The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, held from August 31 to September 1, 2025, reflected India’s careful balancing strategy. On the one hand, New Delhi maintained dialogue with China and Russia, while on the other it reiterated its long-term dependence on the US for its Indo-Pacific strategy. Hosted by China, the summit was the largest in SCO’s history, with leaders from over 20 countries and several international organisations in attendance.

Chinese President Xi Jinping used the platform to announce proposals including an SCO development bank, an energy cooperation mechanism, and a multi-billion dollar loan programme over three years. He also offered member states access to China’s BeiDou satellite system. For India, participation was both a bridge and a shield. It allowed New Delhi to remain engaged with Eurasian institutions while avoiding full alignment with Beijing or Moscow.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held bilateral meetings with Xi and Putin. With Xi, he underlined the importance of India-China relations for advancing an Asian century and a multipolar world order, while also stressing the need for peace along the border through existing mechanisms.

With Putin, Modi reaffirmed the so-called “all weather” nature of India-Russia ties. Their joint limousine ride and discussions showcased enduring warmth, even as India pressed for progress toward peace in Ukraine. Still, the summit highlighted the SCO’s limits. Observers including US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent noted that it was heavy on symbolism but light on substance. India, for its part, avoided endorsing sweeping anti-Western rhetoric and instead stuck to its principle of strategic autonomy.

Behind the scenes, India’s short-term engagement with SCO partners reflected practical needs. Russia continues to provide discounted energy and spare parts for older military systems. China remains a vital trade partner despite unresolved border tensions. These ties are compartmentalised, energy relations are transactional and territorial disputes remain unsettled, even as SCO membership preserves a channel of communication.

India’s longer-term orientation, however, remains firmly westward. Despite recent frictions under Trump’s tariffs on Indian goods and criticism of Russian oil purchases, the US continues to be India’s key partner in the Indo-Pacific. The relationship is reinforced by US willingness to share advanced technologies, expand defence cooperation, and invest in India’s economic transformation.

A bipartisan consensus in Washington sees India as critical to balancing China. Even so, Washington is uneasy about New Delhi’s insistence on treating Moscow as a privileged partner.

India views Russia as a long-standing supplier of defence equipment and energy, but the US considers this closeness at odds with its sanctions regime and wider strategy. The contradiction is sharper given that the US continues to arm and fund Pakistan, whose security establishment is openly hostile towards India. This double standard fuels scepticism in New Delhi, even as ties with Washington deepen in other areas.

Trump’s constitutional two-term limit means his influence over US foreign policy and by extension India-US relations is approaching its end. This relieves Indian policymakers of the uncertainty that one individual’s style can generate. Although his protectionist measures caused alarm initially, the underlying alignment between India and the US has endured, rooted in Indo-Pacific structural realities rather than personalities.

India’s presence at the Tianjin summit was therefore tactical, not a strategic shift.

Cooperation with the US in defence and technology, maritime coordination through the Quad, and efforts to diversify away from Chinese supply chains remain central to India’s strategy. The SCO forum adds flexibility but does not alter direction.

The challenge for New Delhi is one of perception management, convincing Washington that its SCO participation is transactional, not strategic, while also keeping communication channels open with Beijing and Moscow where necessary. This principle, autonomy within alignment, has been the hallmark of Indian diplomacy for decades.

At the summit, Modi balanced calls for counter-terrorism and peacebuilding with restraint, avoiding the anti-US rhetoric promoted by China and Russia. Displays of bilateral warmth coexisted with caution and compartmentalisation. Ultimately, the Tianjin summit illustrated India’s layered diplomacy.

Engagement with the SCO addresses short-term needs and prevents strategic isolation, while partnership with the US secures long-term momentum in the Indo-Pacific. This dual-track approach represents not a shift in direction but a nuanced balance anchored in the West, yet flexible amid Eurasian turbulence. Trump’s personal influence may fade with his term limit, but America’s need for India will remain. That structural reliance ensures India’s long-term trajectory continues westward, even as its tactical engagements adapt to regional realities.