The Joint Declaration signed by the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 in the White House, with the associated agreement to build the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) might be a pivotal point in the history of the Caucasus and the Middle Corridor. TRIPP will replace the “Zangezur” corridor as a connection through Armenian territory between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (NAR), and onwards to Türkiye. When complete, the corridor will allow for traffic to move directly from Baku on the Caspian Sea (there is also talk about building a new port further south of Baku to handle cargoes for the new route west) direct to Türkiye’s transport links to Europe and the rest of the world.

Last week’s announcement was a major step, but the process is a long way from final completion. While Azerbaijan says it is now ready to sign a final peace agreement, it requires Armenia to change its constitution to drop all claims to Azerbaijan territory. A foreign ministry spokesperson stated that “Azerbaijan is ready to sign any time once Armenia fulfills the very basic commitment of removing its territorial claim against Azerbaijan in its constitution.”

Prime Minister Pashinyan must now “sell” the deal in Armenia and that process will be set against the backdrop of the June 2026 parliamentary elections which already look like being potentially difficult given Pashinyan’s conflict with the Church and a local oligarch.

The current mood of America means that no one wants to stand up to Trump and point out that this treaty was close to being signed before Trump took office. Aliyev and Pashinyan first engaged on the issue at COP28 in the UAE in December 2023 and both approved the text when they met in Abu Dhabi on July 10^th this year. It was expected that the Joint Declaration would be signed in Abu Dhabi, but Trump persuaded them otherwise.

The two countries which can tick off a major win from the August 8^th declaration are Türkiye and Azerbaijan. President Erdogan has long campaigned for the opening of the direct link between Türkiye and the Caspian Coast (via Azerbaijan’s NAR and Armenia) to facilitate:

• A new cargo route from China-Central Asia to the Mediterranean.
• A second route for the proposed Green Energy Corridor between Central Asia and (Southern Europe).
• A possible route for Turkmenistan gas to the gas hub which Erdogan wants to build.
• The symbolic linking of Türkiye with the countries of the Organization of Turkic States without having to cross through Christian Armenia or Georgia (the Corridor would be deemed as “neutral” transit).

President Aliyev is on a roll as Azerbaijan becomes even more important to the West. He deflected all major criticism of the attacks in Karabakh in September 2022 and in September 2023 because of the country’s importance as a gas supplier and transit route to the EU. The row directly with France was relatively quickly smoothed over. Now, if the Corridor/TRIPP is built, the importance of Azerbaijan to the West will be even greater.

As part of the Declaration deal, the U.S. dropped the “907^th amendment” sanctions. This was imposed by the U.S. Congress against Azerbaijan in 1991.

Armenia will also gain. Assuming the process of changing the constitution goes ahead successfully, Armenia will be in a stronger position:

• It will be able to build a trade relationship with Türkiye – currently not allowed. It will have access to Türkiye’s Mediterranean ports and airspace transit will be unrestricted.
• Trade with Azerbaijan will start – providing direct access to the Caspian Sea ports and another route to Russia.
• It will be less exclusively tied to Russia for trade and investment.
• EU accession will be less critical as regional trade and investment grows.

Turkmenistan has an opportunity. Assuming the Corridor goes ahead. President Erdogan is expected to significantly step up efforts to improve relations with Turkmenistan. It has long been his ambition to persuade Ashgabat to join the Organization of Turkic States, and it came very close at the annual meeting in Samarkand in late 2023 before Turkmenistan pulled back. However, Ashgabat is very keen to boost the role (and traffic volume) of Turkmenbashi Port and to find major new customers for its gas. It has the world’s 4^th or 5^th largest gas reserves but is almost completely dependent on China for gas exports. With the opening of the Corridor/TRIPP and considering the continued shrinkage of the sea levels in the northern part of the Caspian, Turkmenbashi is a more viable option for the eastern terminal.

Turkmenistan has permission to build a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (part of the 2018 Caspian Sea agreement). Azerbaijan does not want it as it has enough gas coming on stream to fill the available pipeline capacity to Europe. But the Corridor/TRIPP may offer an opportunity to build the trans-Caspian line in the southern Caspian and then a direct line to Türkiye to fill the gas hub which President Erdogan has long promoted to help improve Türkiye’s strategic importance for Europe.

Moscow is wary – but distracted. The Russian foreign ministry’s first reaction to the Declaration was to welcome it but with a caveat. It said the agreement is “as an important step towards lasting regional peace” but warned against foreign intervention near its borders that could “undermine the region’s security and lasting stability” It also reminded about the U.S. involvement in the Middle East which has “always ended badly”. It is also to be remembered that Russia has border guards on the Armenia – Azerbaijan border as part of the CSTO Agreement (note: Karabakh was never part of the CSTO defense agreement as the territory was not internationally recognized as being part of Armenia).

Iran will be a key player. Iran shares the border with Armenia across the Zangezur Corridor. It imports electricity from Armenia and exports gas across the shared border. It has previously warned about any attempt to disrupt this trade or to militarize the border. In response to the Joint Declaration, Iran has issued what can best be described as a mixed message. The Foreign Ministry in Tehran welcomed the declaration, saying that its key concerns on Armenian sovereignty and Iranian access to Armenia have been met. But later, Ali Akbar Velayeti, described as a key advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, stated “This corridor will not become a passage owned by trump. But rather a graveyard for Trump’s mercenaries.”

For now, both sides have only agreed a non-binding Joint declaration. There is a lot some work to be done on both the implementation of a peace deal (such as border delimitation and diplomatic recognition), and on the terms of TRIPP itself. Armenia has been adamant that it is not giving up territory or control of its own territory. This means that there will be a lot of careful wording over the agreements surrounding TRIPP and their enforcement.