The European Union’s foreign policy displayed a marked inward turn under the leadership of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen between 2019 and 2024, concentrating on its immediate neighbourhood while scaling back engagement in other regions, according to a detailed new analysis by Carnegie Europe.

The report by Carnegie Europe deputy director Francesco Siccardi, titled How EU Foreign Policy Turned Regional, finds that despite von der Leyen’s stated aim to support “the EU’s role in the world as a promoter of freedom, democracy, and the rules-based order”, the bloc’s priorities were reshaped by a series of overlapping crises near its borders. 

Brexit negotiations, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and escalating conflicts in Gaza were among the key drivers, prompting the EU to direct more leadership attention, aid and diplomatic personnel to neighbouring countries than in previous commission cycles.

The study looks at a range of activities including foreign aid, diplomatic visits and sanctions. It finds that the EU’s most senior officials, including von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel and former high representative Josep Borrell, made fewer overall trips in 2019-2024 than their predecessors, largely due to pandemic restrictions. 

At the same time, the geographical focus shifted decisively toward Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. Ukraine was the second-most-visited country, with twenty visits compared with eleven in the previous period, while Moldova received nine, up from two previously. Visits to Albania and North Macedonia remained frequent, whereas trips to Russia collapsed from eighteen under Barroso to just one under von der Leyen. 

Carnegie writes that “this growing attention on Eastern Europe corresponded with a decrease in visits to the Middle East”, highlighting the bloc’s reorientation toward its immediate neighbourhood.

Declarations by the high representative also indicated the EU’s shifting attention. Borrell issued 838 statements from 2019-2024, slightly fewer than those by his immediate processors, reflecting, in part, a turn toward social media engagement. Meanwhile, the content shows a pronounced focus on Europe’s East. 

The report points out that references to Eastern Europe accounted for 33% of the total, up from 14 percent in 2010-2014 and 18% in 2014-2019. Statements on Russia and Ukraine alone rose from thirty-five to 139, and declarations on Belarus more than tripled, while the Middle East fell to 30% of total declarations. Overall, Carnegie finds that almost two-thirds of the high representative’s declarations concerned countries in the EU’s neighbourhood.

Sanctions become a core instrument 

Sanctions were a core instrument of EU foreign policy during von der Leyen’s first term. Carnegie reports that the EU penalised “on average 702 entities and individuals a year” in 2019-2024, up from just 92 in 2014-2019. The increase was largely driven by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with measures linked to Moscow accounting for almost half (46.5%) of measures imposed by the bloc. Sanctions on Iran, Syria, Belarus, and al-Qaeda followed, while sanctions on Egypt were lifted. 

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)  missions also mirrored the EU’s pivot. By November 2024, twenty-three missions were underway, with approximately half deployed along the EU’s southern and eastern borders. Carnegie writes that missions “promote peace, stability and security in our neighbourhood and beyond, thereby contributing to increased security in the EU.” 

New deployments included the EU Military Assistance Mission in Ukraine, training armed forces in response to the Russian invasion, and the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova, providing strategic advice on crisis management. The EU also launched missions in Armenia and continued Operation Irini to enforce UN arms embargoes, highlighting the union’s emphasis on frontline states.

Trade and development policy 

Trade policy reinforced the neighbourhood focus. While fewer new agreements entered into force compared with past commissions, the EU updated deals with Ukraine and Moldova in response to Russian aggression. Carnegie highlights that trade negotiations were also launched with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and for a digital trade agreement with Singapore, while a new delegation opened in Turkmenistan. 

“Central Asia has become more important because of its strategic location as a transportation corridor in the context of the Global Gateway strategy,” the report said. Meanwhile, broader global deals progressed, including agreements with Chile and Mercosur countries.

Development assistance shifted dramatically toward Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. Carnegie reported that this group accounted for almost 24% of total aid in 2023, up from 12-14% in 2013–2018, while sub-Saharan Africa’s share decreased to 37%. 

Delegation staffing mirrored this trend: Kyiv became the EU’s second-largest office, Belgrade remained a major hub, and Pristina expanded, reflecting increased engagement in accession-linked and frontline states. In contrast, staff presence in Russia, Turkey and parts of the Middle East was reduced.

Uneven global engagement

The report highlights a more selective global footprint. Carnegie states that “the union’s external aid decreased everywhere” outside Europe’s East and Central Asia, with diminished engagement in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Relations with China remained tense, with repeated calls from von der Leyen for “de-risking”, while engagement in the Pacific, India, and the Philippines remained limited despite new trade talks.

Carnegie notes that “the union’s almost exclusive focus on Ukraine has been criticised for ignoring other conflicts around the world,” while “many have condemned the union’s moral double standards on the conflict in Gaza.” The EU’s COVID-19 response was also criticised for insufficient solidarity with the Global South.

Looking ahead, the report emphasises that the EU faces a balancing act if it is to sustain neighbourhood engagement while preserving global influence. Carnegie concludes that although the EU “sustained its level of engagement with the rest of the world”, it has yet to build a coherent strategic culture. Future success will depend on managing internal fragmentation, funding the 2028-2034 multiannual budget, and maintaining functional tools such as sanctions, civilian and military operations, trade and aid.