When Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian broached the idea of relocating Iran's capital southward to the Persian Gulf coast in 2024, he was ridiculed. This year, on October 1, during a visit to Hormozgan province, Iran's president returned to the theme with renewed urgency. The proposal, he insisted, is no longer a matter of choice but of survival. Tehran is running out of water — fast.
A plan to move the economic and political capital of more than 9mn people in the main metropolitan area has been on the card for decades, but thanks in part to poor planning, overuse of resources and climate change, the plan to shift the bulk of the population away from the foot of the Alborz mountain range is gaining momentum backed by the presidency.
Discussing the matter with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office (which is also in Tehran), he apparently stressed the urgency of the move in the next few years before the Iranian capital hits what South Africa already discovered, “day zero”, the day when the last drop of water comes out of the tap.
Last year, the capital received just 140mm of rainfall, barely half the 260mm threshold considered sustainable. Groundwater depletion has caused land subsidence of up to 30cm annually in some districts. Importing water from the south would cost €4 per cubic metre — about IRR5mn, or roughly $10 at current exchange rates.
"If we cannot establish this balance," Pezeshkian warned, "our development is doomed to failure."
His diagnosis goes beyond hydrology. Tehran, Karaj and Qazvin suffer from what the president calls "development without regard to the balance between resources and consumption" — decades of unplanned growth that have created a megacity of 16mn-18mn people in an increasingly arid region. Before the 1979 revolution, planners reportedly recommended shifting 60% of the population towards the Persian Gulf. Instead, development concentrated around Tehran. The result is a cautionary tale in urban planning gone awry.
Pezeshkian's solution involves not merely relocating government offices but fundamentally reorienting Iran's economic geography. He has sought permission from Khamenei to engage foreign consultants in designing comprehensive development plans for the south — hundred-year blueprints, he suggests, or even two-hundred-year ones. No concrete action has yet materialised.
The economic logic is compelling and needed. Iran produces 8mn barrels of oil and gas daily. A 10% reduction in consumption would save 800,000 barrels per day (bpd), worth $16bn-18bn annually. "We haggle over $1bn today," the president remarked to Hormozgan's business community, highlighting the magnitude of potential savings through efficiency alone.
Yet fiscal indiscipline undermines such rational planning. President Pezeshkian acknowledged that the government and parliament bear joint responsibility for inflation. "One of the main causes of inflation is precisely this development without financial backing," he explained. "We define development when we have no money, then we print money to cover costs—and that means inflation." The result: diminished purchasing power and deeper poverty.
During the Hormozgan visit, the government approved 287bn tomans ($5.7m) in provincial credits, with 44 projects signed across energy, education, health and water sectors. Foreign investment of €178m and domestic investment exceeding 80bn tomans were also finalised. Many expatriate Hormozganis, the president noted, stand ready to invest in their home province — if only the government provides the right conditions.
In September last year, the president said: "We have no choice but to move the country's political and economic centre closer to the southern waters." He said that continuing the current trend of development in Tehran is unsustainable, particularly given the water scarcity.
Whether this marks a genuine turning point or mere rhetoric remains uncertain. Iran has announced grand development schemes before, only to see them fueled by sanctions, mismanagement and competing priorities.