, “sustainable” non-interference is impossible),
• flexible realism,
• the primacy of states in the international system,
• sovereignty, respect and balance of power,
• support for the American working class,
• fairness and competition.

The following are indicated as priorities:

• rejection of mass immigration,
• protection of rights and freedoms,
• division and reorientation of responsibility (primarily towards NATO allies).

Unipolar vs multipolar

Trump’s worldview stands diametrically opposed to the emerging markets’ multipolar order, being championed by Moscow and Beijing. In a speech delivered in India on December 4, President Vladimir Putin declared: “The unipolar world is almost over.” His statement was not mere rhetoric.

Russia has also revised its foreign policy concept  in 2023, and also dropped a lot of the “partnership” rhetoric, replacing it with a more “them and us” framework. Putin has sought to actively dismantle the West-centric order and went to the extreme of invading Ukraine to achieve this goal, breaking his ties with the West completely and irreversibly for the foreseeable future. He has turned to an increasingly sympathetic Global South to promote a system where power is distributed among “sovereign civilisational states,” with no single actor dictating global rules.

Putin’s campaign has been greatly helped by Trump himself and his aggressive trade policies, enshrined in his Liberation Day tariff regime. Trump’s comments about annexing Greenland for “US security” reasons, a desire to turn Canada into the “51^st state”, and most recently, the military build-up in the Caribbean, threatening an invasion of Venezuela, have all only served to undermine America’s authority and drive less developed countries into the Sino-Russian camp. Pointedly, after sitting on the fence for two years, Indonesia, the fourth biggest country in the world, finally decided to join the BRICS+ at the start of this year.

Putin and Xi laid out their alternative visions for the world in a joint 8,000 word essay published last year. The essay describes a “multipolar, transactional” world structured by spheres of influence, mutual respect for sovereignty, and the rejection of imposed ideologies. It calls for stronger roles for non-Western institutions and a reassertion of the United Nations as the centre of international legitimacy — a direct counter to Washington's strategy of working through its own alliances and informal coalitions.

In this alternative order, the US would no longer act as the ultimate guarantor of global norms, and global governance would be reshaped by a broader set of players — including Russia, China, India, and countries in the Global South. The Xi-Putin vision has proven to be much more interesting to the Global South, which still complains of neo-colonialism on the part of the Global North. For them, “globalisation” was just a polite term for the continued enrichment of the Developed World that exports its manufacturing to poor countries to take advantage of their low wages and import the finished goods that enrich their own populations. However, this model is starting to unravel now as foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfers, as well as heavy investments into education and R&D, start to pay dividends. Nowhere is this clearer than in China’s sudden dominance of the EV market, producing a product that the incumbent global carmakers are struggling to compete with. However, this is true for a slew of other sectors.

Ironically, the Sino-Russian multipolar world appeals to states to be wary of Western interventionism, sanctions regimes, and conditionality attached to development aid or security guarantees.

Where the NSS insists that “the United States will be prepared to assist… those countries that voluntarily assume greater responsibility for security in their own neighbourhoods,” the Kremlin’s foreign policy calls for shared stewardship of global security and resource flows. The NSS explicitly states that "sustainable non-interference is impossible for a country like America," while Moscow and Beijing promote non-intervention as a principle — albeit selectively applied.

The collision between these two paradigms — one asserting leadership, the other demanding pluralism — is not merely ideological. It is unfolding in war zones, supply chains, financial systems, and technology markets today, increasing the instability in the world that has already seen military action in Ukraine-Russia, Iran-Israel, India-Pakistan, to name only the most prominent this year.

Yet even as the NSS sets out to preserve American dominance, it must contend with the emerging reality that the unipolar world order is already fraying. As bne IntelliNews argued, the multipolar world is no longer a theoretical construct — it has already arrived.

The Ukraine war, rather than reasserting Western cohesion by crushing Russia’s economy with sanctions and military support to Ukraine, threw the limits of US power into stark relief – especially outside the transatlantic sphere. Much of the Global South has remained non-aligned. The sanctions have largely failed. Russia has not been isolated. And the leading new powers like India, Turkey, Brazil, and Gulf states are increasingly assertive in shaping global decisions — from energy policy to security architecture.

If Putin’s ultimate goal in launching the war in Ukraine was to weaken or dismantle the unipolar world order, he may not win on the battlefield, but he has succeeded in shifting the global conversation. The US NSS represents an attempt to re-anchor the world in a familiar framework — but the reaffirmation of American primacy comes just as most of the Global South countries are now actively working to move beyond it and making rapid progress.

The contest between unipolarity and multipolarity is no longer hypothetical. It has already become the defining geopolitical story of our time.