Vladimir Putin arrived in New Delhi on this very day, December 4, with a suitcase packed with proposals for Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Almost all of them are military — and of enormous interest to both sides.

India and Russia have enjoyed a strategic partnership for decades that covers everything from tanks to missiles, nuclear-powered submarines and space technology, always accompanied by successive rounds of technology transfer to India.

This time, however, the stakes are even higher. India is weighing Trump’s offer of the F-35 against Putin’s Su-57. At the same time, New Delhi is urgently seeking additional S-400 regiments and is showing interest in the next-generation S-500.

The reason is simple: India came away deeply unsatisfied from its last air clash with Pakistan (May 2025). The Pakistani Air Force used a tactic now known as “ABC” - locked by A (usually an AWACS), launched by B (a J-10C), guided by C (ground-based radar or another platform). Thanks to real-time data fusion between airborne early-warning aircraft, ground radars and the active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars of the J-10Cs, Pakistan was able to fire PL-15 missiles far beyond the normal kinematic range of a single fighter’s own radar. India discovered, the hard way, that it needs air-defence systems with dramatically greater reach.

This is exactly where Russia has the decisive edge over the American F-35 (which would, in any case, be supplied in a heavily downgraded export version).

When S-400 batteries are networked with long-range early-warning radars such as the Voronezh-DM systems, it can extend the detection range to 600km in multiple directions, far beyond the standard range. That single capability would place almost the entire Pakistani Air Force “outranged” due to the 200-250km range of the PL-15E.

During the previous contract, India wanted to buy at least five S-400 regiments, but Russia only released three. Expect Delhi to push hard for the remaining units this time.

The Su-57 will also be high on the agenda. India continues to have reservations, mainly because its larger size and less aggressive radar cross-section reduction give it a bigger signature than its direct 5th-generation competitors. Even so, a deal remains probable, largely because it includes deep technology transfer that would accelerate several Indian programmes. For Sukhoi and the wider Russian defence industry, Indian money is vital: export contracts are practically the only source of real profit, since domestic Russian orders come with 20–50% discounts that starve manufacturers of cash. An Indian Su-57 order would help fund the Su-75 Checkmate and the S-70 Okhotnik heavy drone programme.

Russian long-range drones (some evolved from Iranian designs, many now equipped with AI-assisted targeting) are another likely topic. Russia has scaled up to 15 specialised drone production and development centres and is already manufacturing 60,000–70,000 long-range strike UAVs per year, with production expected to exceed 100,000 annually in the coming years. India is very interested.

Donald Trump will almost certainly renew his F-35 push immediately after Putin leaves, but he faces two big obstacles: lingering Indian anger over US tariffs and growing doubts about the F-35’s stealth in real-world conditions. The jet has now been detected and tracked multiple times by different radar systems (Iran, Turkey, Yemen), raising the question whether Chinese-designed radars in Pakistani service could do the same to Indian F-35s. The Su-57 faces similar uncertainties, which is why India wants to accelerate the joint BrahMos-II hypersonic missile (derived from Russia’s 3M22 Zircon) as quickly as possible.

One potentially awkward issue may also surface: India’s recent $375–400mn sale of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines. Moscow was not consulted and was far from pleased; Delhi responded that the missiles are manufactured in India. The episode has caused friction in recent months — especially since China’s fury at seeing Manila armed with such potent anti-ship weapons.

In short, India is likely to take almost everything Putin brought in his suitcase:

- More S-400 regiments (essential coverage against Pakistan’s ABC tactics);

- The Su-57 (for the technology transfer and because its size and payload actually complement the much smaller Tejas rather than compete with it);

- And very probably a major drone cooperation agreement.

Trump’s hand would be considerably stronger today had Washington not imposed punitive tariffs on Indian goods. As things stand, Russia will not let this window close. India is set to remain the biggest financial lifeline of the Russian military-industrial complex — while continuing to buy vast quantities of discounted Russian crude and making handsome profits refining and re-exporting it.

Selling arms to India has always meant stepping on Chinese and Pakistani toes and doing everything possible to slow the deepening of US–Indian ties. That has been Moscow’s play since Soviet days — six decades and counting.