Information released by the Armenian prime minister’s office on August 29 reveals more about the memorandums of understanding (MoUs) signed between Armenia and the US at the White House summit on August 8. 

The US is already expected to have an enhanced role in the South Caucasus, assuming the peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled at the summit is finalised.  There are hopes the agreement will end decades of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and establish a strategic transit corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia. 

Dubbed the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), the corridor could become a key artery of the Middle Corridor linking China and Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Turkey. US involvement in this route would radically alter the balance of power in the region; conversely the influence of regional powers Russia and Iran is expected to decline. 

On top of that Armenia signed the three bilateral MoUs aimed at deepening cooperation with the US in semiconductors and biotechnology, the energy sector including nuclear energy, and the Crossroads of Peace infrastructure and border security project. 

Even before the agreement was signed, Armenia was looking Westwards — but in the weeks since the summit, Yerevan has also indicated it wants to maintain longstanding regional ties with Iran and Russia.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Armenia in mid-August to negotiate trade agreements targeting $1bn in initial bilateral trade, with ambitions of reaching $3bn eventually. 

At the same time, Armenia is maintaining ties with Russia, even though relations soured dramatically when the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) declined to come to Armenia’s aid during fighting with Azerbaijan in 2022.

Despite the recent strain in relations, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has scheduled meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Beijing and plans a subsequent visit to Moscow. 

This follows the visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk in August, during which discussions then focused on trade, energy and transport projects under the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Officials in Moscow have warned that Armenia’s pivot toward the EU could drastically reduce trade turnover with Russia. 

Yerevan is also pursuing full membership in the SCO, a move described by Armenian diplomats as part of a broader approach to multilateral engagement. Armenian Ambassador to China Vahe Gevorgyan said in an interview with CGTN that Yerevan wants to “diversify our relations with key countries of the world, but also with multilateral organisations”. 

These talks come in parallel with Armenia’s overtures to Western countries and institutions, including the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the US. 

Specifically, the Armenian government is pursuing closer relations with the EU, and has started accession to the bloc as a long-term goal. In June, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas met in Yerevan to discuss a nascent partnership agenda covering trade, security and economic development. 

EU accession is, however, a distant dream. While Armenia’s parliament passed a law in 2025 signalling the start of an EU accession process, Yerevan has acknowledged that formal membership discussions remain at an exploratory stage.

Further evidence of Armenia’s strategy to diversify alliances comes from talks with the United Kingdom. On August 26, Pashinyan welcomed British official Stephen Doughty to Yerevan, discussing the elevation of bilateral ties to a strategic partnership. Both sides spoke of shared democratic values and the potential for British investment in Armenian projects.

The White House peace summit has given hope that the bloody and long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will finally be resolved. As officials have pointed out, this will also have a strong economic dimension with solid benefits for a region that has long failed to fulfil its economic potential due to its political divisions — a situation that has been particularly damaging for Armenia. 

The TRIPP corridor, if successfully implemented, could transform Armenia’s role in regional trade flows, offering new revenue streams and investment prospects that have long eluded the landlocked nation. Yet, there are clear obstacles on the way to achieving this, not least the fierce opposition from within the country to a rapprochement with historic foe Azerbaijan. 

In the meantime, Yerevan is nurturing a range of economic and diplomatic ties. Armenia’s approach appears pragmatic: by maintaining engagement with Russia and Iran, and reaching out to China, while simultaneously deepening ties with the EU, US and UK, Yerevan seeks to maximise economic opportunity without destabilising existing relationships.