By mid-2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas, an industry emerged that would become the pillar of Ukrainian national defence, driving innovations that would influence modern warfare.

What began as a story of resilience and voluntary creativity evolved into a flourishing sector that soon came to involve dozens of garage startups and groups of friends, giving rise to a vibrant ecosystem based on private initiative.

At that time Ukraine was marked by deficiencies in its aerial technology, with obsolete equipment and limited imports. Now a drone race has started with the lead swinging backwards and forwards. Russia is adopting Ukrainian military technologies, particularly in interceptor drones, Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on September 11.

"We are dealing with a direct technological race in which the advantage will go to those who not only modernize but also stay ahead," Syrskyi wrote on Facebook.

After Ukraine took an early lead, using cheap commercial drones, the Russian countered by making rapid advances in electronic warfare (EW) as the drone war progressed. Ukraine effectively overcame those problems until Russia developed the fibre optic guided drones, which made EW jamming obsolete. Kyiv initially scoffed at the idea – then adopted it as well.

The arms race has been balanced for much of the last year, but some analysts say that Russia is pulling ahead again, partly because heavy investment into new drone factories in the Urals has increased output and partly because, thanks to help from Chinese technology, Russia’s drones are technologically superior. A cheap Chinese decoy drone was found on the battlefield in July that was stuffed with Chinese tech, whereas previous western tech dominated in Russian-made drones and missiles.

Start-ups

Volunteers like those of Aerorozvidka—founded by IT enthusiasts—began modifying commercial drones, mainly Chinese DJI models, adding thermal cameras and grenades for reconnaissance and attacks. These initial adaptations were funded by crowdfunding and donations via online platforms.

Between 2015 and 2019, private companies such as Athlon Avia with the Furia drone and Skyeton with the Raybird began to emerge.

In 2019, Ukraine imported Turkish Bayraktar TB2s, which brought more experience to the sector. At that stage, domestic production was modest, with a few hundred units per year. Funding came mainly from state-owned defence company Ukroboronprom, with drones still receiving a minimal slice of the military budget. But volunteers and NGOs filled the gaps, making it possible that by 2021 there were about 50-60 companies in the sector.

The Post-2022 Boom: Growth Driven by the Invasion

The full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 catapulted the drone industry to the centre of Ukrainian strategy. Drones went from auxiliary tools to Ukraine’s main weapon. Programs such as Army of Drones, launched in July 2022, and the United24 platform boosted production through donations and state contracts.

The number of companies exploded: from about 100 in 2022 to more than 500 in 2025.

Production jumped from an estimated 200-500 thousand units in 2023 to 1.7-2.2mn in 2024, with a target of 4.5mn in 2025.

The government budget for drones reached $2bn in 2024 and is expected to grow in 2025, with contracts worth $3.5bn.

The Brave1 platform, created in 2023, funded more than 1,000 projects with grants of up to $100 thousand, reducing development cycles from years to weeks.

At that point the drone battle was Ukrainian decentralized agility against Russian bureaucracy.

In the years 2023 and 2024 Ukraine flooded the battlefield with drones, which became the main cause of casualties on the front. The Russians, even having more ammunition and a vast arsenal, were forced into slow advances that lasted several months and at the cost of many casualties.

Drone piloting schools flourished as never before. In 2023 more than 20,000 pilots were trained. The “Army of Drones” project alone trained 10,000 operators by May 2023 and another 10,000 in the following six months, but the total exceeded 20,000 thanks to government subsidies for private schools.

In 2024, at least 80,000 to 100,000 pilots were trained in the approximately 60 active schools. The number of pilots rises every day, with an estimate of training up to 200,000 in 2025.

The rise and decline of the Ukrainian drone industry

Despite the boom, problems emerged from 2023, exacerbated in 2024-2025.

The first Chinese sanctions came in 2023 and a second wave in 2024, forcing Ukrainians to use intermediaries for acquiring parts for their assembly lines. But like every strategy in wartime, the Ukrainians began a relentless search for self-sufficiency.

That was when companies like Motor-G, Vyriy Drone, Helsa, DragoDrones, Skyeton, Wild Hornets and many other smaller workshops entered the scene, composing a fantastic ecosystem.

Currently there are production lines for electric motors, which are mass-produced and with competitive quality. Some say that today Ukrainian drone motors are cheaper and often better quality than the Chinese average.

Flight controllers (ESCs and flight controllers) were another thing the Ukrainians came to master, with 100% of their drones being equipped with national controllers.

Likewise, the carbon and 3D-printed plastic frames manufactured in hundreds of small workshops gained mass-production reinforcement from large companies like Vyriy and Wild Hornets, with proprietary designs, composing a completely decentralized and cheap line. Basic electronics such as modems, antennas and video transmitters also gained dominant local production. Even Li-ion/LiPo batteries began to be manufactured by Ukrainian companies like Energy Jet and Helsa.

With the accelerated pace and resources being allocated, it was then that the Ukrainian industry made its mistaken decision to try to nationalize the production of fibre-optic cables, machine vision and other more sensitive items as well.

Companies like 3DTech, Vyriy, Wild Division and another 14-15 companies approved by Fedorov in mid-2025 began manufacturing this item without long experience in the area.

The result was fibre with a higher breakage rate, higher weight and lower optical quality than high-standard Chinese fibre. The long-flight success rate fell to 30-50% in some local productions (against 80-90% with good Chinese fibre). This forced some drone manufacturers to buy Chinese fibre-optic cable via Poland or Turkey to maintain quality even paying 30% more, yet this was only one of the problems. The spools and fibre-unwinding mechanisms also began to cause headaches.

Even though production has improved, the mechanism still breaks frequently on rough terrain or when the drone makes abrupt manoeuvres.

Another issue is that local production of machine vision/autotargeting systems still has immature local technology, which when implemented reduced the hit rate on moving or camouflaged targets below 60% in real conditions (forest, fog, etc.).

With these problems headed by fragility in the fiber-optic issue, the Ukrainian industry gave space for the Russians to grow and today dominate the long-range fibre-optic drone scenario in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian industry itself, which flourished quickly through its capacity for innovation, did not respect market processes and tried to assume responsibilities that require long maturation periods.

As a result, there was a decline in the Ukrainian advantage on the battlefield, which began to operate entirely vulnerable to Russian jammers.

Today with Chinese fibre-optic drones of up to 60 km, the Russians are able to disrupt Ukrainian logistics and limit the mobility capacity of Ukrainian drone operators who need to change position from time to time.

The fact is that despite the failures, the Ukrainian drone industry, which currently employs more than 60,000 people and sets global trends, positions the country as a possible European UAV hub, with exports in sight. And this will not change whatever the outcome of the war, because the West is far behind the Ukrainians when it comes to drones and needs to absorb this know-how acquired among the mistakes and successes of the battlefield.