As Russia's war in Ukraine plods on, the geopolitical landscape in Asia reveals a few important outposts of support - some less obvious than others - but all in one way or another adding to Moscow’s coffers, and subsequent ability to keep pushing forwards towards Kyiv.

While many Asian nations have quietly distanced themselves from Moscow in a bid to fall into line with US or European allies, several continue to engage with Russia, providing varying degrees of support that help sustain its military campaign and challenge Western-led efforts to isolate the Kremlin.

China - the long time partner

China stands as Russia's most obvious ally in Asia regardless of claims otherwise from Beijing from time to time. Despite often presenting itself as a neutral party, China has long provided crucial support to Moscow's war effort. This assistance includes intelligence sharing; the public awareness of which is likely very limited, substantial economic backing, and, when needed - diplomatic cover. Reports over the past few years have suggested that China may even be behind targeting intelligence for Russian strikes on facilities in Ukraine, indicating a deeper level of cooperation than is publicly acknowledged.

Backing this is an October 10 China-Taiwan weekly update report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) saying “The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) stated that two PRC satellites - the Yaogan 33-03 and Yaogan 33-04—orbited over western Ukraine at the same time as a large-scale Russian strike targeting the western city of Lviv on October 5.”

Economically too China has become a vital trade partner for Russia, compensating for the loss of Western markets. The two nations have strengthened their economic ties, with China increasing its imports of Russian energy resources, notably oil and gas, which are essential for sustaining Russia's war machine, the Asia Society Policy Institute has also pointed out.

Diplomatically, and as expected, China has also consistently blocked or diluted international resolutions condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine, using its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to shield Moscow from global censure.

India – ever on the fence

India meanwhile maintains a delicate balancing act in its relations with Russia. While New Delhi has not openly supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it has refrained from condemning it, reflecting a longstanding strategic partnership referred to cynically in some quarters as India’s go-to penchant for fence-sitting. New Delhi continues to engage in joint military exercises with Moscow, however, including the recent 'Indra 2025' drills, which focus on counter-terrorism and modern warfare tactics, The Times of India has said.

Economically too - much to the annoyance of the US and European nations - India imports Russian energy resources including oil and gas, at discounted rates, citing the need for energy as rising above all other considerations. This in turn helps Moscow mitigate the impact of Western sanctions while remaining a crucial source of energy to help satisfy New Delhi’s energy security and economic interests.

North Korea – outspoken supplier of cannon fodder

North Korea has been one of the few countries to openly and repeatedly support Russia's actions in Ukraine. At a recent military parade in Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un unveiled a new intercontinental ballistic missile and praised North Korean troops fighting in support of Russia in Ukraine. However, according to most reports emerging from the battlefield, North Korean troops are ill-equipped and inexperienced, thus serving as little more than Russian cannon fodder. Several POWs have been paraded on TV and appear at best confused as to what they are doing in the region.

Back in North Korea, Kim has been seen consoling family members of soldiers killed in Ukraine at heavily choreographed ceremonies, although there is no public indication at least that support for Russia will be stopped any time soon. Indeed with news this week of Russian tech support for North Korea’s submarine warfare programme making headlines, Pyongyang may already be in too deep to pull troops from the Russian front line.

Central Asia - economic ties meet ambivalence

The five Central Asian republics - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - have all maintained economic relations with Moscow, though their political support is more nuanced. Trade between Russia and these nations increased by 4% in early 2025 according to The Caspian Post, with mutual trade surpassing $45bn.

However, public opinion in these countries is mixed. According to The Times of Central Asia, surveys in Kazakhstan indicate that only 15% of respondents explicitly support Russia, while a larger share leans toward Ukraine or outright non-alignment.

Politically, and perhaps wisely so given the lack of interest the rest of Asia, Europe and the US has in the region, these nations have abstained from voting on any resolutions condemning Russia's invasion, thus reflecting a cautious approach to avoid antagonising Moscow while not fully endorsing its actions.

Vietnam, Indonesia and ASEAN – a mixed bag

In Southeast Asia, Vietnam and Indonesia are standouts in having expanded their imports of Russian energy resources, primarily oil and gas with most countries opting to ‘keep their heads down’ rather than lean too far one way or the other, and being seen to favour the West or Moscow. Trade turnover between Russia and the ASEAN member nations reached $15.8bn in 2024, a 10% increase over the previous year, The Odessa Journal said on October 8.

As such, while these nations have not publicly supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine, their continued energy trade provides Moscow with much-needed revenue, thereby indirectly backing its war efforts.

Taiwan - private sector engagement

Taiwan, unlike other Asian nations presents a unique case in which private companies have only recently stopped engaging with Russia. Despite the central government's cessation of energy imports from Russia in 2023, private refiners, such as Formosa Petrochemical, were only this month revealed to still be importing Russian naphtha after a British media report outed the trade. Taipei put as much distance as it could between the offending firms and official policy, before later clamping down and forcing the naphtha buyers to toe the government line.

This private-sector engagement, while not state-sanctioned, contributed to Russia's economic resilience for years, and even though officially over, has only served to complicate international efforts to isolate Moscow.

Distance dilutes

All in all, Asia’s response to Russia's war in Ukraine is an assortment of strategic interests meets economic considerations, meets political calculations.

While countries like China and India are big enough and influential enough to openly maintain significant ties with Russia and essentially ignore Western demands, others adopt more cautious or neutral stances.

As such, this diversity in responses reinforces the challenges faced by the West in forming a unified front against Moscow's actions, and while it highlights the evolving geopolitical dynamics at play across Asia, it also reveals that even with Washington making demands on the one hand and Moscow looking for support on the other, with the war in Ukraine so far away, Asia will always do what Asia wants - regardless of promises made to temporarily curry favour one way or the other.