In the latest sign of rising tensions between Washington and Caracas, the USS Gerald R Ford, the world's largest warship, arrived in the Caribbean on November 16, drawing near Venezuelan territorial waters. Its more than 4,000 sailors joined the existing naval deployment in the area, which began building up in late August, bringing the total to about 15,000 personnel — the largest US military presence in the region since the 1989 invasion of Panama.

The stated objective for the mission, dubbed "Southern Spear" by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, is to "defend our Homeland, remove narco-terrorists from our Hemisphere, and secure our Homeland from the drugs that are killing our people". Yet the deployment's scale appears unusually large for anti-trafficking operations alone, and seems misplaced if targeting the main routes through which illegal drugs reach the US.

According to US official data, only 8% of cocaine originates from Venezuela, while the country plays no role in the trafficking of fentanyl, the deadly synthetic opioid responsible for most overdoses. In fact, cocaine — produced in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru — travels north mostly via the Pacific through Ecuador and Mexico, while fentanyl is synthesised by Mexican cartels using chemical precursors from China.

That disparity has not deterred a military ramp-up. The naval deployment has been accompanied by weekly strikes against alleged drug-carrying vessels in the Caribbean and, to a lesser extent, the eastern Pacific, resulting in more than 80 deaths over recent months. The US has provided no evidence to justify the strikes, nor has it identified the victims as drug traffickers, and the legality of such operations under international law remains hotly debated. Even Nato and European allies have raised concerns, with the UK reportedly halting some intelligence sharing with the US, unwilling to be associated with what are widely considered illegal actions against civilians at sea who are innocent until proven guilty.

Despite the official anti-drug rhetoric and a string of denials about potential military action aimed at unseating the Chavista regime, US President Donald Trump has declared that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's days “are numbered". This, along with Trump's confirmation that he approved covert CIA operations inside the South American country, lays bare the naval build-up's likely true purpose: a pressure strategy aimed at forcing Maduro from power.

Influential voices within the administration have encouraged this approach, portraying regime change as an "easy win" close to home, in full alignment with Trump's renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere and, potentially, a way to offset his inability to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine or deflect attention from the Epstein scandal.

The administration's rationale for such action, however, faces widespread scepticism. Few believe the US narrative that the leftist authoritarian leader, on whose head Washington has placed a $50mn bounty for drug trafficking, heads the "Cartel de Los Soles", an alleged narco-trafficking organisation. As the Gerald Ford arrived in the Caribbean, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on November 16 that the US would proceed to designate the cartel — which many analysts view as little more than a fictitious entity — as a foreign terrorist organisation.

The move would effectively label Maduro and his top aides, including Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez, as terrorists, and pave the way for potential strikes inland targeting drug-trafficking infrastructure such as illegal airstrips and warehouses – an option Trump himself has already floated.

Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants and longtime foe of communist Latin American regimes, has orchestrated Trump's U-turn on Venezuela strategy, which began with diplomatic efforts by former envoy Richard Grenell to engage with the Maduro regime.

"By making Venezuela into a national security threat related to crime and drugs, Rubio has been able to get the support of key stakeholders within the administration that do not care specifically about democracy or anti-communist fighting in Latin America," Francisco Monaldi, director of Latin American energy policy at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, told bne Intellinews.

This has allowed the hawkish faction, spearheaded by Rubio and other Florida lawmakers, to sideline Grenell, who had sought dialogue with Maduro and travelled to Caracas in January, touting pragmatic rapprochement as a way to counter Chinese and Russian influence in Venezuela.

"For Marco Rubio and other Florida politicians, it is very important to be aggressive against Cuba and Venezuela, especially as they are failing the local Latino communities by following Trump's crackdown against immigrants, like removing TPS and Humanitarian Parole protections for hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans and Cubans," Elias Ferrer, founder of the Caracas-based Orinoco Research group, told bne Intellinews. "Specifically for Rubio, a foreign policy success could be the springboard from which he launches his presidential bid for 2028."

Maduro, sensing the threat, has attempted to negotiate his survival. According to a New York Times report, he even offered the US all of Venezuela's vast oil wealth and other natural resources in exchange for sanctions relief and the chance to remain in power. Washington ultimately rejected his offer and doubled down on the Caribbean military build-up instead.

"I think Maduro has felt very weak in the last few months, worried about potential US action, so he has been willing to promise a lot of things to try to change the dynamics of the interaction with the US," Monaldi said.

"These include the typical things that Trump seems to like, like the idea of access to reserves of not only oil but critical minerals, which of course might not end up materialising in any significant way."

In an apparent twist, a few hours after Rubio's designation announcement, Trump said he was now open to talks with Maduro. Speaking to reporters on Air Force One, he said the US "may be having some discussions with Maduro", adding that "they would like to talk".

Trump did not elaborate further, but Maduro should harbour no illusions: his last-ditch attempt to offer Venezuela's natural wealth in exchange for staying in power seems unlikely to return to the agenda.

"There are many reasons to believe that with Maduro in power it would be a very unstable equilibrium to actually get those investments going," said Monaldi.

Instead, Trump — whose appetite for direct military action is low, as it would clash with his campaign promises — could offer the autocrat a last window of opportunity to leave power peacefully, departing into exile in Russia or Cuba. To this end, the "terrorist" label for the Soles cartel is set to take effect on November 24, giving Maduro a de facto deadline to make a graceful exit.

Most analysts agree that a full-scale invasion is unlikely at this stage. Given that the 1989 invasion of Panama, a small Central American nation, required more than 25,000 troops, invading Venezuela would demand far greater manpower. Even though Venezuela's army is in poor shape and Maduro's desperate pleas for help to Russia and China are unlikely to yield anything more than diplomatic support, placing "boots on the ground" with the risk of US casualties would be a terrible PR outcome for Trump.

"I don't think the White House really wants to act. They're hoping to engage in what I call regime change on the cheap, although it's not that cheap any more because it costs $8mn a day to keep that aircraft carrier there," Christopher Sabatini, a senior research fellow for Latin America at Chatham House, told The Guardian.

The most likely escalation would instead see targeted land strikes against alleged narco-trafficking infrastructure, combined with sustained "muscle-flexing" through naval build-up and a concerted effort to drive a wedge between Maduro and elements of the Venezuelan army.

The spectre of post-Maduro chaos, however, appears to be restraining Trump.

"Trump definitely has the option of land strikes on his desk. But something is holding him back. From what my sources tell me, he's been warned that there is a risk Venezuela becomes another Libya. It would be easy to decapitate the regime, but difficult to control the country," Ferrer said.

"Parts of the army could rebel against a new government and, at the very least, seize control of remote regions. You also have multiple armed criminal and paramilitary groups operating, including the Farc dissidents and the ELN from Colombia."

Such warnings of instability stand in stark contrast to the hope-filled vision presented by María Corina Machado, the firebrand opposition politician and likely US-backed successor, who was recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for her tireless work promoting democratic rights for the people of Venezuela".

Machado, currently in hiding within the country, is strongly advocating for US intervention and says she has devised a 100-day post-Maduro plan ready to kick in after the autocrat's departure, focused on providing fuel, security, medicine and re-establishing economic order by “reversing socialism’s disaster.”

Her proposal includes an ambitious programme of foreign investments and privatisations to revitalise the shattered economy, with opportunities she estimates at up to $1.7 trillion spanning energy, mining and infrastructure. Yet the transition to new leadership would require, at the very least, the support of the majority of the Bolivarian army and part of the current establishment, possibly in return for sweeping amnesty promises. And no one can exclude the possibility of someone even more radical than Maduro, perhaps from a military or guerrilla background, seizing power.

Few, at home and abroad, would shed a tear for the departure of Maduro, a ruthless and incompetent dictator who has presided over a decade of economic decline, pushed 8mn Venezuelans into exile and, according to multiple independent observers, stole the July 2024 election. But finding someone able to fill his power vacuum may prove more difficult than many care to imagine, and a Libya or Iraq-like nightmare scenario, albeit with a Latin American twist, looms.

"The key difference with the Middle East is that Venezuela is in the western hemisphere. It could not only lead to a second migration crisis, but its instability could also spill over into the region and cause a domino effect reaching the US southern border. Think about how Colombian guerrillas have a presence in Venezuela, Ecuador and Brazil," Ferrer said.

Such a disastrous outcome would leave everyone worse off and "deeply undermine President Trump's counter-narcotics objectives and imperil the lives of more Americans", as Carrie Filipetti, a former state department official, told Politico. And yet, as the administration continues to send mixed messages, no one can entirely dismiss the risk that Trump could, at some point, abandon the venture altogether.

Any backtracking, while catastrophic for the Venezuelan opposition, would likely be welcomed by elements of his MAGA base, where there is deep-seated opposition to foreign intervention and existing misgivings about the confrontational approach towards Venezuela.

But it would contradict Trump's own words on Maduro's "numbered" days and would prove deeply unpopular with the Republican-leaning Latino electorate. For now, as Washington weighs how to navigate this quagmire, the military continues to mass off Venezuela's coast, and the drumbeat of war grows louder — as do the hopes of many Venezuelans, who appear willing to take their chances rather than endure their current misery.